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Introduction 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
How do managers fund their firms? How should managers fund their firms? 
What are the determinants of these decisions? The irrelevance theorem of Franco 
Modigliani and Merton Miller (1958) started an intense discussion on how firms 
choose their capital structure and what the optimal balance between debt and 
equity is. In fact, the debate can be regarded as the starting point of modern 
financial theory, and motivated numerous seminal studies on the topic. But even 
more than 50 years after this first paper, these basic questions regarding corporate 
finance have still not been answered (Neus and Walter 2008). Therefore, Stewart 
Myers‘s 1984 insight, "How do firms choose their capital structures? … We don't 
know." is still compelling today (Myers 1984).  
Observed industry-specific leverage ratios in and across financial systems 
imply the relevance of capital market imperfections (Elsas and Florysiak 2008). 
This severely questions the validity of the irrelevance of capital structure 
decisions for firm value. Moreover, survey studies of CFOs suggest that managers 
have some target debt ratio or range, which also refutes the irrelevance of capital 
structure (Brounen et al. 2004; Graham and Harvey 2001). The number of studies 
on capital structure is enormous, but to date no universal theory has been 
formulated for capital structure.
1
 It has even been argued that there might not be 
any reason to expect a universal theory of capital structure (Myers 2003). Instead, 
―different theories apply to firms under different circumstances.‖ (Frank and 
Goyal 2009). For that reason, this dissertation on empirical capital structure 
research aims to discuss and investigate two specific ―firm circumstances‖ that 
influence coporate financing choices and seem promising for future research.  
First, I investigate a determinant of capital structure that has so far received 
little attention in literatue – credit ratings by the external agencies Standard & 
Poor‘s and Moody‘s. Rating agencies play an eminent role in today‘s capital 
markets. It is likely that firms under the scrutiny of such strong external 
―supervisors‖ may follow a different leverage policy to non-rated firms. However, 
rating agencies‘ renowned importance is so far not reflected in the capital 
                                                 
1
 Harris and Raviv (1991) provide an overview of capital structure research through 1990. 
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structure research. Therefore, I thoroughly investigate the financing choices of 
externally rated firms for managers‘ rating considerations. The number of research 
pieces on the topic is still limited and the methodology of single studies is 
debatable. The first paper that initiated the discussion on credit ratings‘ influence 
on capital structure decisions is Kisgen (2006). The fundamental hypothesis of the 
study is that ―concern for the impact of credit rating changes directly affects 
capital structure decision making, with firms near a ratings change issuing less net 
debt relative to net equity than firms not near a ratings change‖ (Kisgen 2006). As 
an operationalization, he regards plus or minus ratings (e.g. A+ or A-) as near an 
upgrade or downgrade, while the credit ratings in the middle of a broad rating 
category (e.g., A) are treated as not near a rating change. As a second proxy, his 
study calculates a firm-specific credit score based on ratios commonly used by 
rating agencies. This credit score is applied to rank firms of one rating category 
into thirds. The highest and lowest third are treated as near an upgrade or 
downgrade. However, both proxies are rather uninformative regarding the 
likelihood of a rating change (Elsas and Florysiak 2008). The rating agencies 
apply plus or minus notching on the corporate rating scale to signal the relative 
standing of the credit within the major rating categories (Standard&Poor‘s 2009). 
This is associated with discrete default and recovery rates for plus or minus credit 
ratings. In other words, the plus or minus credit ratings are not meant to deliver 
information on the future development of the credit rating. Furthermore, managers 
are not aware of the firm‘s credit score and therefore cannot take it into account if 
they decide on capital structure. In fact, Kisgen (2006) reports that the percentage 
of firms experiencing rating changes hardly differs if the above-mentioned two 
proxies are applied as distinguishing features. Consequently, this dissertation 
develops the methodology of Kisgen (2006) further, but sticks to the above-
mentioned fundamental hypothesis. Accordingly, I apply the rating outlook and 
the watchlisting as appropriate new proxies for the likelihood of a rating change. 
This credit outlook ―assesses the potential direction of a long-term credit rating 
over the intermediate term (typically six months to two years)‖ (Standard&Poor‘s 
2009). The focus of my study is both on providing a more informative measure 
for nearness to a rating change and extending the sample by international firms. 
Generally speaking, this work provides valuable novel findings on the capital 
structure decisions of an internationally capital-markets-oriented firm sample. 
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Raising equity is an obvious way to bolster credit ratios and please rating 
agencies in case of negative rating momentum. Managers can increase the firm‘s 
equity share via internal sources (i.e. retained earnings and depreciation) or 
external sales of securities. While retained earnings are crosssectionally the 
dominant source of funding, ―the economics of security offerings has generated 
considerable empirical research interest over the past two decades‖ (Eckbo and 
Masulis 2005). Survey evidence and stock price dynamics around seasoned equity 
offerings (stock price run-ups prior to the offering and low abnormal returns after 
the offering) indicate that managers exploit temporary overvaluations of the firm‘s 
stock and therefore time the equity offering. These efforts are possible because of 
the information asymmetry between managers and investors and the associated 
incentives for managers to exploit this infomational advantage. In fact, Chang et 
al. (2006) find that firms marked by a high degree of information asymmetry are 
especially prone to timing the market. Externally rated firms, on the other hand, 
reduce adverse selection problems with the information gathering process of the 
rating agencies (Frank and Goyal 2009; Frost 2007). Therefore, it is questionable 
if the market timing hypothesis still holds for externally rated firms‘ seasoned 
equity offerings. Accordingly, I contrast the market timing explanation of 
seasoned equity offerings with an alternative credit rating-capital structure 
hypothesis. Also the characteristics, i.e. the number of shares issued and the offer 
price of the seasoned equity offerings are examined with respect to the pre-offer 
credit rating status. In addition, I expand the analyzed financing decisions to 
debt/equity reductions and repurchases. This allows a clearer distinction to be 
drawn regarding how managers alter the debt ratio if the firm‘s credit rating is 
about to change.  
As a second ―firm circumstance‖ that may alter the composition of the 
balance sheet, I examine managers‘ weighting of public versus private equity in 
the decision to opt out of the public markets and go private. Such a public-to-
private transaction (PTP) is an important step in the corporate life cycle, and 
modifies the capital structure of the firm significantly. However, consensus has 
not been reached in the literature on the underlying motives, and accordingly the 
relevant financial theories. Therefore, I investigate the characteristics of German 
firms that opted out of the public equity markets with the help of a hand-collected 
sample of 52 German PTP transactions between 1995 and 2004. There is a wide 
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strand of literature on the associated motivation and respective costs and benefits 
of PTPs for the US equity market. The transferability of these findings to non-
Anglo-Saxon countries is difficult, as the structure of the financial and legal 
system is known to have a strong influence on corporate decisions.
2
 However, 
evidence in this respect regarding Continental European capital markets is very 
limited. Studying the public-to-private decision in Germany is of particular 
interest, because Germany can still be regarded as a prime example of an insider-
controlled and relationship-based financial system. This is important, as the PTP 
transactions can be regarded as a corporate governance transaction. It is the 
transition from the external capital markets‘ arm‘s-length financing and control to 
a small number of shareholders‘ more relationship-focused financing. Prior 
evidence of German PTP characteristics and motives is sparse, primarily due to 
the limited number of transactions before 1995 and the lack of a central PTP 
transaction database.
3
 Moreover, most of the studies are of a descriptive nature or 
focus on single motives or aspects of PTPs. This study mainly contributes to the 
existing literature by increasing the number of observations, the consideration of 
the introduction of the squeeze-out regulation, and the test for low stock market 
liquidity as a potential motive in PTPs. The up-to-dateness of the studied topic is 
underlined by the observation that going private papers are still being published in 
highly ranked finance journals (e.g., Bharath and Dittmar 2010; Wright et al. 
2006) 
1.2 Research Structure 
The above-mentioned two areas of corporate finance research are covered in 
three self-contained chapters. While the second chapter develops the basic sample 
for the overall analysis of the first part, the dataset is considerably enlarged in 
terms of types of variables in chapter 3. Chapter 4, on the other hand, uses an 
independent and specific dataset. 
In chapters 2 and 3 I examine the role of credit ratings in managers‘ capital 
structure decisions. The credit rating-capital structure hypothesis is a reasonable 
extension of both trade-off and pecking-order theory and was first postulated by 
                                                 
2
 The transferability of these insights is, in addition, restricted by the observation periods of these 
studies, which is mainly in the 1980s.  
3
 Other German studies on the topic include Zillmer (2002; 2003) and Eisele et al. (2003). 
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Kisgen (2006).
4
 The static trade-off theory has a corporate target debt structure 
that balances the costs and benefits of debt and equity (Myers 1984). In general, 
the associated benefit of debt is mainly its function as an interest tax shield and 
related costs are dominated by the costs of financial distress. The dynamic trade-
off theory acknowledges that the target capital structure of firms may fluctuate 
over time. Furthermore, firms show an adjustment behavior towards their target 
mix of debt and equity. The trade-off theory helps explain the higher debt ratios of 
companies with safe, tangible assets and considerable taxable income. On the 
other hand, unprofitable firms with more risky, intangible assets have to rely more 
on equity financing if they follow the trade-off theory. However, there is an 
alternative capital structure theory that reflects the empirical finding that 
profitable companies borrow less (Myers 1984). The pecking-order theory also 
considers the agency costs of equity financing and consequently develops an 
ordering of the financing alternatives. Firms prefer internal finance as this avoids 
adverse signals to investors, which could lower firm values (Myers and Majluf 
1984). Furthermore, the pecking-order theory states that managers prefer debt to 
equity financing if internal resources are insufficient to cover investments. 
Consequently, this theory has no specific target debt ratio, and interest tax shields 
or financial distress arguments are only of second-order importance in the capital 
structure decision making.  
Cross-sectionally, the most reliable factors to explain market leverage are 
the following: median industry leverage (+ effect on leverage), market-to-book 
assets ratio (−), tangibility (+), profits (−), the log of assets (+), and expected 
inflation (+) (Frank and Goyal 2009). When book leverage is considered, more or 
less similar factors are identified. However, firm size, the market-to-book ratio, 
and inflation are not reliable drivers of book leverage. So far, an external debt 
rating has largely been seen as a supply-side factor explaining variation in 
leverage (Faulkender and Petersen 2006). If a firm has a restricted access to debt 
markets, and all else is equal, financing may take place through equity markets. 
The proxy for unlimited access to debt markets is an external debt rating by S&P 
and/or Moody‘s. Ceteris paribus, externally rated firms are expected to have 
higher debt ratios due to their unrestricted access to debt markets.  
                                                 
4
 Other studies on the topic include Kisgen (2009), Kisgen and Strahan (2010), and Hovakimian et 
al. (2009).  
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In terms of the pecking order theory, a higher credit rating should help – by 
means of the information-gathering process by the agency – reduce adverse 
selection problems, and allow for a higher share of equity on the balance sheet 
(Frank and Goyal 2009).
5
 Consequently, most studies only distinguish between 
firms with or without external credit rating and between investment and non-
investment grade credits. However, different corporate credit-rating levels are 
associated with different discrete costs and benefits to the firm. In general, both 
trade-off and pecking-order theory build on the assumption that the capital 
structure depends on the (marginal) costs and benefits of debt and equity. If the 
credit-rating effect is material, also the marginal costs and benefits of debt and 
equity may change (Kisgen 2006). Regarding the trade-off theory, this translates 
into a different target debt ratio.
6
 In terms of the pecking-order theory, the relative 
advantage of debt versus equity may shift. Under certain circumstances, the 
credit-rating effect outweighs the traditional implied costs and benefits of debt 
and equity. In other cases, vice versa may occur. 
Credit rating costs and benefits for the firm can be clustered along the 
following lines: First, regulations regarding bond investments may restrict the 
potential investor pool of a specific rated security. The capital requirements of 
Basel II and III increase the regulatory costs of lower rated securities for banks, 
which, in turn, also add to the required yield on the investment. Furthermore, 
certain funds and insurance companies are restricted to solely investing in 
investment-grade credits. This may lessen the liquidity of lower-rated bonds, 
which generally decreases prices (Patel et al. 1998). Firms will therefore try to 
avoid these rating classes. Second, credit ratings are a key source of information 
on financial risk for investors. Accordingly, firms of the same credit quality are 
pooled together and secondary market spreads reflect this financial risk. 
Consequently, an upgrade or downgrade translates into higher or lower costs of 
funding. Third, direct costs imposed on the firm can come through rating grids or 
investor put rights included in the bond indenture if there is a material downgrade 
(Koziol and Lawrenz 2010). All in all, there are numerous channels through 
                                                 
5
 Alternatively, lower information asymmetries could increase the frequency of external capital 
markets financing, which would tend to increase debt ratios (Faulkender and Petersen 2006; Sufi 
2009). 
6
 Essentially, the rating-dependent cost (benefit) is just in another factor associated with debt and 
equity issuance. 
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which credit ratings can impose direct or indirect costs (benefits) on a firm. 
Consequently, managers are concerned about their firm‘s credit ratings because of 
these associated costs (benefits) with different rating levels.  
The following are the main research questions of chapter 2: Is the credit 
rating‘s influence on capital structure decision making still evident if a more 
informative measure of nearness to a rating change is applied? Is the behavior of 
managers symmetrical to potential upgrades and downgrades in the credit rating? 
Does S&P‘s watchlist also affect subsequent security issuance and repurchase 
decisions? Is the credit rating effect stronger for potential changes in broad rating 
categories? Is the borderline between investment and sub-investment grade 
incrementally more important in the capital structure rationale? Do the credit 
ratings affect US and EMEA firms differently? 
Chapter 2 shows that firms indeed follow a more conservative leverage 
policy if their credit rating is about to be raised or lowered, which is measured by 
a positive/negative rating outlook at the beginning of the fiscal year. The 
subsequent net debt relative to the net equity issuance of negative outlook firms is 
2.1 percent lower than that of firms not near a change in rating. On the other hand, 
the prospect of an upgrade, measured by a positive rating outlook, induces a 
statistically and economically smaller reduction in net debt issuance. It appears 
that managers do not react fully symmetrically to potential upgrades or 
downgrades. Apparently, a negative outlook serves as a stronger signal to 
managers to restrict net debt issuance. However, the results also show that firms 
generally near a change in rating (i.e. a positive or negative outlook) issue 1.8 
percent less net debt relative to net equity in the subsequent financial year than 
firms with a stable rating outlook. The credit rating effect is statistically and 
economically even stronger for a US sub-sample (-3.0 percent). As expected, the 
borderline between investment grade and non-investment grade is incrementally 
more important in capital structure decisions. Also credit-rating hurdle levels, 
which are crucial for access to the commercial paper market, have additional 
explanatory power regarding leverage behavior. 
Beside a more informative measure for the likelihood of a rating change, 
chapter 2 contributes to the literature by enlarging the dataset to an international 
sample (i.e. Europe, Middle East, Africa, and the US) instead of US firms only. 
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Also the magnitude of the measured credit-rating effect on capital structure is 
economically larger compared to previous studies. In addition, in contrast to 
Kisgen (2006), the results are robust regarding the inclusion of large debt and 
equity offerings. Generally, chapter 2 helps validate the results of Kisgen (2006), 
which is a valuable contribution to the ongoing empirical capital structure 
discussion. 
Chapter 3 builds on the results of chapter 2 and further investigates the role 
of credit ratings in a firm‘s debt-equity choice. In particular, the chapter focuses 
on seasoned equity offerings and their prevailing explanation by means of the 
market timing capital structure hypothesis (e.g., Baker and Wurgler 2002; Marsh 
1982). Managers are believed to use favorable equity market conditions or a 
mispricing of the company‘s stock to issue equity.  
In chapter 3 I try to answer the following main research questions: Are 
manager‘s rating concerns a driver of externally rated companies‘ seasoned equity 
offerings? What is the relative importance of manager‘s rating considerations 
versus market timing efforts? What are the effects of losing an investment grade 
rating or access to the commercial paper market on the likelihood of a subsequent 
equity offering? How do potential changes in the credit rating affect the 
composition of seasoned equity offerings? Is the credit rating effect stronger if the 
decision to issue equity is contrasted with the option of further debt issuance? 
Does the incorporation of equity and debt repurchases/reductions change the 
results?  
For this more thorough analysis, the sample from chapter 2 was 
considerably enlarged in terms of considered variables and also complemented 
with stock return data. 
I find that seasoned equity offerings are indeed more often associated with 
prior negative credit-rating outlooks than with a positive outlook. Also in a 
multivariate context, a negative (positive) outlook increases (decreases) the 
probability of a subsequent equity offering. Furthermore, the evidence in this 
study indicates that both market timing opportunities and credit rating concerns 
are significant drivers of seasoned equity offerings. In most cases, the credit-
rating effect is economically even larger. In terms of the debt-equity choice, 
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results show that the likelihood of equity issuance (rather than debt) increases 
(decreases) by 3.3 (6.1) percent if the issuer credit rating has a negative (positive) 
outlook prior to the offering. This clearly shows that the credit-rating effect is 
economically material. Both market-timing and credit-rating concerns are present 
if the equity issue characteristics are investigated. A negative rating outlook 
increases the total offering proceeds and the number of shares sold. Managers‘ 
market timing efforts – measured by the market-to-book ratio – are present in 
higher offering proceeds, a lower number of shares sold, and a considerably 
higher offer price. As expected, a prior negative rating outlook increases the 
probability of a debt reduction, while it reduces the likelihood of a debt issue. In 
this multinomial analysis, a prior positive rating outlook decreases the probability 
of a subsequent equity offering. Most of the reported findings are robust if 
alternative mispricing proxies are applied. 
In summary, chapter 3 strongly supports the credit rating-capital structure 
hypothesis and delivers valuable further insights into the specific relevance of 
credit ratings for managers‘ capital structure decisions. It contributes to existing 
literature by examining a key item in corporate financial research, namely 
seasoned equity offerings. The results indicate that in equity offerings of 
externally rated firms, market timing is not the key driver, but rather the 
prevailing rating situation before the issuance. Consequently, based on my study, 
further research on the topic will have to reconsider some of the prevailing views 
on seasoned equity offerings and their motives.  
All in all, the two studies together imply that any complete model of capital 
structure must include ―credit ratings along with standard tax, information, 
agency, and financial distress factors‖ (Kisgen 2009). 
The second part, chapter 4, comprises the second main topic of the research 
covered in this thesis, which is the public to private transaction in Germany. This 
strand of research is also closely connected to capital structure research, as the 
trade-off theory ―also helps to explain what kinds of companies go private in 
leveraged buyouts‖ (Brealey and Myers 2003). Typical target companies in 
leveraged buyouts feature ―mature, cash-cow businesses with established markets 
for their products but little in the way of high-net present value (NPV) growth 
opportunities.‖ According to the trade-off theory, companies of this kind can and 
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should bear high debt ratios. This is in line with Jensen‘s (1986) free cash flow 
hypothesis, which posits a severe discrepancy in managers and shareholders‘ 
interests. Managers are rather willing to maintain the financial slack in the firm 
and use is it for value-reducing investments (e.g., negative NPV projects). 
Accordingly, financial slack increases agency problems and firm costs. Jensen 
(1986) calls this excess cash the ―free cash flow.‖ It is in the interest of investors 
that managers pay out the free cash flow rather than invest it in below average 
investment opportunities.  
The firm‘s capital structure can serve as a strong measure to discipline 
managers. Additional debt on the balance sheet, through the interest and principal 
payments, helps reduce managers‘ discretionary cash flow, which may be used for 
value reducing activities. The problem with alternative but voluntary measures to 
pay out cash to shareholders, like dividends or share repurchases, is that 
shareholders cannot force payment. The free cash flow hypothesis is also 
connected to the third chapter of this thesis, as it predicts that the announcement 
returns of seasoned equity offerings are negative, since investors expect the raised 
funds to be used for poor investments (McLaughlin et al. 1996). In addition, the 
theory expects a negative relation between post-offering-operating performance 
and the amount of excess cash available for managers.  
Although empirical evidence of the free cash-flow phenomenon is mixed, 
the 1980s in the US and the period 2000–2007 saw an unprecedented number of 
public companies acquired by private equity firms in acquisitions structured along 
these lines. Beside high percentages of debt financing, the deals featured 
incentives for managers, i.e. significant equity stakes in the firm and private 
ownership. The latter allows for close monitoring by the owning partnership and 
strong pressure to achieve improvements in operational efficiency.  
The main research questions of chapter 4 are the following: What are the 
typical characteristics of German firms that opted out of the public equity 
markets? What are the main determinants of the likelihood of a public-to-private 
transaction? Which underlying motives are associated with these factors? Do 
these motives change over time and do they depend on the initiator of the 
transaction? Is the free cash flow theory a suitable explanation of German PTPs? 
Or are the transactions and their respective characteristics better explained by the 
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more basic trade-off theory? What are the key differences between German 
markets and the US equity markets? 
Previous studies have shown that the characteristics and underlying 
motivations of PTPs are diverse and complex. Therefore, by drawing on earlier 
works on the going private phenomenon, chapter 4 condenses the different 
motives into six testable hypotheses. In the following, I describe the main insights 
of chapter 4 regarding these hypotheses. First, with regard to the free cash flow 
hypothesis, the evidence suggests that German PTP firms are not marked by a 
high degree of financial slack aimed at being paid out to new shareholders. This is 
consistent with previous research on the German market. Also Bharath and 
Dittmar (2010) support the idea that the free cash-flow rationale only applies to 
US firms taken private in the 1980s. The evidence supports a leverage potential 
hypothesis, which regards PTPs as under-levered before the transaction and sees 
additional firm value in a higher debt ratio. Cross-sectionally, German PTP firms 
have lower debt ratios than a control group. Regarding the ownership 
concentration hypothesis, I cannot find a lower number of free floating PTP 
shares. On the other hand, the evidence supports hypotheses positing the 
decreasing benefits of a stock market quotation and limited capital market 
efficiency. The former hypothesis is supported by the slow PTP growth rates and 
their mature industry background, which helps limit investment and financing 
needs. For these firm characteristics, the benefits of being a public firm no longer 
outweigh the costs. The latter hypothesis is supported by the low trading volumes 
of PTPs before taking private. It is obvious that this also has adverse implications 
for the firm‘s stock market valuation and therefore relative advantage of a 
quotation.
7
 The dividend payment hypothesis, which states that PTPs have 
relatively higher payout ratios, is not supported by the evidence provided in 
chapter 4. Consequently, German PTPs are not aimed at collecting dividend 
payments privately.
8
  
In summary, the going private companies originated from mature industries 
and, in the three financial years preceding the PTP transaction, their sales figures 
                                                 
7
 This is consistent with Bharath and Dittmar (2010) regarding the US equity market.  
8
 Alternatively, PTPs could aim to increase the payout ratio in the aftermath of the taking private 
transaction. However, the dividend payments of private corporations are not publicly accessible. 
On the other hand, this alternative view has already been tested by the free cash flow hypothesis 
and the evidence is not supportive. 
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showed slow growth. Furthermore, the capital structure had a potential for further 
leveraging and the companies were marked by low profitability. Trading in the 
PTPs‘ shares was very sluggish, which limited the efficiency of capital markets. 
On the whole, while chapters 2 and 3 investigate capital structure decisions 
by managers of capital-markets-oriented firms, chapter 4 analyzes managers‘ 
actual choice between public and private equity financing. Both streams 
contribute interesting new insights into manager behavior to corporate finance 
research. 
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2 Credit Ratings and Capital Structure 
Revisited 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a more precise test of whether and how 
credit rating concerns affect managers‘ subsequent capital structure decisions. The 
studies by Kisgen (2006; 2009) formally prove the relevance of credit ratings in 
determining capital structure. While the first study‘s empirical tests show that 
firms close to a downgrade or upgrade in credit rating follow a more conservative 
capital structure policy than firms not close to a change in rating, the second paper 
focuses on leverage behavior following rating changes. Our study refines 
Kisgen‘s (2006) approach by applying S&P‘s rating outlook as an appealing 
additional proxy for the proximity of a rating‘s change. As far as we know, we are 
the first to incorporate the credit rating outlook in empirical capital structure 
research. Our results confirm the importance of credit ratings in determining 
capital structure. Companies issue approximately 2 percent less net debt relative 
to negative equity in the following financial year, if their long-term credit rating is 
about to be raised or lowered. The effect is both statistically stronger and slightly 
economically larger if the rating outlook is ―negative.‖ The amount of leverage 
reduction is comparable if micro (e.g., A and A-) or broad rating (e.g., AA, A) 
categories are at risk. 
The financial crisis has provided further evidence of the relevance of credit 
ratings for managers‘ capital structure decisions. The main reason for Rexam - 
Europe's biggest maker of cans for beer and soft drinks – conducting a GBP 350 
million capital increase and scrapping its interim dividend in July 2009, was to 
bolster its credit rating, which S&P had reduced to BBB- in Q1 2009. In a press 
release, the company stated: "The loss of an investment-grade credit rating would 
be detrimental to the group, both in terms of the cost and the availability of future 
credit….'' (Rexam 2009). Standard & Poor's said the moves would "more than 
offset the negative impact of the currently difficult trading environment'' (White 
2009). After the capital increase, Moody's also improved its view of the 
company's debt from "negative'' to "stable." In July 2009, Reed Elsevier, the 
Anglo-Dutch publisher, also raised GBP 824 million in an equity offering, 
justifying its move as protecting its BBB+ credit rating (Costello and Sabbagh 
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2009). The majority of European corporate organizations that have recently issued 
equity had prior negative ratings events (i.e. a rating downgrade, a negative watch 
event, or a downgraded outlook). From October 2008 to August 2009, 58 rated 
issuers tapped the European equity markets, of which 46, i.e. 79 percent, had had 
a prior negative credit rating event (Stillit and Khabrieva 2009). Apparently, 
recent equity issuance is partly driven by negative rating actions. Consequently, 
the study by Stillit and Khabrieva (2009) utilizes credit rating indications as a 
method to identify ―would-be‖ equity issuers. Graham and Harvey‘s survey 
(2001) of CFOs shows that credit ratings are the second most important 
consideration in their capital structure decision-making process.
9
 This figure has 
very likely increased sharply over the course of the financial crisis, as the role of 
debt capital and convertible bond markets has increased due to the weak bank 
debt market. 
This study tries to empirically provide answers to the following main 
research questions: Is the credit rating‘s influence on capital structure decision 
making still evident if a more accurate measure of rating change proximity is 
applied? Do managers response symmetrically to potential upgrades and 
downgrades in the long-term issuer credit rating? Does S&P‘s watchlist also have 
a measurable impact on subsequent net debt issuance? Do potential changes in 
broad rating categories lead to more pronounced effects in managers‘ leverage 
behavior? Is the borderline between investment and sub-investment grade 
incrementally important in the capital structure rationale? Do the credit ratings 
affect US and EMEA firms differently? 
Credit ratings formally matter because they serve as a signal of firm quality 
for investors and therefore impact the company‘s cost of capital.10 Rating agencies 
partly possess information, for example, on business plans, capital expenditures, 
or future dividend policy, which is unavailable to investors. Since most companies 
lack a liquid CDS market, rating events are a key source of information for capital 
markets (Stillit and Khabrieva 2009). By means of rating-triggered events, such as 
                                                 
9
 Recently, ThyssenKrupp, Germany‘s largest steel producer, which made notable asset disposals 
to maintain its investment-grade status, has also supported the view that managers care greatly 
about their companies‘ credit ratings, specifically in times of negative rating momentum (Hippe 
2009). 
10
 The study by Kisgen and Strahan (2010) empirically shows the economic relevance of ratings-
based regulations on bond investments for a firm‘s cost of debt. 
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in step-up bonds, loss of access to the commercial paper market, and strategic 
advantages in bidding for contracts, ratings changes can indirectly induce discrete 
costs (benefits) for the firm (Koziol and Lawrenz 2010). Moreover, the regulation 
of banks, insurance companies and broker-dealers‘ bond investments drive the 
liquidity of a firm‘s bond market. In the new Basel II (BIS II) Accord, the capital 
requirements for banks are partly determined by external credit ratings (Boot et al. 
2006). This approach also affects a company‘s potential investor pool and, thus, 
the cost of capital. On the whole, a firm‘s discrete costs (benefits) are associated 
with different rating classes (Kisgen 2006; Kisgen 2009).
11
 
This chapter complements the study by Kisgen (2006) with a cleaner test of 
the so-called ―credit rating-capital structure‖ (CR-CS) hypothesis. In order to 
analyze the response in leverage behavior, Kisgen (2006) regards plus or minus 
ratings as close to a rating change. As a second measure, the study applies a firm-
specific ―credit score‖ and accordingly classifies companies per rating category, 
which is also meant as a proxy for a rating change‘s imminence. The credit score 
approach is a rather noisy signal of an imminent upgrade or downgrade.
12
 
However, since managers are not aware of their companies‘ respective credit 
score and can therefore not incorporate it into their capital structure decision 
making. Since the ―+‖ or ―-‖ assigned to a credit rating is merely a ―sign to show 
relative standing within the major rating categories‖ (Standard&Poor‘s 2009), 
rating agencies do not wish to convey information on the credit rating‘s likely 
future development. On the other hand, investors regard credit ratings assigned a 
―+‖ or ―-‖ as separate rating categories with discrete default rates.  
Consequently, our study develops this approach further and relies on the 
rating outlook as the measure of an imminent rating change. Rating agencies use 
the rating outlook to assess ―the potential direction of a long-term credit rating 
over the intermediate term (typically six months to two years)‖ (Standard&Poor‘s 
2009). Similar to the actual credit rating, the firm‘s economic and/or fundamental 
business conditions are also key determinants of the rating outlook. The study by 
Altman and Rijken (2007) shows that in addition to the actual credit rating, the 
                                                 
11
 For a complete overview of the practical significance of credit ratings for capital structure 
compare Kisgen (2006). 
12
 Kisgen (2006) rightly points out that his approach has a potential errors-in-variables problem 
since the credit score is only measured by error.  
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rating outlook reveals supplementary and, specifically, timely credit risk 
information to financial markets. Moreover, Hamilton and Cantor (2004) 
demonstrate that the rating outlook is highly predictive of short to mid-term rating 
changes. Therefore, using the rating outlook allows us to measure the imminence 
of an upgrade or downgrade in credit rating more precisely.  
While controlling for firm-specific factors and financial distress arguments, 
we find economically significant credit rating concerns in managers‘ capital 
structure decisions for a broad sample of S&P rated companies in Europe, the 
Middle East, Africa (EMEA) as well as the US. Companies which face an 
upgrade or downgrade of their issuer credit rating, issue 1.8 percent less net debt 
relative to net equity (as a percentage of total assets) in the subsequent financial 
year. A negative credit rating outlook is associated with an even more 
conservative leverage policy (-2.1 percent).  
Comparing our findings with those of Kisgen (2006) shows that our 
measured credit rating effect is both economically stronger and our model is 
robust even with the inclusion of large debt and equity offerings. Therefore, our 
study helps to put the credit rating-capital structure hypothesis on a firmer 
footing. Moreover, our results indicate that US firms and EMEA firms manage 
their issuer credit rating differently. We can only find evidence of a statistically 
significant leverage reduction following EMEA firms‘ positive/ negative credit 
rating outlook if large debt and equity offerings are excluded from the analysis. In 
addition, the credit rating effect is economically stronger for US firms (-3.0 
percent). Regarding the potential loss of a broad rating category, our results 
indicate that while the subsequent leverage reduction is statistically significant as 
well, its effect is comparable to the coefficient for changes in micro credit ratings. 
We cannot find systematic leverage reduction following a placement of the 
companies‘ issuer credit rating on S&P‘s CreditWatch. Finally, concerns about 
losing or obtaining an investment-grade rating have, as expected, incremental 
explanatory power regarding subsequent net debt relative to net equity issuance.  
Our study thus contributes to the still limited but growing literature on credit 
ratings and capital structure, and is the first study to incorporate the credit rating 
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outlook in the discussion.
13
 Other corporate finance studies on credit ratings have 
examined their effects on IPO pricing or analyzed the relationship between access 
to public debt markets, approximated by an outstanding credit rating, and the 
corporate capital structure (An and Chan 2008; Lemmon and Zender 2010; Mittoo 
and Zhang 2008). 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The next section 2.2 briefly 
describes the credit rating-capital structure hypothesis in the context of traditional 
capital structure theories. Chapter 2.3 explains the empirical design for testing 
managers‘ capital structure decisions and shows our main results. Chapter 2.4 
analyzes the credit rating effect per rating class and provides further robustness 
tests. The chapter is concluded in section 2.5.  
2.2 Related Literature 
To date, the research on credit ratings and capital structure is rather limited. 
The credit rating-capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS) formed by Kisgen (2006) 
states that ―different credit rating levels are associated with discrete costs 
(benefits) to the firm.‖ Depending on the importance of these costs and benefits, 
the CR-CS may outweigh the implications of traditional capital structure theories, 
i.e. the trade-off and pecking-order theories. This implies that, in certain cases, 
due to the discrete costs (benefits) anticipated by a rating change, the capital 
structure decision making differs from the traditional behavior implied by capital 
structure theories. In other cases, traditional capital structure theories overshadow 
the CR-CS. Beside firm and industry characteristics, which form the relationship 
between firm value and leverage, the proximity of a potential rating change is 
crucial for the credit rating effects‘ relative importance. In terms of the pecking 
order theory, CR-CS implies that firms may issue equity to avoid a possible 
downgrade despite the associated asymmetric information costs and available 
internal funds (Myers 1984). Furthermore, managers could opt for a more 
conservative net debt issuance despite the pecking-order theory‘s contrary 
implications. If the trade-off theory is considered, CR-CS entails firms being 
allowed to choose different firm-value-maximizing capital structure optimums. 
The discrete costs (benefits) cause jumps in the otherwise continuous relationship 
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 In addition to Kisgen (2006; 2009), other studies on the topic include Kisgen and Strahan (2010) 
and Hovakimian et al. (2009). 
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between firm value and leverage. The proximity to these firm value jumps 
determines the costs associated with moving to the new optimum and, therefore, 
this optimal capital structure‘s relative attractiveness for the respective firm.  
The methodological set-up of Kisgen (2006) measures this imminence of a 
rating change in two ways:
14
 The possible upgrade or downgrade to a higher / 
lower major rating category, i.e. BBB or BB, is approximated by the ―+‖ or ―-‖ 
assigned to a credit rating. The second approach measures changes in all rating 
categories with the help of a calculated ―credit score‖.15 The firm-year-specific 
credit score is used to rank firms of a specific micro rating, i.e. BBB- or BBB, in a 
high third, middle third and low third. Firms in the high or low third are treated as 
near a rating change.  
Kisgen (2009) complements his earlier study on the credit rating-capital 
structure hypothesis by analyzing leverage behavior following ratings changes 
with the help of a partial adjustment model (per Flannery and Rangan 2006). He 
demonstrates that companies restrict their net debt relative to net equity issuance 
after a downgrade in credit rating. As the credit rating effect on upgrades is 
minimal, the results indicate ―that mangers target specific minimum credit rating 
levels.‖ 
The study by Hovakimian et al. (2009) examines how firms target their 
credit ratings and how the ratings target feed-back to their capital structure 
decisions. The study shows that firms below their rating targets tend to decrease 
their leverage, while above-target firms ―tend to repurchase equity rather than 
retire debt and tend to increase their dividends (Hovakimian et al. 2009).
16
  
On the whole, the CR-CS is a reasonable extension of the existing capital 
structure hypotheses, which may help explain managers‘ deviations from the 
traditional theoretical implications.  
                                                 
14
 For a thorough description of the methodological set-up, see Kisgen (2006). 
15
 This ―credit score‖ is a measure of firm quality based on financial data regularly used by rating 
agencies, i.e. interest coverage, size, and leverage. The weightings of the individual data fields are 
determined by regressing observed ratings on these factors. 
16
 Other studies on the topic include Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Rauh and Sufi (2010). 
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2.3 Main Empirical Tests 
2.3.1 Methodology 
We follow Kisgen‘s (2006) general empirical set-up to determine the 
significance of credit ratings in capital structure decision making. The discussion 
in section 2.2 adds to the hypothesis that companies near a credit rating upgrade 
or downgrade issue less debt relative to equity than companies not close to a 
rating change. In other words, the management aims to increase the chances of an 
upgrade of the firm‘s credit rating or avoid the possible downgrade by the means 
of a more conservative net debt issuance (net debt minus net equity offerings). In 
order to test the postulated relationship, we need two dummy variables that 
distinguish between firms near a credit rating upgrade / downgrade and those that 
are not, as well as an adequate measure of debt relative to equity issuance.  
In order to correctly test the credit rating effect discussed in section 2.2, we 
examine changes in micro rating categories, i.e. BB+ or BB and in the major 
rating categories, i.e. AA or A. We utilize S&P‘s Rating Outlook and Credit 
Watch (Moody‘s equivalent is the Watchlist) to measure the proximity of a 
change in credit rating. This credit outlook ―assesses the potential direction of a 
long-term credit rating over the intermediate term (typically six months to two 
years)‖ (Standard&Poor‘s 2009) and is determined by the firm‘s economic and/or 
fundamental business conditions. It not only provides the actual credit rating, but 
also supplies investors supplementary credit risk information (Altman and Rijken 
2007). Although corporate ratings are based on the through-the-cycle approach, 
which makes them stable but rather insensitive to short-term developments, the 
rating outlook delivers timely credit risk information. Therefore, investors, who 
are mostly short term oriented, rely heavily on rating outlooks in their credit risk 
assessment. 
A study by Cantor and Hamilton (2005) demonstrates that rating outlooks 
explain the differences between actual ratings and implied ratings based on CDS 
data. A ―positive‖ or ―negative‖ outlook means that a rating may be raised or 
lowered, while a ―stable‖ outlook indicates that a rating is not likely to change in 
the intermediate term. A ―developing‖ outlook is assigned to ratings in ―unusual 
situations in which future events are so unclear that the rating could be raised or 
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lowered‖ (Standard&Poor‘s 2008b). Using Moody‘s rating data, Hamilton and 
Cantor (2004) document that the likelihood that issuers with a negative outlook 
will be downgraded over a one-year horizon is seven times higher than their 
chances of being upgraded. The ratio is 2:1 for upgrades with a positive outlook 
versus a downgrade. Therefore, the rating outlook is highly predictive of future 
rating changes. The anecdotal evidence provided in the introduction and 
investors‘ intense reliance on the rating outlook support the assumption that most 
management teams pay close attention to not only the firm‘s rating, but also to its 
respective outlook. Since the rating outlook‘s time horizon is usually six months 
to two years, there is ample time for the management to alter the firm‘s capital 
structure in order to react to its current rating outlook. 
The second measure of a close rating change is S&P‘s Credit Watch, which 
―focuses on identifiable events and short-term trends that cause ratings to be 
placed under special surveillance…‖ (Standard&Poor‘s 2009). The trigger events 
for placing a corporate rating on credit watch are mostly mergers, acquisitions, 
and recapitalizations. The likelihood of a change in rating must be ―sufficiently 
high‖ for a placement on credit watch and the time horizon is much shorter than 
that of the rating outlook (Keenan et al. 1998; Standard&Poor‘s 2008b). Similar to 
the rating outlook, the credit watch / watchlist placement also supplies financial 
markets with information (Chung et al. 2008). 
While the likelihood of a rating change is higher (typically at least 50 
percent) when a credit rating is placed on credit watch than with a mere positive 
or negative outlook, the available time period for the management to react is 
considerable shorter (typically 90 days). This could reduce the precision of our 
tests, as we have to record the outlook/credit watch at the end of the firm‘s fiscal 
year and measure capital structure decisions over the subsequent 12-month period. 
Since the rating outlook has a mid-term perspective rather than a credit watch‘s 
short-term one, it could be more suitable for our subsequent analysis.  
The dependent variable in our study is the difference between the net debt 
issuance and the net equity issuance (relative to the firm‘s total assets).17 This 
factor allows us to correctly measure the management‘s actions to adapt the 
companies‘ capital structure to the respective credit rating situation. Furthermore, 
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 A similar measure is applied by Kisgen (2006; 2009) and Leary and Roberts (2005). 
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rating agencies regularly rely on book values in their credit risk assessment 
(Standard&Poor‘s 2008b). Therefore, the dependent variable is also based on 
book values. Consequently, we create dummy variables for the rating 
outlook/watchlisting at the end of the firm‘s fiscal year, thus measuring the 
companies‘ net debt relative to its net equity issuance over the subsequent 12 
months. As mentioned before, this approach is likely to add noise to the empirical 
test because a company‘s rating outlook can change during the 12-month period. 
The change would make the measurement at the beginning of the year inaccurate. 
Other complicating factors are the significant transactions costs associated with 
debt and equity offerings and the time lag between decision making and execution 
(Lee et al. 1996). These make equity offerings especially irregular and rare 
(Eckbo and Masulis 2005). On the whole, all these constraining factors could 
impair the accuracy of our tests and, consequently, influence the measured credit 
rating effect.  
Kisgen (2006) excludes very large offerings (debt and equity and debt only) 
from his analysis.
18
 He argues that the postulated relationship between capital 
structure decisions and credit ratings is critical, especially for small and medium-
sized offerings. While a small debt offering might result in a downgrade for a firm 
already close to a downgrade (in our study companies with a negative outlook 
assigned to their credit rating), it should not affect a firm not close to a downgrade 
(in our study companies with a stable or positive credit rating outlook). On the 
other hand, a large debt offering might also be followed by a down notching of 
firms previously not close to a downgrade. The significant shift in the capital 
structure leads to a major deterioration in credit quality that, in turn, makes a 
downgrade inevitable. Large equity offerings are mostly associated with 
management‘s major strategic decisions (e.g., reorganization, acquisitions, etc.) in 
which rating considerations play only a subordinate role. However, in contrast to 
Kisgen (2006), the main results of our study are robust regarding the inclusion of 
large offerings, i.e. offerings greater than 10 percent of the company‘s assets.19  
                                                 
18
 Large offerings are defined as greater than 10 percent of assets. However, the results are robust 
to hurdle rate of 5 percent or 20 percent. 
19
 But the statistical significance is somewhat reduced. The results are qualitatively identical if the 
hurdle rate is changed to offerings greater than 5 percent of assets.  
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2.3.2 Sample Overview and Data Description 
Our sample consists of firms that either have an outstanding or past issuer 
credit rating by Standard and Poor‘s, as well as firms that have withdrawn issuer 
credit ratings due to bankruptcy or termination of the agreement with the rating 
agency (e.g., due to a change in the funding strategy, or as a consequence of going 
private). Our analysis is geared to the Long-term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating 
by S&P. The sample is constructed from S&P‘s rated universe in Europe, the 
Middle East and Africa (EMEA), as well as in the US. Accordingly, the findings 
of our study are based on a very broad set of jurisdictions and capital markets.
20
 
We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) from the sample, as their 
capital structures are likely to differ substantially from industrial or service firms 
(for a similar approach, compare Hovakimian et al., 2001 and Baker and Wurgler, 
2002). Similar to previous papers, we exclude firm years with missing values for 
commonly used variables.  
For firm-level data, we use the Datastream and Worldscope financial 
databases by Thomson Financial.
21
 For inclusion, we require that the firms have 
available accounting and financial data for the year subsequent to the cut-off date 
of the rating and the respective outlook. Therefore, our sample period is 1990 – 
2008, as 1990 is the first year for which S&P‘s rating outlook is obtainable and 
2008 is the last year for which full-year financials are available.
22
 The rating 
outlook was first introduced in the US and subsequently applied to the whole S&P 
universe.  
In order to derive the dependent variable net debt relative to net equity 
issuance for our empirical analysis, we identified equity offerings and repurchases 
from cash flow statements.
23
 Another approach is to rely on balance sheet data (y-
o-y change in book equity minus y-o-y change in retained earnings) in order to 
broaden the data set, as the cash flow data are not available for all firm years.
24
 
                                                 
20
 The robustness tests in chapter 2.4.3control for the different jurisdictions in our sample. 
21
 The results of the analysis should be equivalent to those arrived at if the Compustat financial 
database by S&P had been used as a study by Ulbricht and Weiner (2005) finds no structural 
differences between Thomson Financial and Compustat. 
22
 Standard and Poor‘s introduced reviews in 1981 and outlooks in 1986 (Micu et al. 2006). 
23
 Kisgen (2006) and Hovakimian et al. (2001) follow a similar approach.  
24
 Baker and Wurgler (2002) use this approach in their capital structure study. The indirect 
calculation of the variable also correctly excludes mere equity changes resulting from earnings for 
the year. Our study likewise aims at intentional capital structure decisions by the management and 
not mere changes due to firm performance.  
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The main findings of our study are qualitatively identical if the second approach is 
used. To calculate debt issuances and reductions, we tracked the change in total 
(short term plus long term) book debt, defined as the total liabilities and the 
preferred stock – replaced by the redemption value of the preferred stock if this is 
missing – minus the deferred taxes and convertible debt.25 We relied on balance 
sheet data to calculate the net debt issuance, in order to obtain a broad as possible 
data set. Consequently, our net debt issuance variable comprises debt from public 
as well as private sources. This approach is valid, as the rating agencies do not 
distinguish between public or private debt (Standard&Poor‘s 2008b).  
We largely follow the studies by Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Alti (2006) 
in our selection and definition of control variables that determine capital structure. 
The variables are defined as follows: Book leverage is the book debt divided by 
the total assets. The market-to-book ratio, M/B, is the same as the book debt plus 
the market value of the equity (common shares outstanding multiplied by the 
share price) divided by the total assets.
26
. Profitability is defined as earnings 
before interest, taxes, and depreciation/amortization divided by the total assets. 
Firm size, size, is the natural log of the total sales. R&D/A is the research and 
development expense divided by the total assets and replaced by zero if missing. 
R&D/A serves as a proxy for investment opportunities (Fama and French 2002). 
In conjunction with this, the dummy variable, R&Dd, takes a value of one in the 
regressions if R&D/A is missing and is, accordingly, replaced by zero (Alti 2006). 
The tangibility of the total assets, tangibility, is the net plant, property, and 
equipment over the total assets; and financial slack is the cash and equivalents 
divided by the total assets (Dittmar and Thakor 2007). Moreover, we added the 
interest coverage ratio to this list; interest coverage is defined as earnings before 
interest and tax over gross interest expenses, because it is one of the most 
important determinants of a firm's credit rating. Industry leverage is defined as the 
median industry total debt to assets ratio based on the two-digit SIC code 
(Hovakimian et al. 2001). 
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 Compare Hovakimian et al. (2001) for a similar approach.  
26
 Consistent with previous studies on the topic, we drop observations for which M/B or its 
modifications exceed 10.0. 
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On the whole, the sample consists of 13,363 firm years and 1,298 firms. 
Excluding observations with missing values, leaves 11,308 firm years. Table 2-1 
provides summary statistics on the overall sample and sub-samples.  
The table shows that the EMEA firms are larger – both in terms of the total 
assets and sales – than the US firms. This is not surprising, as the EMEA public 
debt markets are dominated by large firms, while the US debt market has 
traditionally also been open to smaller scale firms. The test statistics regarding the 
two sub-samples are based on simple two-sided t-tests of the differences in the 
means and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests of differences in medians. 
These statistics show that US firms have higher market-to-book and leverage 
ratios (not tabulated). We find no statistical difference in the research and 
development expenses. On average, EMEA firms have more tangible assets on the 
balance sheet and a higher percentage of financial slack. However, their interest 
coverage ratios are lower than those of their US counterparts. With regard to the 
different rating outlooks, the tests show that negative outlook firms have 
statistically significantly lower market-to-book ratios, higher leverage ratios, 
lower profitability, lower percentages of financial slack, and considerably lower 
interest coverage ratios. On the other hand, positive outlook firms exhibit higher 
market-to-book ratios, higher profitability, more tangible assets, a higher share of 
financial slack, and higher interest coverage ratios. In order to gauge on what 
dimension firms with a negative/positive outlook differ significantly from other 
firms with same rating, we have run a regression analysis of the credit rating level 
and outlook on various firm characteristics (not tabulated). The results confirm the 
abovementioned univariate analysis findings.  
In terms of firm years, the sample is rather well distributed along rating 
classes. However, 84 AA+ firm years compare poorly with 1,524 firm years for 
BBB companies. Nevertheless, the findings of our study should not be driven by 
certain rating classes.  
Figure 2-1 shows the average net debt minus the net equity issuance per 
rating category, while figure 2-2 divides the dependent variable into its two 
components and therefore depicts the average net debt and average net equity 
issuance per rating category. 
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Figure 2-1 shows that companies rated BB or better issue more net debt 
minus net equity over the sampling period. The average net debt relative to net 
equity issuance (as a percentage of total assets) ranges from 0.50 percent to 3.85 
percent. While companies BB- or below issue more net equity than net debt. The 
respective offering range is from -4.98 percent to -0.99 percent. Lower-rated 
companies apparently try to prevent a further deterioration in credit quality and, 
therewith, credit rating by issuing more equity than debt. On the other hand, 
investment-grade and crossover firms use their rather good credit standing and, in 
turn, more attractive refinancing costs to alter their capital structure the other way. 
Interestingly, the boundary between positive and negative net debt minus net 
equity issuance does not seem to be the division between investment grade and 
speculative grade, but a bit below — around the rating classes BB and BB-.  
The more thorough analysis of figure 2-2 shows that the strongest separating 
factor between higher and lower-rated companies is the average net equity 
issuance. While companies rated from AAA to BB have, on average, bought back 
parts of their equity, the lower-rated group has issued additional equity to 
strengthen its credit quality. Net debt issuance paints a similar picture, although 
the relationship is not as strong. Higher-rated companies have a positive net debt 
issuance, while the lower-rated group has, on average, redeemed outstanding debt 
or restricted debt issuance to a minimum. The two figures clarify that it is 
necessary to control for the firm‘s credit quality in the empirical tests, as higher-
rated firms tend to issue more net debt relative to net equity. In order to separate 
the credit rating effect from a potential financial distress effect, we have selected 
the leverage ratio, and the company size as base case control variables. 
Investment-grade companies specifically must have a minimum sales figure to 
become and remain investment grade. Moreover, any financial distress arguments 
are likely to decrease with increasing firm size. As a third control variable, we 
have selected the firm‘s profitability. In order to have comparable results, we have 
followed Kisgen‘s (2006) approach when selecting control variables.27  
We have now operationalized the credit-rating effect hypothesis by means 
of dummy and financial variables. This allows us to test the relationship between 
credit ratings and capital structure decision making in an empirical context.  
                                                 
27
 We added more control variables that are known as key determinants of capital structure in the 
robustness tests. 
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2.3.3 Main Empirical Results 
First, we formally investigate managers‘ concern regarding a possible micro 
credit rating change, i.e. the change in any rating category. Our hypothesis states 
that firms with a positive or negative outlook will issue less net debt relative to net 
equity than firms with a stable outlook.  
Figure 2-3 and figure 2-4 show the net debt (issuance of debt minus 
repurchase of debt) and the net equity issuance (issuance of equity minus 
repurchase of equity) individually per rating category and differentiate between 
firms with a positive/negative outlook and firms with a stable outlook. While 
firms close to a change in micro rating are expected to issue less net debt, they 
presumably issue more net equity than firms not close to a change in micro rating.  
Figure 2-3 shows that in 13 of the 18 rating categories, net debt issuance is 
smaller for firms with a positive/negative outlook at the beginning of the period. 
As depicted in figure 2-4, the relationship is similar regarding net equity issuance. 
In 13 of the 18 rating classes, the amount of net equity issued is higher for firms 
with a positive/negative outlook. As a result, on an individual basis, the 
relationship between net debt and net equity issuance and close credit rating 
changes is as expected for the majority of the rating categories. Moreover, the 
relationship between net debt net equity issuance and the credit quality of the 
issuer, already displayed in figure 2-1 and figure 2-2, is also evident in figure 2-3 
and figure 2-4. These first descriptive results strongly support our hypothesis 
regarding the relevance of credit ratings in capital structure decision making.  
The following three equations allow us to formally test our hypothesis in a 
pooled time-series, cross-section framework. We use fixed-effects panel (within) 
estimators to control for firm heterogeneity in the panel context (Baltagi 2008; 
Greene 2003). This approach allows for time-omitted variables in the regressions, 
which, in turn, should help to limit endogeneity problems.
28
 Moreover, we include 
year dummy variables in the analysis to allow for aggregate time effects.  
  
                                                 
28
 We have not applied an instrumental variable regression because of the weak instrument 
problem and the difficulty of identifying potential endogenous variables in our analysis.  
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NetDebtIssit = α + β0 PosNegOutl it + φ Kit+ ui + εit  (1) 
NetDebtIssit = α + β1 PosOutlit + β2 NegOutlit + φ Kit+ ui + εi (2) 
NetDebtIssit = α + β3 ChgeOutlit + φ Kit+ ui + εit   (3) 
While PosOutlit and NegOutlit are the credit rating outlook dummy variables 
for each individual firm i at time t, PosNegOutlit is an aggregate credit rating 
outlook dummy variable for positive or negative outlook, which is measured on a 
yearly basis at the end of the firm‘s financial year.29,30 The aggregate dummy 
variable ChgeOutlit also codes companies with a ―developing‖ rating outlook as 
―1‖ and accordingly includes them in PosNegOutlit. The set of control variables 
described above are labeled Kit.
31
 Our hypothesis implies that βi < 0, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 
i.e. firms close to change in rating issue less net debt relative to net equity. The 
null hypothesis is βi ≥ 0. The empirical results are shown in table 2-2. Panel A 
comprises the entire sample, panel B excludes very large debt offerings (> 10 
percent of assets) and panel C excludes both very large debt and equity offerings 
from the sample.
32
  
The null hypothesis that managers are unconcerned about ratings in their 
capital structure decisions can be rejected in all three panels. Looking at the 
broadest - panel A -, the coefficient of the PosNegOutl dummy variable has the 
expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Firms 
with a positive or negative outlook annually issue 1.8 percent less net debt to net 
equity as a percentage of total assets than firms with a stable outlook. Therefore, 
credit ratings‘ effect on the capital structure is not only statistically significant, but 
also economically significant. Consequently, in contrast to Kisgen (2006), we 
were able to prove credit ratings‘ influence on the capital structure without 
excluding large offerings from the sample. As the fixed-effects model relies solely 
                                                 
29
 The subscripts i and t are suppressed in the following for notational convenience.  
30
 Introducing an aggregate explanatory variable for a positive or negative credit rating outlook 
implies that managers react symmetrically to both outlooks. The study by Kisgen (2006) proves 
this symmetric behavior. Alternatively, one could argue that managers are willing to rely more on 
debt financing than on equity financing when the credit rating outlook is positive. Splitting up the 
aggregate outlook variable allows us to test for this alternative explanation. 
31
 We have selected the base case control variables consistent with Kisgen (2006): book leverage, 
size, and profitability.  
32
 The results are robust regarding using 5 percent of assets as the threshold for excluding very 
large debt or debt and equity offerings.  
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on variance over time for each firm, the model fit, measured by the within R
2 
of 
0.0330, should be acceptable. Moreover, the coefficient of -1.8 percent is higher 
than the measured -0.9 percent by Kisgen (2006).
33
 On the whole, although the 
study by Kisgen (2006) chooses a different approach to measure an imminent 
change in credit rating, the empirical results are comparable to our analysis. This 
clearly demonstrates the robustness of the credit rating – capital structure 
hypothesis.  
Dividing the aggregate credit outlook dummy variable into the positive and 
negative outlook dummy variables reveals additional findings. With a coefficient 
of -2.1 percent, an assigned negative credit rating outlook has an even stronger 
economic effect on the capital structure, while a positive outlook has apparently 
no statistically significant influence on capital structure decision making in the 
broad sample. However, the coefficient of PosOutl in panel A is also negative. 
Including the ―developing‖ credit outlook does not improve the results in panel A. 
With the exception of the company size in panel A, the control variables‘ 
coefficients have the predicted signs. All three control variables are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. A higher profitability specifically has an 
economically significant positive influence on net debt relative to net equity 
issuance, while a higher leverage ratio promotes, as expected, a more conservative 
capital structure policy.  
As discussed above, it could make sense to exclude large offerings (debt 
only / debt and equity) from the analysis, as they are likely to have rating 
consequences for all firms whether these have an imminent change in credit rating 
or not. This approach significantly improves the fit – measured by the overall R2 – 
of our regression.  
In panels B and C, the credit rating effect on net debt relative to net equity 
issuance is smaller, ranging from -0.04 percent for the aggregate variable 
PosNegOutl in panel B to -0.9 percent for the NegOutl in panel B.
34
 In both 
panels, the negative credit outlook has a highly significant (statistically significant 
                                                 
33
 The exact equivalent value for our study is -2.3 percent less net debt relative to net equity (as a 
percentage of the total assets), as Kisgen (2006) excludes the control variables from the regression 
in order to measure the unaltered credit rating effect.  
34
 The results are robust if industry fixed effects – based on the two digit SIC code – are applied 
instead of the company fixed effects. 
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at the 1 percent level) influence on the managers‘ capital structure decision 
making. The findings of panel A that the positive outlook has no statistically 
significant effect on the mix of net debt to net equity issuance are affirmed. 
Interestingly, the coefficient of the PosOutl dummy variable is positive in panels 
B and C. It appears that managers do not react symmetrically to a positive or 
negative credit rating outlook. While managers adapt a more conservative capital 
structure policy if the company is close to a downgrade, the positive credit 
outlook has no such effect. This is in contrast to Kisgen (2006), who shows ex-
ante leverage reduction behavior for plus ratings and credit scores on the upper 
end. Our findings are, however, consistent with the study of Kisgen (2009), which 
finds only little ex-post capital structure changes following upgrades, while 
managers reduce leverage significantly after downgrades. Our results could also 
imply that firms target minimum credit rating targets. Alternatively, a negative 
credit outlook might just be a stronger signal to managers than the positive credit 
outlook. In panels B and C, the credit outlook variable ChgeOutl, which includes 
the ―developing‖ outlook, is also significant with the coefficient‘s predicted 
negative sign. The company size proxy variable has the coefficient‘s expected 
positive sign in both panels and is highly significant in panel B. 
The statistically significant credit rating effects of all three panels are robust 
regarding dividing the dependent variables into its components, i.e. net debt and 
net equity issuance only (not shown). Second, our results for firms near a 
downgrade should be distinct from any financial distress arguments. We have 
included control variables like the profitability, the leverage ratio, and company 
size to control for the of firm‘s financial health. Generally, firms of increasing 
size should have a lower probability of experiencing distress. Therefore, the 
positive coefficients of the log of sales in panels B and C indicate that firms with 
lower probability of going bankrupt issue more debt relative to equity (Kisgen 
2006). Accordingly, the credit outlook dummy variables should have further 
explanatory power in addition to mere financial distress effects.  
Table 2-3 provides analyses along the lines of table 2-2 of the two sub-
samples US and EMEA firms. Regarding the EMEA sample, potential robustness 
concerns are cross-country differences in the legal and regulatory framework of 
Credit Ratings and Capital Structure Revisited 30 
the respective financial markets.
35
 In order to address this set of problems, we 
added additional control variables to Panel B of table 2-3. First, we estimated 
equations (1) and (2) by including country dummies. Second, in unreported 
regressions, we included country-specific creditor and shareholder rights indices 
in the analysis (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 2002; La Porta et al. 1998). In 
panel B, we used standard errors clustered by firms and years because time-
invariant independent variables (e.g., country dummy variables) are lost in the 
fixed-effects panel model‘s within transformation due to their collinearity with the 
unit effect dummies (per Petersen 2009). 
The results of panel A of table 2-3 show that the credit rating effect is even 
more pronounced for US firms. In addition, we find negative and statistically 
significant coefficients for both positive (-1.7 percent) and negative outlook firms 
(-3.6 percent).
36
 Consistent with the findings of table 2-2, the rating effect of a 
negative outlook is economically and statistically larger, but also US firms with a 
positive rating outlook follow a more conservative net debt issuance in the 
following year. This is also in line with Kisgen‘s results (2006) and further 
supports the hypothesis that the measured credit rating effect differs from distress 
arguments. The descriptive statistics in table 2-1 clearly show that positive 
outlook firms are, on average, financially healthier and are thus less likely to 
default. Consequently, a financial distress rationale would argue for higher net 
debt issuance in the following year. However, the negative coefficient of the 
positive outlook dummy variable in table 2-3 indicates that US firms also follow a 
more conservative financial policy if their corporate rating is about to be 
upgraded.  
In a further (unreported) analysis, we excluded actually downgraded firms 
from the sample.
37
 This restriction allows us to test whether the leverage response 
is due to the mere anticipation of a downgrade, or to a concrete downgrade in the 
following year. We find that the estimated coefficient for negative outlook firms 
maintains its economic effect and significance level. This shows that firms restrict 
                                                 
35
 An established strand of literature covers the relationship between law and finance. See, among 
others, Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2009), La Porta et al. (1998), Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) and Davydenko and Franks (2008). 
36
 This results is robust if standard errors clustered by firms and years are applied instead of the 
fixed effects panel estimators (Petersen 2009). 
37
 This examination was done on the back of a very thoughtful anonymous referee‘s comment.  
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net debt issuance in the following year even if they just expect a possible 
downgrade. 
The results of panel B of table 2-3 show that EMEA firms are not subject to 
a direct credit rating effect. In fact, the estimated coefficients for the negative 
outlook and combined outlook dummy variables are positive. Conversely, the 
coefficients of the control variables are in line with the results of US firms. 
However, if we exclude large debt and equity offerings from the sample, we find 
negative and statistically significant coefficients for positive and negative outlook 
firms. The credit rating effect is economically smaller than in the US, but it is still 
measurable and differs from any distress arguments.
38
 There are three possible 
explanations for EMEA firms‘ deviant result. First, the considerably smaller 
sample size of 2,086 EMEA firm-years compared to 9,218 US firm-years reduces 
the power of these tests. Second, as described above, EMEA firms‘ distinct nature 
in terms of size, tangibility, leverage, and market-to-book ratio. The US firms are 
also, on average, lower rated than their EMEA counterparts. Third, EMEA firms 
are less sensitive to corporate credit ratings. In fact, we find negative and – to 
some extent – statistically significant coefficients for positive and negative 
outlook firms in all three major capital markets in the EMEA sample: France, 
Germany, and the UK. 
As discussed above, the S&P‘s watchlisting is a stronger and shorter-term 
indication of credit ratings changes. However, watchlisting is generally resolved 
by a rating‘s change or confirmation within 90 days. This makes the measurement 
of the watchlisting effect on capital structure decision making extremely difficult, 
as we have to measure the credit rating outlook/watchlisting on a cut-off date and 
have to rely on full-year financials for our analysis. Table 2-4 shows the results of 
the credit watchlisting dummy variables WatchPos and WatchNeg along the lines 
of equation (2) for the overall sample and US/EMEA firms.  
Only the WatchNeg dummy variable of the broad data set in panel A and B 
is statistically significant, but has an incorrect sign of the estimated coefficient. In 
the other regressions, the credit watchlisting dummy variables have no significant 
influence on the net debt relative to the net equity issuance. The results indicate 
                                                 
38
 The credit rating effect has to be economically smaller, as the exclusion of large debt and equity 
offerings also decreases the average net debt issuance. The effect is comparable if large debt and 
equity offerings are also excluded from the US sample. 
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that the watchlisting period is too short to be measured correctly on a 12-month 
basis. We therefore exclude the watchlisting dummy variables from our further 
analysis.  
Losing or obtaining a broad rating category, for example, A or BBB, might 
be an even stronger signal to investors than the change between micro rating 
categories, or may induce rating-triggered costs (benefits) for the firm. To 
facilitate a formal investigation of the relationship between changes in broad 
ratings and managers‘ capital structure decisions, we introduce three additional 
dummy variables. The dummy variable BroadPos takes the value ―1‖ if the firm‘s 
rating is on the upper border of a broad rating, for example, BB+, and has a 
positive outlook.
39
 The dummy variable BroadNeg takes the value ―1‖ if the 
firm‘s rating is on the lower border of a broad rating, for example, BB-, and has a 
negative outlook. The aggregate dummy variable BroadPosNeg takes the value 
―1‖ if BroadPos or BroadNeg equals ―1‖. The table 2-5 shows the results of the 
multivariate regressions along the lines of the previous section.  
All three rating dummy variables have the expected negative coefficient in 
panels A and B. A broad rating category‘s potential imminent change induces a 
more conservative net debt relative to net equity issuance in the following year. 
The effect ranges from -2.4 percent for the positive outlook to -1.8 percent for 
broad ratings‘ negative outlook. Similar to our analysis of micro rating changes 
above, only the negative outlook dummy variable and the aggregate dummy 
variable are statistically significant at the 5 percent level for the capital structure 
decision making. In this analysis, this even holds true for US firms. We cannot 
find any systematic leverage reduction with regard to EMEA firms if potential 
changes in the broad ratings are examined. But with respect to the overall sample 
and the US sub-sample, the possibility of losing a broad rating level has a 
measurable influence on the decision to issue debt versus equity in the following 
financial year. The estimated effect is comparable to imminent micro rating 
changes‘ effect shown above. Looking at the magnitude of the relationship, a 
                                                 
39
 In line with the findings for micro rating changes, we have excluded watchlistings from our 
further analysis.  
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potential change in broad rating is not necessarily regarded more severe than a 
change in micro rating.
40
  
On the whole, the credit rating effect is economically significant for both 
micro and broad rating changes. The magnitude of the effect of both types of 
rating changes is comparable. The discussion on rating concerns above implies 
that certain rating categories or rating border lines may have a stronger influence 
on the capital structure decision making than others. The following section 2.4, 
therefore, analyzes the credit rating effect per rating category.  
2.4 Empirical Results per Rating Category and further 
Robustness Tests 
As discussed above, we expect certain rating levels to be especially 
important in managers‘ financing decisions. On these rating borderlines, the costs 
(benefits) for the firm are particularly high. In the following, we further examine 
these rating categories.  
2.4.1 Crossover Credits 
Regulations on bond investments and coupon step-ups in bond 
documentations imply that the borderline between investment-grade and 
speculative-grade ratings is incrementally important for the corporate capital 
markets refinancing. In order to analyze so-called crossover credits‘ capital 
structure decision making, we define two additional rating dummy variables.
41
 In 
panel A of table 2-6, the dummy variable investment grade/speculative grade 
(IGSGPosNeg) takes the value ―1‖ if the company is rated BBB- with negative 
outlook or BB+ with positive outlook. While in panel B, the dummy variable 
IGSGPosNeg takes the value ―1‖ if the company is rated BBB, BBB- with negative 
outlook or BB+, BB with positive outlook. Owing to the importance of the 
distinction between investment-grade and speculative-grade ratings, this broader 
definition of crossover credits, which includes companies rated BBB or BB, 
                                                 
40
 In a further analysis, we split the effect into a firm on the upper/lower border of a broad rating 
category and one on a positive/negative rating outlook. We find that only the combined variable 
has explanatory power with regard to net debt issuance. A credit rating on the upper/lower border 
of a broad rating category has no statistically significant influence on leverage behavior.  
41
 Other definitions imply that crossover credits have a split rating, i.e. are rated low investment 
grade by one rating agency and upper speculative grade by another.  
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makes sense. This approach is consistent with Kisgen (2006). The table 2-6 shows 
the results of the tests along the lines of the previous section with the two different 
definitions of the IGSGPosNeg variable. 
The results of table 2-6 show that the coefficient on IGSGPosNeg is negative 
for both definitions of the rating dummy variable. The effect ranges between -1.1 
percent to -2.8 percent less net debt relative to net equity (as a percentage of the 
company‘s total assets) if the firm is rated in the crossover area and has the 
respective rating outlook. However, the negative relationship between a crossover 
rating and the net debt relative to net equity issuance in the following year is only 
statistically significant in panel B.  
The results imply that the distinction between investment-grade and 
speculative-grade ratings is indeed important for managers of rated companies.
42
 
The possibility of losing or obtaining an investment-grade rating has a significant 
influence on the decision to issue debt relative to equity.  
2.4.2 Credit Ratings’ Relevance for Access to the Commercial Paper 
Market 
An analysis per broad rating categories shows that the credit rating effect is 
most prominent regarding rating classes, which are crucial for the access to the 
US commercial paper market. Table 2-7 depicts the multivariate regression results 
per broad rating categories.
43
 
In panel A, the PosNegOutl variable has a negative coefficient in 4 of the 6 
broad rating categories and differs significantly from 0 regarding BB-rated 
companies. The picture is similar for the negative outlook dummy variable. 
However, the NegOutl is statistically significant for A, BBB and BB-rated firms. 
Panel B, which excludes large debt offerings from the sample, improves the 
significance levels for A and BBB firm years, but does not change the qualitative 
proposition.  
As discussed above, ―there is a strong link between the short-term and long-
term rating systems‖ (Standard&Poor‘s 2008a). Firms are likely to have their 
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 In fact, the credit rating effect on negative outlook firms rated in the speculative grade is 
comparably stronger than for investment-grade credits.  
43
 The smaller sample sizes reduce the power of the tests somewhat.  
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commercial paper downgraded from A-1 to A-2 if their issuer credit rating is 
lowered from A to BBB.
44
 Similarly, the short-term rating is likely to be lowered 
from A-2 to A-3 if the company‘s credit rating is downgraded from BBB to BB. 
Since the major part of the US commercial paper market is made up of tier-1 
(rated at least A-1 by Standard and Poor‘s and P-1 by Moody‘s) and tier-2 (rated 
A-2 / P-2) securities, a downgrade to A-3 would have severe consequences for the 
company‘s short-term refinancing. A downgrade to A-2 also has adverse 
implications for the short-term funding, as 80 percent of the US commercial paper 
market is made up of tier-1 securities.
45
 In contrast, tier-2 securities only make up 
4 percent of the overall commercial paper market. Therefore, the results of panels 
A and B for A and BBB-rated companies might indicate that the access to the 
commercial paper market plays a crucial role in the rating and, thus, in the capital 
structure rationale.
46
 In addition, the majority of pharmaceutical companies, 
utilities, and major oil corporate organizations ―seek to keep an ‗A‘ in their 
rating‖ (Stillit and Khabrieva 2009). Such a prime credit rating offers 
pharmaceutical companies protection in the case of litigation and guarantees oil 
majors a competitive funding advantage relative to emerging market sovereigns. 
This may also help explain the incremental relevance of the ―A‖ rating category in 
managers‘ capital structure rationale. 
Moreover, the statistically significant credit rating effect on BBB and BB-
rated companies in panel B supports the above discussed relevance of the 
investment-grade speculative grade distinction. The comparatively strong effect of 
-2.3 percent and -4.8 percent less net debt relative to net equity of the two broad 
rating categories emphasizes the prominence of credit rating concerns regarding 
the change from investment grade to speculative grade.  
2.4.3 Robustness Tests 
In order to show the robustness of our results, we have added a number of 
additional control variables to table 2-3 that are known to be determinants of 
capital structure. Table 2-8 shows that the credit rating effect on both positive and 
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 However, there is a certain overlap of rating categories (Standard&Poor‘s 2008a). 
45
 The figure refers to outstanding volume data as of September 2009 and is available from the 
Federal Reserve at www.federalreserve.gov. 
46
 This is consistent with the study by Kisgen (2009), which analyzes capital structure decisions 
following actual downgrades or upgrades. 
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negative outlook firms persists in this alternative model specification. Regarding 
the additional control variables, the market-to-book ratio and the percentage of 
financial slack turn out to be statistically and economically significant 
determinants of net debt relative to the net equity issuance. 
Moreover, we added the abovementioned controls for different countries 
and jurisdictions to table 2-2 and table 2-6.
47
 The untabulated results show that the 
credit rating effect is robust with regard to these alternative model specifications. 
In further (unreported) analyses, we test for business cycle or economic 
downturn effects in the net debt issuance.
48
 The credit rating effect could possibly 
be driven by the overall economic situation in single years. We therefore run 
regressions of (1) and (2) on a year-by-year basis.
49
 The PosNegOutl dummy 
variable has a negative coefficient sign in 10 of 18 individual years and is 
significant in four years.
50
 The credit rating effect ranges from -0.02 percent to -3 
percent less net debt relative to net equity annually as a percentage of the total 
assets. The NegOutlook has a negative coefficient in 11 of 18 individual years. It 
has a significant influence on the net debt relative to the net equity issuance in six 
years. The credit rating effect on the capital structure ranges from -0.33 percent to 
-3.8 percent annually. Accordingly, our empirical results could not have been 
driven by any business trends or economic shocks. 
2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
In this study, we analyze more precisely whether capital structure decisions 
are directly affected by credit rating concerns. Our hypothesis argues that 
managers account for credit ratings in their leverage setting, because of discrete 
costs (benefits) associated with different rating levels. The seminal study by 
Kisgen (2006) on the topic demonstrates this relationship by using dummy 
variables that account for a firm close to a rating change. Our study develops this 
approach further by using the credit rating outlook as an adequate measure of an 
                                                 
47
 This implies standard errors clustered by firms and time, instead of fixed-effects panel 
estimators. 
48
 We have already allowed for aggregate time effects in our analysis above by including year 
dummy variables. 
49
 The equations are identical except for the subscript t and the fixed-effect panel estimator.  
50
 The distributions of PosNegOutl and NegOutl are already statistically significant using a simple 
binomial test.  
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imminent change in the issuer credit rating. The rating outlook ―assesses the 
potential direction of a long-term credit rating over the intermediate term 
(typically six months to two years)‖ (Standard&Poor‘s 2009). Our results show 
that companies near a ratings change issue 1.8 percent less net debt relative to net 
equity (as a percentage of the total assets) over the subsequent period than firms 
not near a rating change. Therefore, the credit rating effect is economically 
stronger than the one measured by Kisgen (2006). Moreover, the effect is even 
evident if large debt offerings are not excluded from the analysis. The negative 
relationship between an imminent rating change and the net debt relative to net 
equity issuance is evident in both micro and broad rating changes. This supports 
the hypothesis that managers regard ratings as signals of firm quality (micro 
ratings) and are concerned about rating-triggered costs/benefits, as well as bond 
regulations (broad ratings). Managers‘ reaction to imminent upgrades and 
downgrades is not totally symmetrical. The prospect of a potential downgrade 
induces an economically more conservative capital structure policy. Nevertheless, 
the relationship is statistically significant for upgrades too. We find that US firms 
are more sensitive to their prevailing credit rating situation.
51
 The credit rating 
effect on EMEA firms is only measurable if large debt and equity offerings are 
excluded. In addition, our results regarding different rating levels may indicate 
that the credit rating effect is very prominent in investment-grade credits, which 
are concerned with their access to the US commercial paper market. The 
borderline between investment-grade and speculative-grade ratings is, as 
expected, also very important.  
This study adds to the growing literature on capital structure and credit 
ratings. By offering a more accurate and straightforward methodological set-up, it 
further strengthens the idea that managers are concerned with credit ratings and 
that this translates into real economic decision-making effects. In addition, this 
study broadens previous findings by postulating more precise propositions on 
upgrades vs. downgrades. Further research on the topic could include other major 
rating agencies‘ rating assessments in the analysis to provide an even more 
integrated model. 
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 However, this finding might be due to the smaller EMEA sample size. 
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Tables 2 
Table 2-1 Summary Statistics 
 
  
(1) Overall Sample (2) US Firms (3) EMEA Firms (3) Positive Outlook Firms (4) Negative Outlook Firms (5) Stable Outlook Firms
Total Assets Mean 11,000,000 7,610,368 24,300,000 8,077,455 12,600,000 11,100,000
Median 2,954,108 2,261,127 9,698,440 2,361,936 3,262,550 2,994,590
Standard deviation (27,100,000) (21,300,000) (39,900,000) (21,200,000) (32,400,000) (26,300,000)
Total Sales Mean 9,389,901 7,034,445 18,400,000 7,698,389 9,115,975 9,669,639
Median 2,590,167 2,081,609 7,099,807 1,965,793 2,785,800 2,622,650
Standard deviation (23,600,000) (19,300,000) (34,200,000) (21,600,000) (19,500,000) (24,800,000)
M/B Mean 1.549 1.587 1.410 1.728 1.259 1.600
Median 1.323 1.342 1.258 1.441 1.152 1.358
Standard deviation (1.099) (1.136) (0.936) (1.322) (0.757) (1.128)
Book Leverage Mean 0.520 0.531 0.476 0.505 0.604 0.501
Median 0.461 0.467 0.442 0.450 0.511 0.446
Standard deviation (0.916) (1.000) (0.474) (0.471) (0.834) (0.975)
Profitability Mean 0.136 0.133 0.147 0.174 0.100 0.140
Median 0.132 0.132 0.128 0.147 0.104 0.136
Standard deviation (0.236) (0.221) (0.287) (0.329) (0.195) (0.231)
R&D/A Mean 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.015
Median 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard deviation (0.032) (0.033) (0.028) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Tangibility Mean 0.367 0.362 0.385 0.347 0.365 0.370
Median 0.320 0.312 0.357 0.300 0.326 0.322
Standard deviation (0.240) (0.240) (0.239) (0.238) (0.230) (0.243)
Financial Slack Mean 0.082 0.079 0.091 0.092 0.075 0.082
Median 0.047 0.040 0.068 0.054 0.044 0.047
Standard deviation (0.103) (0.107) (0.084) (0.110) (0.093) (0.103)
Interest Coverage Mean 7.456 7.531 7.021 8.496 3.627 8.230
Median 3.684 3.516 4.257 4.295 2.351 3.993
Standard deviation (15.348) (15.985) (11.987) (16.677) (10.096) (15.947)
Number of firms (n) 1,298                             993                                305                                549                                765                                1,263                             
Number of firm years (N) 13,363                           10,582                           2,781                             1,214                             2,416                             9,733                             
Panel A: Summary Statistics on Firm-Specific Variables
Panel B: Number of Firms and Firm-years
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The table provides summary statistics (the mean, median, and standard deviation) of various firm characteristics for the overall sample and sub-samples. The overall 
sample consists of S&P-rated firms during the period 1990-2008. The US firm sample consists of firms incorporated in the US. The EMEA firm sample consists of 
firms incorporated in Europe, Middle East or Africa. Positive, Negative, and Stable Outlook firms are defined as firms with the respective rating outlook as the end of 
the fiscal year. Total Assets is defined as the book value of total assets. Total Sales are net sales. Market-to-book ratio, M/B, is defined as the book debt plus the 
market value of the equity divided by the total assets. Book Leverage is the ratio of book debt to total assets. Profitability is measured by earnings before interest, 
taxes, and depreciation divided by the total assets. R&D/A is the research and development expense divided by the total assets. Asset tangibility is defined as the net 
plant, property, and equipment divided by the total assets. Financial Slack is defined as cash and short-term investments divided by the total assets. Interest Coverage 
is defined as earnings before interest and tax over gross interest expenses. The financial information was obtained from the Thomson Financial database.  
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Table 2-2 Multivariate regressions for credit rating influence on capital structure decision making 
 
The table shows coefficients (within estimator) and standard errors from pooled time-series, cross-sectional regressions (company fixed effects). The 
dependent variable is the net amount of net debt and net equity raised for the year, divided by the beginning of the year‘s total assets. PosNegOutl is an 
aggregate rating-outlook dummy variable equal to ―1‖ if the credit rating outlook is ―positive / negative‖. PosOutl and NegOutl are dummy variables 
for the rating outlook equal to ―1‖ if the rating outlook is ―positive‖ or ―negative‖ and ―0‖ otherwise. ChgeOutl is an aggregate rating-outlook dummy 
variable equal to ―1‖ if the rating outlook is ―positive / negative / developing‖. The control variables include Book Leverage (debt ratio), total book debt 
divided by total book debt plus total book equity, Profitability, previous year‘s EBITDA divided by total assets and Size, the natural log of total sales. 
The sample covers the period 1990 to 2008 and excludes observations with missing values for any of the variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
White‘s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors clustered by firm. The total variation (overall R2) can be decomposed into within variation (within 
R
2
) over time for each individual and between variation across individuals (between R
2
). Year dummy variables (not shown) have been included to 
allow for aggregate time effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Including large offerings
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Intercept 1.2011 ** 1.2000 ** 1.1948 ** -0.1751 *** -0.1781 *** -0.1749 *** -0.0281 -0.0300 -0.0283
(0.5456) (0.5466) (0.5465) (0.0457) (0.0457) (0.0456) (0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0274)
PosNegOutlt-1 -0.0181 ** - - -0.0040 ** - - -0.0041 ** -
(0.0085) - - (0.0019) - - (0.0015) -
PosOutlt-1 - -0.0125 - - 0.0051 - - 0.0022 -
- (0.0080) - - (0.0036) - - (0.0026) -
NegOutlt-1 - -0.0212 ** - - -0.0086 *** - - -0.0071 *** -
- (0.0108) - - (0.0020) - - (0.0017) -
ChgeOutlt-1 - - -0.0041 - -0.0048 ** - - -0.0048 ***
- - (0.0062) - (0.0019) - - (0.0014)
Book Leveraget-1 -0.0163 ** -0.0163 ** -0.0165 ** -0.0067 * -0.0065 * -0.0067 * -0.0058 * -0.0057 * -0.0058 *
(0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Profitabilityt-1 0.1821 ** 0.1796 ** 0.1850 ** 0.0789 *** 0.0745 *** 0.0776 *** 0.0590 *** 0.0560 *** 0.0577 ***
(0.0772) (0.0761) (0.0779) (0.0206) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0128)
Sizet-1 -0.0842 ** -0.0841 ** -0.0840 ** 0.0112 *** 0.0114 *** 0.0113 *** 0.0013 0.0015 0.0014
(0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 (within) 0.0330 0.0331 0.0322 0.0558 0.0578 0.0561 0.0483 0.0501 0.0487
R2 (between) 0.0158 0.0150 0.0166 0.0591 0.0591 0.0593 0.0431 0.0405 0.0442
R2 (overall) 0.0069 0.0068 0.0068 0.0676 0.0678 0.0680 0.0569 0.0570 0.058
N 11,308 11,308 11,308 8,672 8,672 8,672 8,053 8,053 8,053
Panel B: Excluding large debt 
offerings (> 10% of assets)
Panel C: Excluding large debt and 
equity offerings (> 10% of assets)
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Table 2-3 By Region: Multivariate regressions for credit rating influence on capital structure decision 
making 
 
The table shows coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series, cross-sectional regressions. Panel A 
applies (company) fixed effects (within) estimators. Panel B shows standard errors clustered by firms and years 
(Petersen 2009). The dependent variable is the net amount of net debt and net equity raised for the year, divided 
by the beginning of the year‘s total assets. Column 3 of Panel B shows estimates from regressions if large debt 
and equity offerings (greater 5 percent) are excluded from the sample. PosNegOutl is an aggregate rating-outlook 
dummy variable equal to ―1‖ if the credit rating outlook is ―positive / negative‖. PosOutl and NegOutl are 
dummy variables for the rating outlook equal to ―1‖ if the rating outlook is ―positive‖ or ―negative‖ and ―0‖ 
otherwise. The control variables include Book Leverage, total book debt divided by total book debt plus total 
book equity, Profitability, previous year‘s EBITDA divided by total assets and Size, the natural log of total sales. 
The sample covers the period 1990 to 2008 and excludes observations with missing values for any of the 
variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are White‘s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors clustered by 
firm (Panel A) and clustered by firm and time (Panel C). The total variation (overall R
2
) can be decomposed into 
within variation (within R
2
) over time for each individual and between variation across individuals (between R
2
). 
Year dummy variables (not shown) have been included to allow for aggregate time effects. In panel B additional 
control variables for different countries and jurisdictions in the international sample have been included. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
  
1 2 1 2 3
Intercept 0.6027 *** 0.6005 *** 0.2313 0.2469 0.0371 **
(0.1337) (0.1337) (0.2120) (0.2215) (0.0139)
PosNegOutlt-1 -0.0293 *** - 0.0441 - -
(0.0058) - (0.0396) - -
PosOutlt-1 - -0.0169 ** - -0.0215 -0.0070 *
- (0.0082) - (0.0145) (0.0040)
NegOutlt-1 - -0.0364 *** - 0.0729 -0.0066 **
- (0.0063) - (0.0546) (0.0029)
Book Leveraget-1 -0.0157 ** -0.0157 ** -0.0194 -0.0181 -0.0131 ***
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0143) (0.0154) (0.0032)
Profitabilityt-1 0.1765 ** 0.1703 ** 1.1544 1.1595 *** 0.1036 ***
(0.0792) (0.0790) (0.1136) (0.1092) (0.0131)
Sizet-1 -0.0419 *** -0.0418 *** -0.0273 -0.0282 -0.0002
(0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0184) (0.0189) (0.0012)
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummy Variables No No Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No No
R2 (within) 0.0367 0.0371 na na na
R2 (between) 0.0009 0.0010 na na na
R2 (overall) 0.0080 0.0081 0.3167 0.3184 0.0642
n 990 990 304 304 288
N 9,218 9,218 2,086 2,086 1,590
Panel A: US Firms Panel B: EMEA Firms
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Table 2-4 Credit Watch Dummy Variables: Multivariate Regressions for Credit Rating Influence on Capital 
Structure Decision Making 
 
The table shows coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series, cross-sectional 
regressions. Panel A and B applies (company) fixed effects (within) estimators. Panel C shows 
standard errors clustered by firms and years (Petersen 2009). The dependent variable is the net 
amount of net debt and net equity raised for the year, divided by the beginning of the year‘s total 
assets. WatchPos is an aggregate rating-outlook dummy variable equal to ―1‖ if the rating is on 
―watch positive‖ and ―0‖ otherwise. WatchNeg is an aggregate rating-outlook dummy variable equal 
to ―1‖ if the rating is on ―watch negative‖ and ―0‖ otherwise. The control variables include Book 
Leverage, the total book debt divided by the total book debt plus the total book equity, Profitability, 
previous year‘s EBITDA divided by total assets and Size, the natural log of total sales. The sample 
covers the period 1990 to 2008 and excludes observations with missing values for any of the 
variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are White‘s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors 
clustered by firm (Panel A and B) and clustered by firm and time (Panel C). The total variation 
(overall R
2
) can be decomposed into within variation (within R
2
) over time for each individual and 
between variation across individuals (between R
2
). Year dummy variables (not shown) have been 
included to allow for aggregate time effects. In panel C additional control variables for different 
countries and jurisdictions in the international sample have been included. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
  
Panel A: 
All Firms
Panel B: 
US Firms
Panel C: 
EMEA Firms
Intercept 1.1943 ** 0.5909 *** 0.2394
(0.5495) (0.1317) (0.2225)
WatchPost-1 0.0040 0.0219 -0.0846
(0.0380) (0.0401) (0.0708)
WatchNegt-1 0.0421 *** 0.0490 *** 0.0544
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0389)
Book Leveraget-1 -0.0165 ** -0.0160 ** -0.0204
(0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0145)
Profitabilityt-1 0.1942 ** 0.1925 ** 1.1584 ***
(0.0789) (0.0805) (0.1133)
Sizet-1 -0.0844 ** -0.0423 *** -0.0263
(0.0386) (0.0094) (0.0179)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes No
R2 (within) 0.0334 0.0361 na
R2 (between) 0.0191 0.0024 na
R2 (overall) 0.0075 0.0070 0.3162
n 1,295 990 304
N 11,308 9,218 2,086
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Table 2-5 Broad Rating Changes: Multivariate Regressions for Credit Rating Influence on Capital Structure 
Decision Making 
 
The table shows coefficient and standard errors from pooled time-series, cross-sectional regressions. 
Panel A and B applies (company) fixed effects (within) estimators. Panel C shows standard errors 
clustered by firms and years (Petersen 2009). The dependent variable is the net amount of the net debt 
and net equity raised for the year, divided by the beginning of the year‘s total assets. The dummy 
variable BroadPos takes the value ―1‖ if the firm‘s rating is on the upper border of a broad rating and 
has a positive outlook and ―0‖ otherwise. The dummy variable BroadNeg takes the value ―1‖ if the 
firm‘s rating is on the lower border of a broad rating and has a negative outlook and ―0‖ otherwise. 
The dummy variable BroadPosNeg takes the value ―1‖ if BroadPos or BroadNeg equals ―1‖and ―0‖ 
otherwise. The control variables include Book Leverage, the total book debt divided by the total book 
debt plus the total book equity, Profitability, the previous year‘s EBITDA divided by total assets and 
Size, the natural log of total sales. The sample covers the period 1990 to 2008 and excludes 
observations with missing values for any of the variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are White‘s 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors clustered by firms (Panel A and B) and clustered by firm 
and time (Panel C). The total variation (overall R
2
) can be decomposed into within variation (within 
R
2
) over time for each individual and between variation across individuals (between R
2
). Year dummy 
variables (not shown) have been included to allow for aggregate time effects. In panel C additional 
control variables for different countries and jurisdictions in the international sample have been 
included.*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
  
Panel 1 2 1 2
Intercept 1.4931 ** 1.4922 ** 0.5966 *** 0.2411
(0.6134) (0.6129) (0.1333) (0.2160)
BroadPost-1 -0.0239 - -0.0241 -0.0261
(0.0189) - (0.0158) (0.0317)
BroadNegt-1 -0.0175 ** - -0.0173 * 0.0127
(0.0086) - (0.0096) (0.0142)
BroadPosNegt-1 - -0.0196 ** - -
- (0.0087) - -
Book Leveraget-1 -0.0170 ** -0.0170 ** -0.0159 ** -0.0185
(0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0077) (0.0152)
Profitabilityt-1 0.2677 ** 0.2668 ** 0.1838 ** 1.1556 ***
(0.0962) (0.0965) (0.0782) (0.1149)
Sizet-1 -0.1055 ** -0.1055 ** -0.0421 *** -0.0269
(0.0434) (0.0434) (0.0095) (0.0179)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No
R2 (within) 0.0537 0.0536 0.0342 na
R2 (between) 0.0258 0.0254 0.0014 na
R2 (overall) 0.0137 0.0136 0.0067 0.3154
n 1,295 1,295 990 304
N 11,305 11,308 9,217 2,084
Panel A: All Firms Panel B: 
US Firms
Panel C: 
EMEA Firms
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Table 2-6 Crossover Credits: Multivariate Regressions for Credit Rating Influence on Capital Structure 
Decision Making 
 
The table shows coefficients (within estimator) and standard errors 
from pooled time-series, cross-sectional regressions (company fixed 
effects). The dependent variable is the net amount of the net debt 
and net equity raised for the year, divided by the beginning of the 
year‘s total assets. In panel A, the dummy variable investment 
grade/speculative grade (IGSGPosNeg) takes the value ―1‖ if the 
company is rated BBB- with negative outlook or BB+ with positive 
outlook and ―0‖ otherwise. In panel B, the dummy variable 
IGSGPosNeg takes the value ―1‖ if the company is rated BBB 
(negative outlook), BBB- (negative outlook), BB+ (positive 
outlook)or BB (positive outlook)and ―0‖ otherwise. The control 
variables include Book Leverage, the total book debt divided by the 
total book debt plus the total book equity, Profitability, previous 
year‘s EBITDA divided by total assets and Size, the natural log of 
total sales. The sample covers the period 1990 to 2008 and excludes 
observations with missing values for any of the variables and firm 
years with debt or equity offerings greater than 10 percent of the 
total assets. Standard errors (in parentheses) are White‘s 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors clustered by firms. The 
total variation (overall R
2
) can be decomposed into within variation 
(within R
2
) over time for each individual and between variation 
across individuals (between R
2
). Year dummy variables (not shown) 
have been included to allow for aggregate time effects. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively.  
  
Panel A: BBB- 
and BB+
Intercept 0.7582 0.7555 **
(0.3781) (0.3783)
IGSGPosNeg -0.0112 -0.0275 ***
(0.0109) (0.0076)
Book Leveraget-1 -0.0172 ** -0.0171 **
(0.0080) (0.0080)
Profitabilityt-1 0.1972 ** 0.1957 **
(0.0821) (0.0821)
Sizet-1 -0.0492 ** -0.0489 *
(0.0251) (0.0251)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R2 (within) 0.0154 0.0159
R2 (between) 0.0832 0.0825
R2 (overall) 0.0131 0.0134
n 1,295 1,295
N 11,308 11,308
Panel B: BBB, BBB-, 
BB+ and BB
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Table 2-7 Analysis by Broad Rating Categories: Multivariate Regressions for Credit Rating Influence on 
Capital Structure Decision Making 
 
The table shows coefficients (within estimator) and standard errors from pooled time-series, cross-
sectional regressions (company fixed effects). The dependent variable is the net amount of net debt 
and net equity raised for the year divided by the beginning of the year‘s total assets. PosNegOutl is an 
aggregate rating-outlook dummy variable equal to ―1‖ if the rating outlook is ―positive / negative‖ and 
―0‖ otherwise. PosOutl and NegOutl are dummy variables for the rating outlook, equal to ―1‖ if the 
rating outlook is ―positive‖ or ―negative‖ and ―0‖ otherwise. The control variables (not shown) 
include Book Leverage, the total book debt divided by the total book debt plus the total book equity, 
Profitability, the previous year‘s EBITDA divided by total assets and Size, the natural log of total 
sales. The sample covers the period 1990 to 2008 and excludes observations with missing values for 
any of the variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are White‘s heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors clustered by firms. Year dummy variables (not shown) have been included to allow for 
aggregate time effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. 
  
Panel A: Including large offerings
AA A BBB BB B CCC
Regression 1
PosNegOutlt-1 0.00214 -0.0146 -0.0104 * -0.0335 ** 0.03596 -0.1360 *
(0.0132) (0.0079) (0.0060) (0.0109) (0.0581) (0.0747)
Regression 2
PosOutlt-1 -0.0086 -0.0061 0.01266 -0.0179 0.0410 -0.1531
(0.0356) (0.0160) (0.0101) (0.0147) (0.0474) (0.2305)
NegOutlt-1 0.00364 -0.0169 * -0.0232 *** -0.0481 *** 0.03244 -0.1313
(0.0131) (0.0080) (0.0071) (0.0141) (0.0687) (0.0881)
Panel B: Excluding large debt offerings (> 10% of assets)
AA A BBB BB B CCC
Regression 1
PosNegOutlt-1 -0.0100 -0.0141 *** -0.0033 0.0064 0.0089 -0.0383 **
(0.0073) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0047) (0.0066) (0.0147)
Regression 2
PosOutlt-1 -0.0173 -0.0035 0.01466 ** 0.02135 ** 0.01893 * -0.2888
(0.0251) (0.0092) (0.0047) (0.0073) (0.0098) (0.1890)
NegOutlt-1 -0.0090 -0.0171 *** -0.0129 *** -0.006 0.00276 -0.0263
(0.0078) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0060) (0.0075) (0.0192)
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Table 2-8 Alternative Control Variables: Multivariate Regressions for Credit Rating Influence on Capital 
Structure Decision Making 
 
The table shows coefficients (within estimator) and standard errors from pooled time-series, cross-sectional 
regressions (company fixed effects). The dependent variable is the net amount of net debt and net equity raised 
for the year, divided by the beginning of the year‘s total assets. PosOutl and NegOutl are dummy variables for 
the rating outlook equal to ―1‖ if the rating outlook is ―positive‖ or ―negative‖ and ―0‖ otherwise. The control 
variables include Book Leverage, total book debt divided by total book debt plus total book equity, Profitability, 
previous year‘s EBITDA divided by total assets and Size, the natural log of total sales. M/B, is defined as the 
book debt plus the market value of the equity divided by the total assets. R&D/A is the research and development 
expense divided by the total assets. Asset tangibility is defined as the net plant, property, and equipment divided 
by the total assets. Financial Slack is defined as cash and short-term investments divided by the total assets. 
Interest Coverage is defined as earnings before interest and tax over net interest expenses. Industry Leverage is 
defined as the two-digit SIC industry median debt ratio. The sample covers the period 1990 to 2008 and excludes 
observations with missing values for any of the variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are White‘s 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors clustered by firm. The total variation (overall R
2
) can be 
decomposed into within variation (within R
2
) over time for each individual and between variation across 
individuals (between R
2
). Year dummy variables (not shown) have been included to allow for aggregate time 
effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Intercept 0.5693 ***
(0.1309)
PosOutlt-1 -0.0193 **
(0.0086)
NegOutlt-1 -0.0259 ***
(0.0059)
Book Leveraget-1 -0.0153 **
(0.0070)
Profitabilityt-1 -0.0113
(0.0929)
Sizet-1 -0.0420 ***
(0.0085)
M/Bt-1 0.0409 ***
(0.0096)
R&D/At-1 0.2416
(0.2763)
R&Ddt-1 -0.0113
(0.0086)
Tangibilityt-1 0.0667
(0.0480)
Financial Slackt-1 0.1476 *
(0.0780)
Interest Coveraget-1 0.0019 ***
(0.0003)
Industry Leveraget-1 -0.1678
(0.1336)
Fixed Effects Yes
Year Dummy Variables Yes
R2 (within) 0.0709
R2 (between) 0.0216
R2 (overall) 0.0320
n 944
N 8,858
US Firms
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Figures 2 
Figure 2-1 Average Net Debt minus Net Equity Issuance per Rating Category, 1990-2008 
 
This figure depicts the average net debt minus net equity issuance (as a percentage of the total assets) by 
rating category. The sample consists of S&P-rated firms for the period 1990 to 2008. Firm years with 
very large debt offerings (>10 percent of assets) have been excluded from the statistics.  
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Figure 2-2 Average Net Debt and Average Net Equity Issuance by Rating Category, 1990-2008 
 
This figure depicts the average net debt and net equity issuance (as a percentage of the total assets) by 
rating category. The sample consists of S&P-rated firms for the period 1990 to 2008. Firm years with 
very large debt offerings (>10 percent of assets) have been excluded from the statistics.  
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Figure 2-3 Average Net Debt Issuance (issuance of debt minus repurchase of debt) by Credit Rating Outlook 
and Rating Category, 1990-2008 
 
This figure depicts the average net debt issuance (as a percentage of the total assets) by rating category divided 
into firm years with a positive or negative outlook and those with a stable outlook. The sample consists of S&P-
rated firms for the period 1990 to 2008. Firm years with very large debt offerings (>10 percent of assets) have 
been excluded from the statistics.  
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Figure 2-4 Average Net Equity Issuance (issuance of equity – repurchase of equity) by Credit Rating Outlook 
and Rating Category, 1990–2008 
This figure depicts the average net equity issuance (as a percentage of total assets) by rating category divided 
into firm-years with a positive or negative outlook and those with a stable outlook. The sample consists of S&P-
rated firms for the period 1990 to 2008. 
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3 Debt-Equity Choice: Credit Rating Concerns 
or Market Timing? 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the debt-equity choice of a rated company sample. 
Specifically, the aim is to contrast the market timing rationale and credit rating 
concerns of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Our empirical set-up allows for a 
more accurate test of rating concerns than has previously been provided in the 
literature. Our research is important because SEOs are widely believed to be due 
to managers‘ market timing efforts (e.g., Marsh 1982). However, Chang et al. 
(2006) find that specifically firms marked by a high degree of information 
asymmetry exploit favorable market conditions or the mispricing of the 
companies‘ stock if they issue equity. On the other hand, externally rated firms, 
i.e. firms that access public debt markets, tend to be larger, willing to comply with 
strict disclosure requirements, and show sufficient informational transparency 
(Lemmon and Zender 2010).
52
 This helps limit potential mispricing by capital 
markets and suggests that rated firms should be less prone to market timing.
53
 In 
addition, empirically, the studies by Kisgen (2006; 2009) show that credit rating 
considerations and concerns play an incrementally important role in determining a 
firm‘s financing policy relative to traditional capital structure policies. Our study 
develops this approach further and significantly refines the empirical 
methodology. Finally, corporate managers‘ survey reports suggest that credit 
rating concerns and market timing influence most capital structure decisions 
(Graham and Harvey 2001).  
The purpose of this study is therefore to gauge the relative importance of 
market timing and credit rating considerations in a firm‘s debt-equity choice. 
Moreover, the chapter analyzes corporate financing decisions on a very broad 
scale, i.e. including also debt and equity reductions. Our results show that under 
certain circumstances credit rating concerns are indeed more important for the 
decision to conduct a seasoned equity offering than market timing. The effect is 
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 Lemmon and Roberts (2010) show that even speculative grade companies are larger and 
financially healthier than non-rated bank-dependent companies (measured by Altman Z-scores). 
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 Alternatively, fluctuations in adverse selection costs could be the driver of market timing 
(Wagner 2008). However, consistent with most previous works, our study focuses on mispricing 
as the main mechanism for market timing. 
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even greater if the decision to issue equity is contrasted with the choice to issue 
debt. 
Owing to the financial crisis, negative rating momentum and covenant 
pressure induced strong equity issuance in 2009 (Stillit and Khabrieva 2009). 
Ratings-led issuers included Europe's biggest maker of beer and soft drink cans, 
Rexam (GBP 350mn), and the Anglo-Dutch publisher Reed Elsevier (GBP 
800mn). In summary, 58 rated issuers tapped the European equity markets from 
October 2008 to August 2009, of which 46, i.e. 79 percent, had had a prior 
negative credit rating event. The ―through-the-cycle‖ and therefore rather sticky 
nature of credit ratings means that they will lag behind any upturn in operational 
performance (Altman and Rijken 2006; Altman and Rijken 2007; Fons et al. 
2002). Therefore, only additional equity to bolster credit ratios guarantees relief 
from credit rating and covenant pressure. But there are also examples of 
opportunistic equity issuance on the back of strong share performance in 2009: 
Global steel maker ArcelorMittal (USD 3.2 bn.) and the UK supermarket chain 
Sainsbury‘s (GBP 242 m.). 
Managers‘ credit rating centricity can be formally explained by credit 
ratings‘ function as a signal of credit quality for investors and their impact on the 
firm‘s cost of capital (Boot et al. 2006). Kisgen and Strahan (2010) show the 
economic significance that ratings-based regulations have on bond investments 
and firm‘s cost of debt. This can be through direct rating-triggered costs (e.g., 
through step-up coupons or put rights for investors) or by restricting potential 
investor pools to certain groups (some pension funds are restricted in only being 
allowed to invest in high quality borrowers) (Billett et al. 2010; Koziol and 
Lawrenz 2010). Given that investors regard credit ratings as informative and a 
signal of firm quality, the loss of a certain rating level is associated with discrete 
costs for the firm (Kisgen 2006; Kisgen 2009). In the absence of a liquid CDS 
market, the firm‘s credit rating and particularly the rating outlook are investors‘ 
key sources of financial risk information (Altman and Rijken 2007). All this helps 
explain managers‘ sensitivity to the firm‘s credit rating and outlook.54 
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 For a complete description of the relevance of credit ratings for managers‘ capital structure 
decisions please see Kisgen (2006). 
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This study complements earlier works on credit ratings‘ relevance for 
capital structure decisions. Specifically, our study extends Kisgen (2006) and 
Michelsen and Klein (2010), who analyze the leverage behavior of firms close to 
rating upgrades or downgrades. In line with the two studies, we also want to 
measure security issuance and repurchase decisions in relation to imminent 
changes in the firm‘s credit rating. The methodology of Kisgen (2006) regards 
plus or minus ratings as being close to a rating‘s change. However, according to 
rating agencies, the ―+‖ or ―-‖ attached to a credit rating is only a ―sign to show 
relative standing within the major rating categories‖ (Standard&Poor‘s 2009). 
Consequently, a ―+‖ or ―-‖ rating does not allow conclusions to be made on the 
future development of the issuer credit rating.
 55
  
Our study develops the approach further, while sticking to the fundamental 
hypothesis that firms issue equity rather than debt if their credit rating is about to 
be downgraded, and relies on the rating outlook to measure the likelihood of a 
change in the issuer credit rating in the following year (see Michelsen and Klein 
2010 for a similar approach). Hamilton and Cantor (2004) show that over a one-
year horizon ―issuers with negative outlooks are seven times more likely to be 
downgraded than upgraded; issuers with positive outlooks are nearly twice as 
likely to be upgraded as downgraded; and issuers with stable outlooks have the 
highest probability of no rating change.‖ Furthermore, the default rates within a 
rating class are systematically associated with the outlook status. In addition, the 
study provides evidence that the rating history is no longer predictive of future 
rating changes if the rating outlook is controlled for. In fact, rating agencies have 
introduced rating outlooks to balance rating stability (―through-the-cycle‖ 
approach) and timeliness, i.e. accuracy in default prediction. Standard&Poor‘s 
states that a rating outlook is meant to assess ―the potential direction of a long-
term credit rating over the intermediate term (typically six months to two years)‖ 
(Standard&Poor‘s 2009). Rating agencies further define outlooks as a response to 
changes in the economic and fundamental business conditions. A rating outlook 
therefore provides a signal of the probability and the direction of a rating‘s 
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 Alternatively, Kisgen (2006) introduces a firm-specific ―credit score‖ that is meant to act as a 
proxy for a rating change‘s imminence. However, managers do not know their firm‘s credit score 
and therefore cannot take it into account if they decide on capital structure. 
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change.
56
 Using credit scoring models, Altman and Rijken (2007) show that a 
rating outlook provides investors with additional information. In summary, the 
discussion illustrates that a rating outlook is an almost perfect proxy for the 
likelihood of a rating‘s change. As far as we know, we are, together with 
Michelsen and Klein (2010), the first to incorporate rating outlooks in the 
empirical capital structure and security issuance discussion. The study 
complements Michelsen and Klein (2010) by studying the security issuance 
decision (seasoned equity and debt) in more depth and by clearly differentiate the 
credit rating effect of seasoned equity offerings from market timing attempts by 
managers. Moreover, we track the leverage and market-to-book ratios in SEO 
time, i.e. relative to the offering year. Also the scope of control variables has been 
considerably enlarged compared to Michelsen and Klein (2010). 
Consequently, our study tries to provide answers to the following main 
research questions: Are externally rated companies‘ seasoned equity offerings 
also marked by manager‘s market timing efforts, or are they instead driven by 
rating concerns? What is the relative importance of rating considerations versus 
market timing? Do potential rating downgrades have a stronger influence on 
subsequent equity issuance than potential upgrades? What is the relative 
importance of the two explanations if the debt-equity choice is considered? Does 
the incorporation of equity and debt repurchases/reductions change the results? 
Does the risk of losing an investment grade rating or access to the commercial 
paper market increase the likelihood of a seasoned equity offering even further? 
We find that a negative rating outlook prior to the transaction is 
significantly more often found in respect of firms conducting SEOs than a positive 
rating outlook. Using logistic estimates and controlling for other firm 
characteristics suggest that a negative outlook increases and a positive decreases 
the likelihood of an SEO. The effect is both statistically and economically 
stronger if dual issues are excluded or the debt-equity choice is analyzed. On the 
other hand, the influence of market timing on the SEO decision is slightly less 
than rating concerns. Including equity and debt repurchases in the analysis 
provides further insights. As expected, negative rating momentum decreases the 
likelihood of equity repurchases and debt issues.  
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 Cantor and Hamilton (2005) show that outlooks partly explain the differences between actual 
ratings and ratings implied by CDS spreads. 
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the 
empirical predictions regarding the questions of market timing‘s and credit 
rating‘s influence on capital structure. This section further describes the context of 
earlier studies on these two topics. Section 3.3 provides this study‘s empirical 
methodology and a summary of the statistics of the rated firm sample. Section 3.4 
forms the main body of the univariate and multivariate analyses of the equity and 
debt issuance decision. Further robustness tests are described in section 3.5, while 
the chapter is concluded in section 3.6. 
3.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses 
Most studies on topics such as IPO underpricing or empirical capital 
structure only differentiate between firms with a public issuer credit rating and 
those that are non-rated (e.g. An and Chan 2008; Lemmon and Zender 2010). 
Lemmon and Zender (2010), for example, use an external credit rating as a proxy 
for unconstrained debt capacity, i.e. access to public debt markets.
57
 None of these 
studies distinguish between different rating classes or between the respective 
rating outlooks. 
Beside the seminal studies by Kisgen (2006; 2009), Hovakimian et al. 
(2009) focus explicitly on credit ratings in capital structure decision making. 
Kisgen‘s studies analyze net debt issuance prior to and following rating changes. 
While managers follow a more conservative leverage strategy if the firm‘s credit 
rating is about to be raised or lowered, they only reduce leverage following actual 
downgrades; rating upgrades do not induce significant subsequent capital 
structure activity. The study by Michelsen and Klein (2010) incorporates the 
rating outlook in the discussion and shows that the credit rating effect persists if 
this more accurate measure of the likelihood of a rating‘s change is employed. 
However, their results suggest that managers react not fully symmetrically to 
potential upgrades and downgrades. The credit rating effect of a negative rating 
outlook is both statistically and economically stronger. Together with Kisgen 
(2009), these findings are generally consistent with managers‘ targeting of 
minimum rating levels. This is supported by Hovakimian et al.‘s (2009) study, 
which proves that firms reduce (increase) leverage if the actual credit rating is 
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 Bolton and Freixas (2000) also support the idea that access to public debt markets measures a 
firm‘s debt capacity. 
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below (above) the target rating. The empirical relationship holds if corporate 
payout policy or acquisitions are considered.  
As our sample comprises US S&P rated companies, as well as European, 
Middle Eastern, and African, and we aim to compare rating concerns regarding 
SEOs with the market timing explanation, our research also relates to other 
international studies on market timing (e.g. Bie and Haan 2007; Kim and 
Weisbach 2008; Mahajan and Tartaroglu 2008; Sautner and Spranger 2009).  
In the light of these prior studies, we expect that a negative (positive) prior 
rating outlook increases (decreases) the likelihood of a seasoned equity offering. 
The effect should be more pronounced if equity issuance is compared with debt 
issuance. Consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2002), we also expect that a higher 
market-to-book ratio increases the SEO probability.
58
 Our study will contrast the 
influence of the two hypotheses on equity and debt issuance.  
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Sample Construction 
The initial sample consists of US and EMEA firms that either have an 
outstanding or past (long-term domestic) issuer credit rating by Standard and 
Poor‘s. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) from the sample due to 
the highly regulated environment in which they operate and as their capital 
structures are likely to differ substantially compared from those of industrial or 
service firms. Since our analysis is geared to S&P‘s credit rating outlook, which 
although it was previously assigned, was only reflected in the database in 1990, 
the period under review is 1990-2008.
59
 In a first step, we match all observations 
with firm-level and stock return data from the Thomson Financial database. In a 
second step, we match all observations with Securities Data Company‘s (SDC) 
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 Our study focuses on the short-term impact of market timing on security issuance decisions. 
Other papers study whether firms undo the effects of market timing on capital structure in the long 
run (e.g. Leary and Roberts 2005).  
59
 The rating outlook was first introduced in the US and subsequently applied to the whole S&P 
universe. 
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Global New Issues database.
60
 This allows us to identify firms that have issued 
public equity, i.e. conducted seasoned equity offerings during the sampling 
period. Pure secondary offerings, i.e. offerings during which the firm received no 
cash, are excluded. Only pure primary and combinations of primary and 
secondary offerings are included in the subsequent analysis. Moreover, we 
exclude unit offers, closed-end funds, American Depository Receipts, limited 
partnerships, and penny stocks from the sample.
61
 In the rare cases of a single 
issuer having conducted multiple SEOs per year, we aggregate the issue proceeds 
and treat the total as a single observation. In order to guarantee a broad dataset, 
firms are not required to have complete data for all the variables available on 
Thomson Financial every year.  
Firm years are classified as net debt issuers if the year on year change in 
total (short-term plus long-term) book debt exceeds 5 percent of the total assets 
(for a similar approach, see Hovakimian et al. (2001)). Therefore, the definition of 
debt issuance comprises capital from both public and private sources.
62
 This is a 
valid approach as rating agencies do not distinguish between the sources of capital 
and market timing efforts largely refer to equity issuances (Baker and Wurgler 
2002; Standard&Poor‘s 2008b). 
Consequently, our main findings are based on a sample of 13,736 firm 
years, 822 SEOs, and 5,491 debt issuances. 
We largely follow the studies by Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Alti (2006) 
in our selection and definition of variables that determine capital structure. The 
variables are defined as follows: book debt, D, is the total liabilities and the 
preferred stock (replaced by the redemption value of the preferred stock if this is 
missing) minus the deferred taxes and convertible debt; book equity, E, is the total 
assets minus the book debt; book leverage, D/A, is the book debt divided by the 
total assets; and net equity issued, e/A, is the change in the book equity from the 
fiscal year t-1 to t minus the change in balance sheet retained earnings divided by 
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 Alternatively, equity issuers can be defined as firms with a year-on-year change in balance sheet 
equity greater than 5 percent of their total assets (Hovakimian et al. 2001). This alternative 
definition of equity issuers does not materially affect the findings of this study. 
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 See Bortolotti et al. (2008), Draho (2008) and Hsuan-Chi et al. (2010) for alternative equity 
selling mechanisms. 
62
 The main findings of the study are robust if debt issuance is restricted to public non-convertible 
debt.  
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the total assets. Net debt issued, d/A, is defined as the year on year change in book 
debt, while market-to-book ratio, M/B, is the same as book debt plus the market 
value of equity (common shares outstanding multiply by the share price) divided 
by the total assets.
63
 The standardized market-to-book ratio, Stand-M/B, is the 
actual market-to-book ratio divided by the median market-to-book ratio of all 
firms in the sample (DeAngelo et al. 2009); the historic finance weighted average 
of the market-to-book ratio, BW-M/B, is consistent with Baker and Wurgler 
(2002); and the industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio, Indu-M/B, is the actual 
market-to-book ratio divided by the median industry market-to-book ratio 
(Dittmar and Thakor 2007). The industry is the three-digit SIC code; the prior 
abnormal stock return, PriorAbnReturn, is the average 36- month prior (and 
ending immediately before the year in question) stock return net of the value-
weighted market index (Loughran and Ritter 1995; Loughran and Ritter 1997); 
while the future abnormal stock return, FutureAbnReturn, is the average 36-month 
future (starting with the closing price after the year in question) stock return net of 
the value-weighted market index. Other measures of mispricing relative to 
previous years are the price run-up, PriceRunup, defined as market value of equity 
in year t divided by the average market value of the equity of the years t-1 and t-2. 
The price-earnings multiple, PE, is defined as the share price at the fiscal year-end 
divided by the last 12-month earnings per share. Discretionary accruals, Disc-
Accruals, are a balance-sheet-based overvaluation measure, defined as the 
difference between realized and normalized accruals (Chan et al. 2006; Polk and 
Sapienza 2008). 
Profitability, EBITDA/A, is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation/amortization divided by the total assets. Firm size, SIZE, is the 
natural log of total sales; while R&D/A is the research and development expense 
divided by the total assets and replaced by zero if missing. It serves as a proxy for 
investment opportunities (Fama and French 2002). In conjunction with this, the 
dummy variable, R&Dd, takes a value of one in the regressions if R&D/A is 
missing and is accordingly replaced by zero (Alti 2006). The tangibility of the 
total assets, PPE/A, is the net plant, property, and equipment over assets; and 
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 Consistent with previous studies on the topic, we drop observations for which M/B or its 
modifications exceed 10.0. 
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financial slack, Cash/A, is the cash and equivalents divided by the total assets 
(Dittmar and Thakor 2007).  
3.3.2 Operationalization of Rating Concerns 
Consistent with Michelsen and Klein (2010), we define managers‘ rating 
concerns on the basis of S&P‘s credit rating outlook. Specifically, we construct 
dummy variables that help distinguish between firms that are close to a credit 
rating upgrade / downgrade and those that are not. This setting allows us to test 
for changes in both micro rating categories, i.e. BBB+ or BBB, and in major 
(broad) rating categories, i.e. BBB or BB. Although corporate ratings are rather 
stable and insensitive to short-term movements in the firm‘s economic and/or 
business conditions (due to the ―through-the-cycle‖ rating methodology), the 
rating outlook delivers additional and particularly timely information on corporate 
creditworthiness (Altman and Rijken 2007). In an attempt to balance rating 
stability and timeliness, the credit outlook ―assesses the potential direction of a 
long-term credit rating over the intermediate term (typically six months to two 
years)‖ (Standard&Poor‘s 2009). Since investors rely heavily on the rating 
outlook – especially from their point-in-time perspective – managers also pay 
close attention to the firm‘s prevailing rating outlook. 
As an operationalization, we create two dummy variables, PosOutl/NegOutl, 
for the rating outlook at the end of the firm‘s fiscal year and track the firm‘s 
security issuance decisions over the subsequent 12 months (Michelsen and Klein 
2010). This approach is likely to add noise to the empirical tests because the 
firm‘s rating outlook or issuer rating can easily change during the 12-month 
period. Any interim fiscal year changes would therefore render a measurement at 
the beginning of the year inaccurate. Other constraining issues are the 
considerable transactions costs associated with debt and equity offerings and the 
time lag between decision making and issuance (Lee et al. 1996). Owing to these, 
seasoned equity offerings are very irregular and rare (Eckbo and Masulis 2005). 
On the whole, all these complicating factors could impair the accuracy of our 
analyses and, consequently, influence the measured credit rating effect.  
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The variables PosOutl and NegOutl are the focal point of this study 
regarding measuring firms‘ potential rating concerns when conducting seasoned 
equity offerings or issuing debt.  
3.3.3 Sample Characteristics 
Tables 3-1 to 3-3 display the summary statistics of the externally rated firm 
sample.  
Table 3-1 presents selected variables‘ statistics for the overall sample, the 
two security issuance types (debt and equity), and non-issuers. By comparison, 
our equity issuers are larger than the sampled firms in related studies by Elliott et 
al. (2008) and Chang et al. (2006). This is not surprising, as externally rated firms 
tend to be larger than average public firms (Chang et al. 2006; Hovakimian et al. 
2009; Lemmon et al. 2008).
64
 In line with previous works, the SEO firms are also 
smaller in terms of both total assets and sales than the debt issuance sub-sample. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the equity issuers‘ average market-to-book ratio is slightly 
lower than that of debt issuers. However, both averages are higher than those of 
non-issuers. Equity and debt issuers‘ leverage, profitability, and financial slack 
(cash balances) statistics are more or less equal.
65
 The SEO subsample has more 
tangible assets than debt or non-issuers. Generally, we expect firms with a high 
degree of collateral to issue debt instead of equity. This differing finding might be 
due to the overall rated sample having more tangible assets on average than the 
cross section of non-rated issuers (Lemmon et al. 2008).  
Table 3-2 and table 3-3 show summary statistics of SEO firms relative to the 
offer (fiscal) year. Table 3-2‘s general patterns are consistent with studies by Alti 
(2006) and Wagner (2008). On average, leverage drops from 64.4 percent before 
the SEO to 60.7 percent in the (fiscal) year of the offering, and is more or less 
constant in the following years. Favoring market timing, the market-to-book ratio 
is highest at 1.59 in the year before the offering and declines subsequently. As 
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 Generally, rated firms have more easy access to debt at lower costs (Elliott et al. 2008). This 
translates into a higher leverage ratio of firms with rated debt outstanding. Moreover, Hovakimian 
et al. (2009) show that rated firms tend to be older, more profitable, and have more tangible assets. 
In terms of market values, their leverage ratios are also higher on average than those of the cross-
section of non-rated firms. 
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 Consistent with Hovakimian (2004), we find that equity issuers are rather under-levered than 
over-levered.  
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expected, the equity financing e/A is most pronounced (9.7 percent of total assets) 
in the offer year and drops significantly in the aftermath. Interestingly, debt 
financing coincides with the equity issuance decision and is at its highest around 
the SEO offer year (Walker and Yost 2008). While 8.3 percent (of total assets) in 
the year prior to the offering and 7.1 percent in the offering year, debt issuance 
declines heavily in the following years. Cash balances increase only slightly from 
7.4 percent pre-SEO to 8.2 percent in the offering year. Therefore, in contrast to 
Kim and Weisbach (2008), we do not find widespread stockpiling of issue 
proceeds. However, our results could be more in line with DeAngelo et al. (2009), 
who find that their sample firms would soon face financial constraints without the 
SEO issue proceeds. 
Table 3-3 displays leverage and market-to-book ratios in SEO time by rating 
outlook as of the fiscal year-end before the offering year. The pre-SEO leverage 
ratio of the three different rating outlooks is comparable. Perhaps surprisingly, in 
the offer year, the leverage reduction of -10.2 percent in positive outlook firms is 
most pronounced. This should be compared with -3.8 percent and -5.5 percent in 
negative and stable outlook firms. Interestingly, negative outlook firms reduce 
their leverage ratio significantly from 61.0 percent to 57.9 percent between the 
offer year +3 and the offer year +5, while the other firms keep the ratio more or 
less constant over the same period.
66
 In terms of market-to-book ratio, negative 
outlook firms have a considerable lower ratio in the year before the offering, 
which declines even further in the offer year. However, the ratio increases 
significantly between the offer year and the offer year +1. In contrast, SEOs with 
a positive prior rating outlook show a hike in the market-to-book ratio in the SEO 
year, but decline steadily thereafter. This suggests that the mispricing 
opportunities and managers‘ market timing efforts of positive and negative 
outlook SEOs might differ.  
The rating distribution of the SEO sample is essentially symmetric (not 
tabulated); with approximately 250 firms each, BBB and BB issuers dominate the 
dataset. This is consistent with the overall rating distribution of S&P‘s long-term 
issuer credit rating distribution. 
                                                 
66
 This is in contrast to Walker and Yost (2008), who find that firms increase their long-term debt 
after the seasoned equity offering. This debt increase results in firms' leverage ratios after the SEO 
being similar to those before the offering. 
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3.4 Main Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Univariate Evidence of the Decision to Conduct an SEO 
Table 3-4 contrasts the rating outlook, market timing opportunities, and 
capital structure characteristics of seasoned equity issuers and non-equity issuers, 
as well as debt issuers and non-debt issuers. Moreover, the table shows univariate 
test statistics for equity versus debt transactions.
67
  
Panel A of table 3-4 suggests that the credit ratings of firms conducting 
SEOs have a negative outlook significantly more often and a positive outlook 
prior to the transaction less often. This favors our hypothesis that SEOs are 
conducted to support or protect the issuer‘s credit rating. With respect to the 
market-to-book ratio and its modifications, we find no evidence of market timing 
efforts. Note that the non-issuing group even exhibits a higher historic finance 
weighted average of the market-to-book ratio than the SEO sample. However, the 
lack of statistical significance may be due to the above-mentioned shortcomings 
of the market-to-book ratio as a proxy of the market timing efforts. In fact, the 
SEO sample differs significantly with respect to our alternative market timing 
proxy variables PriorAbnReturn and FutureAbnReturn. On average, firms in the 
SEO sample statistically show significantly higher stock returns prior to the 
offerings, while their post-transaction stock returns are lower than those of the 
non-issuing group. These observed stock return patterns support the hypothesis 
that managers conduct SEOs to take advantage of attractive stock market 
valuations (Loughran and Ritter 1995). We find that firms issuing equity have 
statistically higher pre-transaction leverage ratios, less R&D expenses, and more 
tangible assets. They exhibit significantly lower operating profitability and are 
smaller, in terms of total sales, than non-equity-issuers.  
In panel B of table 3-4, we find that, statistically, debt issuers less often 
have a negative rating outlook prior to debt offerings, which is consistent with our 
postulated credit rating-capital structure hypothesis. However, they exhibit no 
difference with respect to the positive rating outlook. Managers might regard a 
possible downgrade of the corporate rating as a stronger signal to follow a more 
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 In panel C, we exclude cases where firms issued both debt and equity in a given fiscal year 
(Hovakimian et al. 2001; Marsh 1982). Our results are qualitatively identical if these cases are 
instead classified according to the maximum amount of a type of security issued in a given year.  
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conservative debt issuance.
68
 This may be interpreted as consistent with Kisgen 
(2009), who finds that ratings downgrades result in subsequent leverage 
reductions, but that firms do not appear to react to rating upgrades. On average, 
firms issuing debt exhibit higher market-to-book ratios. Interestingly, the pattern 
of pre-transaction and post-transaction stock returns is similar to the above-
mentioned equity issuer characteristics. This can be explained by the above 
described coincidence of equity and debt issues. We find that debt issuers have 
lower leverage ratios and R&D expenses and exhibit a higher operating 
profitability and asset tangibility.  
Panel C contrasts equity and debt issuers‘ sample characteristics. The results 
suggest that equity issuers more often have a pre-transaction negative rating 
outlook. However, we find no statistical and only marginal economic difference 
with regard to the positive outlook. Consistent with the findings of panel A 
regarding the SEO sample, debt issuers, on average, exhibit higher market-to-
book ratios. As expected, on the back of the simultaneous timing of equity and 
debt issues, there is no statistical difference in respect of the abnormal stock return 
patterns (Walker and Yost 2008). However, equity issuers have higher pre-offer 
leverage ratios and show lower operating profitability. They are smaller in terms 
of total sales and have more tangible assets on the balance sheet. 
On the whole, from a univariate point of view, we find strong evidence of 
rating considerations prior to equity and debt transactions, while we find only 
limited support for rated equity issuers‘ potential market timing efforts.  
3.4.2 Multivariate Tests of the Security Issuance Decision 
To identify the multivariate impact of our empirical proxies on the 
likelihood of security issuance, we estimate logit regression models (DeAngelo et 
al. 2009).
69
 The dependent variable in table 3-5‘s regressions equals one if a firm 
conducts an SEO in a given year and zero otherwise. We use the above-described 
rating dummy variables, market timing proxies, and capital structure 
characteristics as independent variables. 
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 Using Eurobond data, Steiner and Heinke (2001) find only abnormal negative bond returns 
following negatives reviews and downgrades and no significant price changes following positive 
reviews and upgrades. Hull et al.‘s (2004) results suggest that positive rating events are far less 
significant for CDS prices than negative rating events.  
69
 Our findings are qualitatively identical if, instead, probit models are applied. 
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Table 3-5 provides the regression results with the coefficients reported as 
marginal effects. While panel A contains the full sample, panel B excludes cases 
of SEOs and debt offerings (dual issues) in the same fiscal year (Autore and 
Kovacs 2010; Hovakimian et al. 2001; Marsh 1982). The descriptive analysis in 
section 3.3.3 suggests that rated firms‘ equity and debt issuance are often paired.70 
Excluding dual issues allows us to draw a clearer distinction between the decision 
to issue equity or debt. 
The first column of panel A includes only the two rating outlook dummies 
in the analysis. Both variables have a statistically significant influence on the 
likelihood of an SEO. As expected, firms are likelier to announce an SEO at the 
fiscal year-end following a negative rating outlook before the offering, while a 
positive prior rating outlook lessens the likelihood of an SEO. At 0.9 percent and -
1.7 percent the marginal effects of the rating concerns are modest. This 
nevertheless supports our hypothesis that firms issue equity to bolster their credit 
rating if they experience negative rating momentum, and refrain from issuing 
equity if the rating momentum is positive. However, the overall model fit is rather 
poor.  
The second column of table 3-5 provides the regression results of only the 
set of control variables and market timing proxies (Alti 2006; Wagner 2008). 
While the influence of the standardized market-to-book ratio on the SEO 
probability is positive, its marginal effect is only modest. Therefore, using the 
market-to-book ratio as the proxy for mispricing, we find only limited support for 
the market timing hypothesis. With respect to the other control variables, the 
results show that profitability, R&D expenses, and size lessen the likelihood of an 
SEO. On the other hand, firms with more tangible assets are likelier to announce 
an SEO.  
The third column of panel A presents logistic estimations for the full set of 
variables. Note that the negative rating outlook variable is no longer statistically 
significant under this setting, while the positive rating outlook still has a 
statistically significant negative influence on the SEO likelihood. The other 
variables‘ marginal effects are largely unchanged. Also clustering the standard 
errors by industry (based on the two-digit SIC code), or by industry and time does 
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 Walker and Yost (2008) report a similar finding. 
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not change our results (per Petersen 2009). This finding is not fully consistent 
with our credit-rating hypothesis, as we regard a negative rating outlook a 
stronger signal for managers. There are two possible explanations for this result. 
First, the yearly measurement of the rating outlook – discussed above – is likely to 
add noise to the analysis. Second, the results may be driven by equity offerings 
together with debt offerings. As our postulated implications for debt and equity 
offerings with respect to the rating rationale are contrary, it could make sense to 
restrict the sample to SEOs with no simultaneous debt offering in the same fiscal 
year. 
In this alternative specification in panel B of table 3-5, only a negative prior 
rating outlook has a statistically significant positive influence on the SEO 
decision. Moreover, its marginal effect of 1.1 percent is also slightly higher 
compared to the 0.7 percent in panel A. The positive rating outlook dummy 
variable still has a negative marginal effect but it is no longer statistically 
significant. These findings are consistent with our univariate results above. We 
find no evidence of market timing attempts, as the standardized market-to-book 
ratio has no economically significant impact on the likelihood that an SEO will be 
conducted. The results of the control variables are qualitatively identical to those 
in panel A.  
Together, the estimates indicate that rating concerns indeed play a 
significant role in the decision to conduct an SEO. If the market-to-book ratio is 
applied as the mispricing proxy, the rating concerns inherent in SEOs are even 
stronger than market timing attempts.  
Next, we more closely investigate the general security issuance decision. 
Table 3-6‘s logistic estimations are motivated by Autore and Kovacs (2010) and 
Hovakimian et al. (2001), and contrast the decision to issue equity or debt. The 
dependent variable in the regressions equals one if a firms conducts an SEO in a 
given year and zero if it issues a significant amount of debt.
71
 In panel A, dual 
issues of equity and debt are excluded from the analysis, while we restrict the 
sample to ―pure‖ transactions in panel B (Hovakimian 2004; Hovakimian et al. 
2009). Transactions in which firms issue equity while reducing debt, or where 
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 The results are qualitatively identical if the equity issuance is defined on the basis of changes in 
the balance sheet equity. This approach could help mitigate the effect of executive stock options 
(Autore and Kovacs 2010). 
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they issue debt while repurchasing equity, are excluded. This is motivated by 
Hovakimian (2004), who provides evidence that the subsample of equity issues 
together with debt reductions is the major driver of the target leverage‘s role (and 
deviation from it) in earlier debt versus equity issuance models.  
Consistent with the credit rating-capital structure hypothesis, we expect 
firms to issue equity rather than debt when their credit rating outlook is negative 
(Kisgen 2006; Michelsen and Klein 2010). On the other hand, a positive rating 
outlook could limit the need for an SEO, and therefore lessen the likelihood of an 
equity issue relative to a debt issue. Losing or obtaining a broad rating category, 
such as A or BBB, might be an even stronger signal to investors than the change 
in micro rating categories, or may induce rating-triggered costs (benefits) for the 
firm. Table 3-6 provides evidence of the relationship between changes in broad 
ratings and managers‘ security issuance decisions.72 In addition, the dummy 
variable investment grade/speculative grade (IGSG) allows us to test for the 
importance of the distinction between investment-grade and speculative-grade 
ratings.
73
 We expect that particularly firms on the verge of an investment grade 
credit rating issue equity rather than debt in order to support an upgrade or avoid 
any down notching to speculative grade. On the other hand, temporary market 
mispricing, measured by the standardized market-to-book ratio, is expected to 
increase the likelihood of equity financing versus debt financing. 
The logistic estimations in panel A of table 3-6 show that the credit rating 
effect in external financing decisions is stronger if debt and equity issuance are 
contrasted. While both rating outlook dummy variables have the expected sign of 
the marginal effect, the market-to-book ratio has a negative influence on the 
equity issuance likelihood. However, only a negative rating outlook has a 
statistically significant influence on the issuance of equity rather than debt. The 
dummy variables measuring imminent changes in broad rating categories have the 
expected signs of the marginal effects, but they do not exhibit a statistically 
significant influence on the security issuance decision.
74
 The same is true for the 
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 See Michelsen and Klein (2010) for a complete definition of the dummy variables that help to 
measure the potential change in broad rating categories. 
73
 The variable IGSG is defined consistent with chapter 2. 
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 The dummy variable BroadPos takes the value ―1‖ if the firm‗s rating is on the upper border of 
a broad rating, for example, BB+, and has a positive outlook. The dummy variable BroadNeg 
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investment grade/speculative grade variable IGSG. The marginal effect estimates 
in panel B suggest that if only ―pure‖ transactions are considered, both credit 
rating outlooks are key drivers of security issuance decisions. A positive rating 
outlook lessens the likelihood of equity issuance rather than debt by 6.1 percent, 
while a negative outlook increases the likelihood by 3.3 percent. In addition, in 
this context, neither the broad rating changes variables nor our market timing 
proxy gains statistical significance.
75
  
In summary, the debt-equity choice models support our credit-rating 
hypothesis. The security issuance decisions of externally rated firms appear to be 
driven more by rating considerations than by market timing attempts.
76
  
Firms‘ capital structure decision adjustments are not solely done through 
security issuance, but also with the help of equity repurchases and debt 
reductions.
77
 The study by Hovakimian (2004) reports that debt reductions are 
specifically used to offset deviations from the target leverage. Therefore, only a 
model that displays the whole spectrum of possible mechanisms for capital 
structure alterations is appropriate to correctly measure possible credit rating 
concerns and market timing efforts. Table 3-7‘s multinomial logit model estimates 
the probability of issuing or repurchasing debt or equity against a no-transaction 
alternative.  
Marginal effects indicate that the probability of a debt issue is less for firms 
with a negative prior rating outlook (-5.7 percent). Also the likelihood of firms 
buying back debt is higher if there is a negative rating momentum (2.9 percent). 
However, the negative credit rating outlook is insignificant if equity issues or 
repurchases are considered. Moreover, a positive rating outlook has no effect on 
issuing, or repurchasing debt or equity. Apparently, managers react to rating 
pressure by adjusting primarily the firm‘s debt position. This is reasonable, as 
equity offerings have a longer lead time and higher transactions costs. Consistent 
                                                                                                                                     
takes the value ―1‖ if the firm‗s rating is on the lower border of a broad rating, for example, BB-, 
and has a negative outlook. 
75
 The marginal effects of the control variables are in line with the findings of the previous logit 
models. 
76
 In section 3.4.4 we will replicate the logistic estimates with alternative market timing proxies. 
77
 Kisgen (2009) examines firms‘ issuance and repurchase decisions following downgrades and 
upgrades. The results indicate that a downgrade is associated with a lower probability of debt 
issuance, a higher probability of debt reduction, and a lower probability of equity repurchases.  
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with our univariate results, the probability of a debt or equity issue is higher for 
firms with higher market-to-book ratios. Higher pre-issuance book leverage levels 
lessen the probability of debt or equity issues and equity repurchases. As 
expected, the likelihood of debt reductions increases with pre-issue leverage.
78
  
The results imply that both rating considerations and market timing efforts 
play a role in managers‘ capital structure decisions if a multinomial model is 
applied. We find no evidence that distinguishing between investment grade and 
speculative grade is incrementally important in the security issuance and 
repurchase choice. However, this might be due to the inherent restrictions in 
measuring the respective credit rating outlook and the subsequent financing 
decisions. 
3.4.3 Equity Issue Characteristics 
To complete the picture, we have investigated the composition of SEOs 
more closely, i.e. the primary and secondary components (Alti 2006; Wagner 
2008). The market timing capital structure theory not only indicates that firms 
issue equity when their perceived market conditions are favorable, but they also 
sell more equity if they believe that their stock price is overvalued.
79
 This can be 
either achieved by issuing shares at higher offer prices or by selling a higher 
number of shares (Alti 2006). Our subsequent regressions will account for this 
differentiation and various other firm characteristics.
80
 Considering the credit 
rating-capital structure hypothesis, we expect firms with a negative rating outlook 
to sell a higher amount of equity, while the offer price is likely to be lower due to 
negative rating momentum. Managers are expected to issue as much equity as 
possible to prevent the rating agencies from downgrading the firm. Given our 
previous results, the motivations for SEOs following positive rating outlooks are 
not as clear cut. Consequently, we do not expect these types of offerings to have 
any significant characteristics. 
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 This is generally consistent with a hypothesis of target leverage in capital structure decisions 
(Hovakimian 2004; Hovakimian et al. 2001). 
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 We expect stronger market timing if all the proceeds are considered, as this variable also 
includes the primary component of the total issuance amount, i.e. share sales by the firms‘ existing 
shareholders, who may be regarded as insiders (Alti 2006). Kim and Weisbach (2008) even use the 
fraction of secondary shares sold as a measure of overvaluation. 
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 Deviations from the target leverage as a driver of equity issue characteristics are accounted for 
by including firms‘ pre-offer leverage level. To control for firm heterogeneity in industry 
characteristics, we clustered standard errors using the three-digit SIC code. 
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Table 3-8‘s regressions results of the total issuance proceeds, primary 
proceeds, and primary proceeds standardized by pre-SEO assets suggest the 
market timing of equity issues. Firms with higher market-to-book ratios also sell a 
higher amount of equity. As expected, the effect is strongest for the total proceeds, 
which also include sales by firm insiders. Normalizing the proceeds figure by the 
SEO fiscal year-end total assets may lessen the market timing effect. Consistent 
with this, the market-to-book effect is stronger if the primary proceeds are 
standardized by the pre-SEO total assets. However, also the results of the negative 
rating outlook SEOs are consistent with the hypothesis of managers structuring 
equity issues to please rating agencies. Total SEO proceeds are indeed higher if 
preceded by a negative rating outlook. We do not find any statistical or 
economically significant influence on primary proceeds. This makes total sense, 
as the firms‘ capital ratios can only improve if additional equity is sold, i.e. 
secondary shares, and with fresh equity entering the firm. Looking at the 
composition of the issue proceeds, as expected, the credit rating effect comes by 
means of a higher number of shares sold. The offer price coefficient is negative 
but insignificant. Interestingly, the market timing effect is based on a lower 
number of shares sold, although at considerably higher prices. 
In summary, we find evidence of both market timing and credit rating 
concerns if the equity issue proceeds are investigated.  
3.4.4 Alternative Market Timing Measures 
The appropriateness of the market-to-book ratio to correctly measure market 
timing is challenged in the literature (e.g. Alti 2006; Elliott et al. 2007; Elliott et 
al. 2008; Kayhan and Titman 2007; Leary and Roberts 2005). To account for the 
concerns, table 3-9 provides the logistic estimations results as in panel A of table 
3-5 but with alternative market timing proxies.
81
  
Both raw and industry-adjusted market-to-book ratios have a comparable 
positive economic effect on the SEO likelihood. Note that Baker and Wurgler‘s 
(2002) historic finance weighted market-to-book ratio shows a negative, though 
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 The base case control variables are also included in the logistic regression but the results are not 
tabulated. 
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statistically not significant, marginal effect.
82
 A positive rating outlook‘s 
statistically significant negative influence persists in these alternative model 
specifications and stands at approximately -1.4 percent. Using stock return data as 
the proxy for market timing efforts suggests that SEOs are positively related to 
prior excess stock returns and negatively related to future excess stock returns 
(DeAngelo et al. 2009). This is consistent with our market timing hypothesis. 
However, the economic effect is rather limited. Note that the rating outlook 
variables lose their statistical significance if abnormal stock returns are included 
in the logit model. Higher price run-ups and price-earnings multiples also raise the 
likelihood of an SEO.
83
 The economic effect of these mispricing proxies and the 
rating concerns on the SEO likelihood is comparable. For further robustness, we 
also apply a balance sheet-based market timing proxy in our analysis. 
Accordingly, we include discretionary accruals as a proxy for mispricing (Chan et 
al. 2006; DeAngelo et al. 2009; Polk and Sapienza 2008). While we expect a 
positive correlation between the amount of discretionary accruals and the SEO 
likelihood, the marginal effect of the logistic estimate is essentially negative. We 
therefore omit the discretionary accruals variable from further analysis. 
In summary, the credit rating effect of a positive outlook on the SEO 
likelihood persists in most alternative model specifications.  
3.5 Further Robustness Issues 
To determine the robustness, we have run logistic estimates of our overall 
SEO sample‘s sub-samples. The sub-groups: investment grade companies, 
speculative grade companies, US companies, EMEA companies, firms on the 
verge of losing their prime commercial paper rating (i.e. firms rated AA-, A, or 
BBB), and the sampling periods 1990-1999 and 2000-2008. 
Table 3-10 suggests that the credit rating effect in SEOs is only evident for 
firms rated investment grade. The logit model‘s marginal effects of speculative 
rated companies show the right signs but prove to be statistically insignificant. A 
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 We therefore omitted the historic finance weighted market-to-book ratio from the main body of 
analysis. 
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 Price run-up is the change in market capitalization defined as the market capitalization in a 
given year divided by the average market capitalization of the prior two fiscal years (Elliott et al. 
2008).  
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possible explanation is that investment grade firms‘ cost of capital is more 
sensitive to minor changes and therefore managers steer their credit rating more 
forcefully. On the other hand, the market timing effect, measured by the 
standardized market-to-book ratio, is comparatively stronger and statistically 
significant for both investment grade and speculative grade firms. 
In addition, in untabulated analyses we have included country dummies in 
the multivariate regressions to control for the different jurisdictions and legal 
frameworks of our sample. In a second step, we estimated the logistic regressions 
of table 3-5 through table 3-9 including country-specific creditor and shareholder 
rights indices (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 2002; La Porta et al. 1997). The 
results show that the credit rating effect persists both economically and 
statistically in these alternative model specifications. 
Kisgen (2006) demonstrates that firms are most concerned about ratings if 
access to the commercial paper market is at risk.
84
 Accordingly, we build a sub-
sample of firms rated AA-, A, or BBB and only include the negative rating 
outlook dummy variable. Comparing the results from table 3-10 with the logistic 
estimates of table 3-5‘s panel A shows that a negative outlook indeed has a 
stronger positive effect on the SEO likelihood if a company could lose its prime 
commercial paper rating. 
Interestingly, managers‘ reaction to a positive and negative credit rating 
outlook seems to differ in US and EMEA companies. While a positive rating 
outlook statistically significantly decreases the SEO likelihood for US firms, 
SEOs by EMEA firms are positively related to a prior negative rating outlook. 
Moreover, the results of table 3-10 suggest that only the latter sampling period 
rating concerns play a significant role in managers‘ equity issuance decisions. 
This may be explained by debt capital markets‘ increasing importance for 
corporate refinancing and the resultant increasing importance of credit ratings 
(Dittrich 2007; Frost 2007).  
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 See Kisgen (2006) and Michelsen and Klein (2010) for a complete description of the 
relationship of long-term and short-term ratings.  
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3.6 Summary and Conclusion 
The results of this study imply that rating concerns are an important 
consideration for equity issuing ﬁrms. We find that the likelihood of a seasoned 
equity offering is positively (negatively) related to a negative (positive) prior 
rating outlook. Thereby, a positive rating outlook‘s negative impact is 
economically stronger than market timing, measured by the standardized market-
to-book ratio. Excluding dual issue (parallel issuance of debt and equity in a given 
fiscal year) confirms that also a negative rating outlook has a statistically 
significant positive influence on the SEO likelihood. Rating concerns are even 
more important if the decision to issue equity rather than debt is considered. 
Specifically, we report that the probability of equity issuance (rather than debt) 
increases (decreases) by 3.3 (6.1) percent if the issuer credit rating has a negative 
(positive) outlook prior to the offering. Market timing considerations play only a 
subordinated role in the externally rated firm sample‘s debt-equity choice. In 
addition, multinomial logistic estimates show that a negative rating outlook 
decreases the likelihood of pure debt issues, although it increases the probability 
of pure debt reductions. On the other hand, a positive rating outlook statistically 
significantly lowers managers‘ need to issue equity. Moreover, the rating effect 
mostly persists if alternative market timing proxies are applied.  
In summary, our results suggest that, going forward, empirical capital 
structure studies should also take rating concerns/considerations into account 
when they investigate managers‘ financing decisions.  
Further research on credit ratings and managers‘ behavior could include 
other corporate decision making topics like payout and investment policy. 
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Tables 3 
Table 3-1 Descriptive Statistics of Rated Company Sample 
 
(1) Rated Sample (2) Rated Security Issuers (3) Rated SEO Sample (3) Rated Debt Issuers (4) Rated Non-issuers
Total Assets Mean 10,838.3 11,657.4 8,154.2 12,009.8 10,181.3
Median 3,079.5 3,234.9 2,406.4 3,348.7 2,930.0
Standard deviation (24,996.3) (27,280.8) (18,139.9) (27,963.4) (22,981.6)
Total Sales Mean 8,955.9 9,423.1 5,423.1 9,761.2 8,581.8
Median 2,625.1 2,645.5 1,534.1 2,779.9 2,609.5
Standard deviation (20,937.8) (22,204.9) (12,502.4) (22,831.3) (19,858.9)
M/B Mean 1.551 1.679 1.566 1.687 1.455
Median 1.323 1.393 1.323 1.399 1.274
Standard deviation (1.102) (1.159) (0.963) (1.170) (1.048)
D/A Mean 0.623 0.649 0.607 0.652 0.603
Median 0.588 0.608 0.594 0.610 0.572
Standard deviation (0.382) (0.439) (0.216) (0.450) (0.327)
EBITDA/A Mean 0.141 0.135 0.117 0.136 0.145
Median 0.133 0.129 0.109 0.131 0.137
Standard deviation (0.183) (0.251) (0.071) (0.259) (0.098)
R&D/A Mean 0.015 0.013 0.009 0.013 0.017
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard deviation (0.032) (0.029) (0.022) (0.030) (0.034)
PPE/A Mean 0.367 0.374 0.437 0.370 0.361
Median 0.320 0.327 0.418 0.323 0.315
Standard deviation (0.240) (0.250) (0.276) (0.248) (0.233)
Cash/A Mean 0.082 0.080 0.082 0.080 0.083
Median 0.047 0.045 0.044 0.045 0.048
Standard deviation (0.102) (0.103) (0.107) (0.102) (0.102)
Number of issues - 5,886                                     822                                 5,491                              -
Number of firm years 13,736                  - - - 7,339                              
Panel A: Summary Statistics on Firm-Specific Variables
Panel B: Number of Debt/Equity Issues and Firm Years
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The table provides summary statistics (the mean, median, and standard deviation) of various firm characteristics for the overall sample and sub-samples. The 
overall sample consists of S&P-rated firms during the period 1990-2008. Security issuers are firms that have conducted seasoned equity or debt offerings in the 
respective fiscal year. Accordingly, debt issuers are defined by a change in the total book debt greater than 5 percent of their assets. Non-issuer have not 
conducted a seasoned equity offering or issued debt. Total Assets is defined as the book value of total assets. Total Sales are net sales. Market-to-book ratio, M/B, 
is defined as the book debt plus the market value of the equity divided by the total assets. Book Leverage, D/A, is the ratio of book debt to total assets. 
Profitability is measured by EBITDA/A, which is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by the total assets. R&D/A is the research and 
development expense divided by the total assets. Asset tangibility, PPE/A, is defined as the net plant, property, and equipment divided by the total assets. 
CashSTInvest/A is defined as cash and short-term investments divided by the total assets. The financial information was obtained from the Thomson Financial 
database. Observations with missing values for commonly used variables are excluded from the empirical tests in this chapter. 
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Table 3-2 Descriptive Statistics of Seasoned Equity Offerings 
 
The sample consists of SEOs of S&P-rated firms between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2008. Statistics 
(the mean, median, and standard deviation) are reported in years relative to the offering year. The offering year is 
the fiscal year during which the SEO takes place. Firm-specific fiscal year-ends and fiscal year changes are 
accounted for. D/A is book debt to assets (book leverage). M/B are the assets minus the book equity plus the 
market equity all divided by the assets, where the book equity is defined as the total assets minus the total 
liabilities and preferred stock plus deferred tax and convertible debt. d/A is the residual change in assets divided 
by the assets. e/A is the change in the book equity minus the change in balance-sheet-retained earnings divided 
by the assets. Cash/A is cash and short-term investments over the assets. N are the number of observations. 
  
Year N D/A M/B d/A e/A Cash/A
OY-1 Mean 816 0.6439 1.5905 0.0828 0.0445 0.0737
Median 0.6263 1.3403 0.0620 0.0131 0.0361
StandDev. (0.2388) (1.0086) (0.1901) (0.1175) (0.1030)
Offer Year Mean 818 0.6065 1.5662 0.0714 0.0970 0.0815
Median 0.5937 1.3232 0.0533 0.0755 0.0442
StandDev. (0.2156) (0.9633) (0.1817) (0.1220) (0.1068)
OY+1 Mean 778 0.6052 1.4143 0.0545 0.0359 0.0761
Median 0.5952 1.2768 0.0428 0.0131 0.0399
StandDev. (0.2162) (0.8369) (0.1464) (0.0820) (0.1011)
OY+2 Mean 708 0.6063 1.3465 0.0432 0.0260 0.0699
Median 0.6017 1.2428 0.0319 0.0103 0.0355
StandDev. (0.2166) (0.8038) (0.1431) (0.0854) (0.0927)
OY+3 Mean 648 0.6035 1.3387 0.0374 0.0147 0.0700
Median 0.5998 1.2397 0.0306 0.0094 0.0391
StandDev. (0.2193) (0.7740) (0.1429) (0.1147) (0.0895)
OY+5 Mean 498 0.5926 1.2718 0.0244 0.0155 0.0736
Median 0.6005 1.1844 0.0276 0.0073 0.0378
StandDev. (0.2256) (0.9269) (0.1580) (0.1087) (0.0986)
OY+7 Mean 355 0.6079 1.3239 0.0382 0.0093 0.0793
Median 0.5837 1.1887 0.0277 0.0044 0.0428
StandDev. (0.2739) (1.0601) (0.1316) (0.0689) (0.0952)
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Table 3-3 SEO Firm Sample: Time Series of Selected Variables by Credit Rating Outlook before the Offering 
 
The sample consists of SEOs of S&P-rated firms between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2008. Statistics 
(the mean, median, and standard deviation) are reported in years relative to the offering year. 
Positive/Negative/Stable Outlook refers to companies with an assigned positive/negative/stable credit rating 
outlook by S&P at the fiscal year-end before the offering year. The offering year is the fiscal year during which 
the SEO takes place. Firm-specific fiscal year-ends and fiscal year changes are accounted for. D/A is the book 
debt to assets (book leverage). M/B is the assets minus the book equity plus market equity all divided by the 
assets, where book equity is defined as the total assets minus the total liabilities and preferred stock plus deferred 
tax and convertible debt.  
Year
Positive
Outlook
Negative
Outlook
Stable
Outlook
Positive
Outlook
Negative
Outlook
Stable
Outlook
OY-1 Mean 0.6716 0.6609 0.6395 1.7470 1.2673 1.5185
Median 0.6452 0.6327 0.6244 1.2708 1.1744 1.2784
StandDev. (0.3327) (0.1999) (0.2356) (1.4358) (0.4525) (0.9597)
Offer Year Mean 0.6123 0.6458 0.5987 1.7939 1.1804 1.3560
Median 0.5795 0.6087 0.5903 1.4091 1.1458 1.2424
StandDev. (0.2533) (0.2257) (0.2126) (1.4828) (0.9858) (1.0142)
OY+1 Mean 0.5985 0.6369 0.6060 1.5138 1.3842 1.3861
Median 0.5872 0.6067 0.6021 1.2497 1.3182 1.2652
StandDev. (0.2029) (0.2217) (0.2173) (0.9210) (0.7215) (0.8463)
OY+2 Mean 0.5823 0.6158 0.6131 1.3319 1.3698 1.3637
Median 0.5867 0.6064 0.6040 1.2392 1.2989 1.2431
StandDev. (0.1820) (0.2157) (0.2250) (0.7710) (0.7185) (0.8543)
OY+3 Mean 0.5683 0.6090 0.6079 1.3149 1.3580 1.3540
Median 0.5903 0.6088 0.5881 1.2723 1.2823 1.2299
StandDev. (0.1914) (0.2049) (0.2300) (0.7252) (0.6338) (0.8391)
OY+5 Mean 0.5883 0.5784 0.6057 1.3736 0.9708 1.3120
Median 0.6090 0.5696 0.6005 1.2647 1.0998 1.1830
StandDev. (0.1820) (0.1745) (0.2349) (0.5895) (0.6533) (0.9709)
OY+7 Mean 0.6744 0.6340 0.6039 1.3349 1.0766 1.2849
Median 0.6111 0.5593 0.5885 1.1961 1.1580 1.1570
StandDev. (0.6111) (0.3851) (0.2262) (0.7425) (0.7031) (1.0379)
D/A M/B
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Table 3-4 Univariate Test Statistics 
 
The table reports differences (two sided t-test) in key variables between equity issuers and non-equity issuers, between debt issuers and non-debt issuers and between equity and 
debt issuers. The sample consists of S&P rated equity and debt issues between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2008. Equity issuers are defined as firms conducting a seasoned 
equity offering. Debt issuers exhibit a change in book debt greater than 5 percent of their total assets. In panel C, dual issues (firms that issue both debt and equity in the same 
fiscal year) are excluded from the analysis (Hovakimian et al. 2001; Marsh 1982). PosOutl and NegOutl are dummy variables for the credit rating outlook equal to ―1‖ if the 
rating outlook is ―positive‖ or ―negative‖ and ―0‖ otherwise. Market-to-book ratio, M/B, is defined as the book debt plus the market value of the equity divided by the total assets. 
Stand-M/B, which is the standardized market-to-book ratio, is defined as the firm‘s raw M/B divided by the median market-to-book ratio of all the firms. BW-M/B is the historic 
finance weighted market-to-book ratio. Indu-M/B, which is the industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio, is defined as the firm‘s M/B divided by the median industry‘s M/B, where 
the industry is determined using the three-digit SIC codes. PiorAbnReturn is the average 36-month market-adjusted prior abnormal stock return (winsorized on the 1 percent and 
99 percent quantile). FutureAbnReturn is the average 36-month market-adjusted future abnormal stock return (winsorized on the 1 percent and 99 percent quantile). Book 
leverage, D/A, is the ratio of the book debt to the total assets. Profitability is measured by EBITDA/A, which is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by total 
assets. SIZE is measured as the natural log of the net sales. R&D/A is the research and development expense over the total assets. The dummy variable R&Dd takes the value of 
―1‖ when research and development expense information is missing in the database. Asset tangibility, PPE/A, is defined as the net plant, property, and equipment divided by the 
total assets. The financial information was obtained from the Thomson Financial database. In this chapter, observations with missing values for commonly used variables are 
excluded from the empirical tests. T-values indicate if the two subsets are significantly different using a t-test. *, **, and *** denote that the parameter is statistically significantly 
different from ―0‖ at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Equity Issuers Non-Equity Issuers Difference Debt Issuers Non-Debt Issuers Difference Equity Issuers Debt Issuers Difference
Mean Mean t-value Mean Mean t-value Mean Mean t-value
PosOutlt-1 0.068 0.093 2.427 ** 0.094 0.093 -0.162 0.075 0.097 1.360
NegOutlt-1 0.209 0.178 -2.230 ** 0.147 0.196 6.384 *** 0.229 0.143 -4.411 ***
M/Bt-1 1.590 1.570 -0.481 1.715 1.443 -13.019 *** 1.501 1.771 4.082 ***
Stand-M/Bt-1 1.322 1.274 -1.319 1.393 1.173 -12.154 *** 1.241 1.434 3.322 ***
BW-M/Bt-1 1.536 1.701 3.725 *** 1.715 1.649 -2.935 *** 1.487 1.763 4.034 ***
Indu-M/Bt-1 0.857 0.855 -0.117 0.926 0.797 -11.108 *** 0.854 0.947 2.681 ***
PriorAbnReturn 0.748 0.478 -3.236 *** 0.609 0.359 -6.054 *** 0.678 0.682 0.034
FutureAbnReturn 0.187 0.315 2.277 ** 0.267 0.339 2.358 ** 0.165 0.265 1.379
D/At-1 0.644 0.614 -2.153 ** 0.606 0.632 3.610 *** 0.691 0.594 -4.663 ***
EBITDA/At-1 0.120 0.143 3.407 *** 0.148 0.138 -2.799 *** 0.117 0.148 2.208 **
SIZEt-1 7.242 7.889 11.364 *** 7.952 7.895 -1.916 * 7.289 7.833 6.331 ***
R&D/At-1 0.009 0.015 5.811 *** 0.013 0.016 4.101 *** 0.009 0.015 3.342 ***
R&Ddt-1 0.534 0.430 -5.867 *** 0.414 0.443 3.023 *** 0.494 0.413 -3.134 ***
PPE/At-1 0.448 0.365 -9.517 *** 0.378 0.364 -3.237 *** 0.441 0.374 -5.135 ***
Panel C
Rating 
Variables
Market 
Timing 
Variables
Control 
Variables
Panel A Panel B
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Table 3-5 Logit Model of Seasoned Equity Offering Decision 
 
  
dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx
(se) (se) (se) (se) (se)
PosOutlt-1 -0.017 ** - -0.017 ** -0.017 ** -0.017 **
(0.141) - (0.147) (0.124) (0.111)
NegOutlt-1 0.009 * - 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.095) - (0.097) (0.119) (0.118)
Stand-M/Bt-1 - 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 **
- (0.050) (0.050) (0.053) (0.088)
D/At-1 - 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
- (0.098) (0.096) (0.119) (0.113)
EBITDA/At-1 - -0.204 *** -0.195 *** -0.195 *** -0.195 ***
- (0.569) (0.564) (1.024) (1.054)
SIZEt-1 - -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 **
- (0.030) (0.030) (0.041) (0.052)
R&D/At-1 - -0.167 ** -0.167 * -0.167 -0.167
- (1.590) (1.597) (2.088) (2.488)
R&Ddt-1 - 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
- (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.107)
PPE/At-1 - 0.069 *** 0.069 *** 0.069 *** 0.069 ***
- (0.218) (0.220) (0.311) (0.363)
Company Clusters Yes Yes Yes No No
Industy Clusters No No No Yes Yes
Offer Year Clusters No No No No Yes
N 13,689 12,849 12,806 12,806 12,806
Pseudo-R 2 0.0015 0.0385 0.0404 0.0404 0.0404
Chi 2 8.40 165.18 170.66 133.94 190.60
Prob 0.0150 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Panel A: All Seasoned Equity Offerings
Pooled Logit
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This table shows a logit analysis of the seasoned equity offering (SEO) decision in 
a given year as a function of a set of explanatory variables. The sample consists of 
SEOs by S&P-rated companies between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2008. 
Panel A reports statistics for the full SEO sample, while panel B is only based on 
SEOs exhibiting no debt offering in the same fiscal year, i.e. excluding ―dual‖ 
issues (Hovakimian et al. 2001; Marsh 1982). PosOutl and NegOutl are dummy 
variables for the credit rating outlook equal to ―1‖ if the rating outlook is 
―positive‖ or ―negative‖ and ―0‖ otherwise. Stand-M/B, which is the standardized 
market-to-book ratio, is defined as the firm‘s raw M/B (defined as book debt plus 
the market value of equity divided by total assets) divided by the median market-
to-book ratio of all the firms. Profitability is measured by EBITDA/A, which is the 
earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by the total assets. SIZE is 
measured as the natural log of the net sales. R&D/A is the research and 
development expense over the total assets. The dummy variable R&Dd takes the 
value of ―1‖ when research and development expense information is missing in the 
database. Asset tangibility, PPE/A, is defined as the net plant, property, and 
equipment divided by the total assets. The financial information was obtained from 
the Thomson Financial database. In this chapter, observations with missing values 
for commonly used variables are excluded from the empirical tests. Coefficients 
are reported as marginal effects. Robust asymptotic standard errors are in brackets 
(clustered at the firm, industry, or offer year level). *, **, and *** denote that the 
parameter is statistically significantly different from ―0‖ at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. Prob denotes the significance level of 
the asymptotic Chi
2
 statistic, which tests the hypothesis that all parameters in the 
model are simultaneously equal to zero. 
dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx
(se) (se) (se)
PosOutlt-1 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.198) (0.219) (0.266)
NegOutlt-1 0.011 ** 0.011 ** 0.011 **
(0.113) (0.119) (0.111)
Stand-M/Bt-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.081) (0.101) (0.159)
D/At-1 0.006 * 0.006 0.006 *
(0.107) (0.123) (0.112)
EBITDA/At-1 -0.097 *** -0.097 ** -0.097 **
(0.727) (1.166) (1.044)
SIZEt-1 -0.004 *** -0.004 ** -0.004 *
(0.035) (0.042) (0.071)
R&D/At-1 -0.149 * -0.149 * -0.149 *
(2.481) (2.852) (2.901)
R&Ddt-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.119) (0.112) (0.110)
PPE/At-1 0.042 *** 0.042 *** 0.042 ***
(0.240) (0.283) (0.328)
Company Clusters Yes No No
Industy Clusters No Yes Yes
Offer Year Clusters No No Yes
N 12,466 12,466 12,466
Pseudo-R 2 0.0382 0.0382 0.0382
Chi 2 130.80 115.45 176.19
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Panel B: Excluding Dual Issues
Pooled Logit
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Table 3-6 Logit Model of Debt-Equity Choice 
 
This table shows a logit analysis of the debt-equity choice in a given year as a function of a set of explanatory 
variables. The sample consists of equity and debt issues by S&P-rated companies between January 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 2008. Debt issues are defined as a change in the book debt greater than five percent of the total 
assets. Equity issues are defined as seasoned equity offerings. The dependent variable equals ―1‖ for equity 
issues and ―0‖ for debt issues. In panel A, observations with both debt and equity offerings in the same fiscal 
year (dual issues) are excluded from the analysis (Hovakimian et al. 2001; Marsh 1982). Panel B excludes 
―mixed‖ transactions (debt (equity) issuance together with equity (debt) reduction in the same fiscal year) and 
therefore considers only ―pure‖ transactions (Hovakimian 2004). PosOutl and NegOutl are dummy variables for 
the credit rating outlook and are equal to ―1‖ if the rating outlook is ―positive‖ or ―negative‖ at the fiscal year-
end before the offering, and ―0‖ otherwise. The dummy variable BroadPos takes the value ―1‖ if the firm‘s rating 
is on the upper border of a broad rating category and has a positive outlook, and ―0‖ otherwise (Michelsen and 
Klein 2010). The dummy variable BroadNeg takes the value ―1‖ if the firm‘s rating is on the lower border of a 
broad rating and has a negative outlook and ―0‖ otherwise. The dummy variable IGSG takes the value ―1‖ if the 
company is rated BBB, BBB-, BB+, or BB, and ―0‖ otherwise (Michelsen and Klein 2010). Stand-M/B, which is 
the standardized market-to-book ratio, is defined as the firm‘s raw M/B (defined as the book debt plus the market 
value of the equity divided by the total assets) divided by the median market-to-book ratio of all the firms. Book 
leverage, D/A, is the ratio of the book debt to the total assets. Profitability is measured by EBITDA/A, which is 
earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by the total assets. SIZE is measured as the natural log of 
the net sales. R&D/A is the research and development expense over the total assets. The dummy variable R&Dd 
takes the value of ―1‖ when research and development expense information is missing in the database. Asset 
tangibility, PPE/A, is defined as the net plant, property, and equipment divided by the total assets. The financial 
information was obtained from the Thomson Financial database. In this chapter, observations with missing 
values for commonly used variables are excluded from the empirical tests. Coefficients are reported as marginal 
effects. Robust asymptotic standard errors are in brackets (clustered at the firm level). *, **, and *** denote that 
the parameter is statistically significantly different from ―0‖ at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. Prob denotes the significance level of the asymptotic Chi
2
 statistic, which tests the hypothesis that 
all parameters in the model are simultaneously equal to zero. 
dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx
(se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se)
PosOutlt-1 -0.022 - -0.025 -0.061 ** - -0.067 **
(0.204) - (0.211) (0.180) - (0.184)
NegOutlt-1 0.038 *** - 0.038 *** 0.033 ** - 0.034 **
(0.124) - (0.124) (0.113) - (0.113)
BroadPosOutlt-1 - -0.026 - - -0.051
- (0.342) - - (0.273)
BroadNegOutlt-1 - 0.020 - - 0.005
- (0.160) - - (0.162)
IGSGt-1 - - 0.004 - - 0.019
- - (0.115) - - (0.105)
Stand-M/Bt-1 -0.011 -0.015 ** -0.012 0.010 0.008 0.011
(0.095) (0.097) (0.097) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058)
D/At-1 0.026 0.031 0.026 0.007 0.012 0.008
(0.309) (0.351) (0.340) (0.133) (0.136) (0.146)
EBITDA/At-1 -0.300 *** -0.323 *** -0.303 *** -0.481 *** -0.494 *** -0.486 ***
(0.899) (0.902) (0.911) (0.729) (0.751) (0.735)
SIZEt-1 -0.008 ** -0.007 ** -0.007 ** -0.009 ** -0.009 ** -0.009 **
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
R&D/At-1 -0.269 -0.317 -0.368 * -0.146 -0.115 -0.119
(2.763) (2.545) (2.639) (1.854) (1.930) (1.877)
R&Ddt-1 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 0.019 0.020 0.019
(0.122) (0.120) (0.121) (0.109) (0.110) (0.110)
PPE/At-1 0.080 *** 0.080 *** 0.080 *** 0.140 *** 0.144 *** 0.145 ***
(0.245) (0.246) (0.249) (0.235) (0.235) (0.238)
N 4,824 4,821 4,792 4,481 4,475 4,451
Pseudo-R 2 0.0545 0.0503 0.0561 0.0441 0.0398 0.0455
Chi 2 133.32 115.50 133.86 115.91 101.25 116.52
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Panel A: Excluding Dual Issues Panel B: Pure Transactions
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Table 3-7 Multinomial Analysis of Capital Issuance and Repurchase Decision 
 
This table shows a multinomial logit analysis of the security issuance and repurchase decision in a given year as 
a function of a set of explanatory variables. The sample period is January 1, 1990 to December 31, 2008. Pure 
debt (equity) issues are identified when only a debt (equity) issuance and no equity (debt) reduction occurs 
(Hovakimian 2004). Pure debt reductions and equity repurchases are similarly defined. Equity issues 
(repurchases) are instances when the net equity issued (repurchased) exceeds five percent of beginning-year firm 
assets. The net equity issuance is measured as the change in book equity minus change in the retained earnings. 
The book value of equity is the total assets minus the total liabilities minus preferred stock plus deferred taxes. 
Debt issues (reductions) are instances when the net debt issuance (retired) exceeds five percent of the total 
assets. The net debt issuance is measured as the change in the book value of long-term debt and short-term debt. 
PosOutl and NegOutl are dummy variables for the credit rating outlook equal to ―1‖ if the rating outlook is 
―positive‖ or ―negative‖ at the fiscal year-end before the offering and ―0‖ otherwise. Stand-M/B, which is the 
standardized market-to-book ratio, is defined as the firm‘s raw M/B (defined as the book debt plus the market 
value of the equity divided by the total assets) divided by the median market-to-book ratio of all the firms. Book 
leverage, D/A, is the ratio of the book debt to the total assets. Profitability is measured by EBITDA/A, which is 
the earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by the total assets. SIZE is measured as the natural 
log of the net sales. R&D/A is the research and development expense over the total assets. The dummy variable 
R&Dd takes the value of ―1‖ when research and development expense information is missing in the database. 
Asset tangibility, PPE/A, is defined as the net plant, property, and equipment divided by the total assets. The 
financial information was obtained from the Thomson Financial database. In this chapter, observations with 
missing values for commonly used variables are excluded from the empirical tests. Coefficients are reported as 
marginal effects. Robust asymptotic standard errors are in brackets (clustered at the industry level). *, **, and 
*** denote that the parameter is statistically significantly different from ―0‖ at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent level, respectively. Prob denotes the significance level of the asymptotic Chi
2
 statistic, which tests the 
hypothesis that all parameters in the model are simultaneously equal to zero. 
Pure Debt 
Issues
Pure Equity 
Issues
Pure Debt 
Reduction
Pure Equity 
Repurchases
dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx
(se) (se) (se) (se)
PosOutlt-1 0.004 -0.022 ** 0.005 0.004
(0.070) (0.179) (0.106) (0.134)
NegOutlt-1 -0.057 *** 0.006 0.029 ** -0.005
(0.061) (0.110) (0.072) (0.121)
Stand-M/Bt-1 0.041 *** 0.011 *** -0.031 *** -0.001
(0.034) (0.052) (0.065) (0.052)
D/At-1 -0.077 ** 0.000 0.051 ** -0.027 ***
(0.170) (0.125) (0.148) (0.205)
EBITDA/At-1 -0.093 -0.175 *** -0.025 0.211 ***
(0.372) (0.605) (0.509) (0.591)
SIZEt-1 -0.004 -0.004 *** -0.005 ** 0.005 **
(0.017) (0.033) (0.021) (0.029)
R&D/At-1 -0.269 ** -0.110 ** -0.004 -0.104 *
(0.914) (1.752) (1.135) (1.691)
R&Ddt-1 0.017 * 0.009 ** 0.002 -0.006
(0.055) (0.115) (0.072) (0.105)
PPE/At-1 0.085 ** 0.070 *** -0.110 *** -0.059 ***
(0.114) (0.245) (0.146) (0.241)
N 12,806
Pseudo-R 2 0.0221
Chi 2 478.13
Prob 0.0000
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Table 3-8 Equity Issuance Characteristics 
 
  
ProccedsT/At=0 Procceds
P/At=0 Procceds
P/At=-1 Quantity
T QuantityP Price
PosOutlt-1 0.019 -0.001 0.001 0.006 -0.001 -1.020 **
(0.022) (0.014) (0.021) (0.008) (0.010) (0.461)
NegOutlt-1 0.021 ** 0.002 0.000 0.009 * 0.012 * -0.410
(0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.289)
M/Bt 0.048 *** 0.013 ** 0.021 ** -0.012 *** -0.015 *** 1.591 ***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.236)
D/At-1 0.002 -0.004 -0.054 ** 0.024 ** 0.062 ** -1.302 ***
(0.027) (0.018) (0.024) (0.012) (0.020) (0.305)
EBITDA/At-1 0.534 ** 0.058 0.127 0.023 -0.101 ** 0.853
(0.226) (0.062) (0.084) (0.041) (0.047) (2.442)
SIZEt-1 -0.033 *** -0.023 *** -0.033 *** -0.016 *** -0.009 *** -0.118
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.101)
R&D/At-1 -0.774 ** -0.164 -0.262 -0.062 -0.039 -4.373
(0.309) (0.119) (0.169) (0.084) (0.120) (8.312)
R&Ddt-1 -0.023 ** -0.010 -0.011 -0.017 ** -0.024 ** -0.434
(0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.357)
PPE/At-1 -0.099 *** -0.049 *** -0.083 *** -0.041 ** -0.021 -0.427
(0.017) (0.012) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.797)
N 1,135 646 649 1,113 685 1,135
R 2 0.3889 0.2620 0.2507 0.1139 0.1222 0.1423
Panel A: Offering Proceeds Panel B: Decomposition of offering proceeds
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The table shows coefficients and standard errors from pooled time series, cross-sectional regressions. The sample consists of seasoned equity offerings by S&P-rated companies 
between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2008. The dependent variable is indicated in the column title, t=0 is the fiscal year of the SEO, and t=-1 is the fiscal year prior to the 
SEO. In panel A, Proceeds
T
 are the total offering proceeds, Proceeds
P
 are the primary offering proceeds. All proceed variables are scaled by the firm‘s total assets. In panel B, 
the total and primary offering proceeds are deconstructed into their components, i.e. number of shares and offering price. Quantity
T
 is the total number of shares divided by the 
total shares outstanding at t=0. Quantity
P
 is the total number of primary shares divided by the total number of shares outstanding at t=0. Price is the offer price scaled by per 
share book value in t=0. PosOutl and NegOutl are dummy variables for the credit rating outlook equal to ―1‖ if the rating outlook is ―positive‖ or ―negative‖ at the fiscal year-
end before the offering, and ―0‖ otherwise. Market-to-book ratio, M/B, is defined as the book debt plus the market value of the equity divided by the total assets. Book leverage, 
D/A, is the ratio of book debt to total assets. Profitability is measured by EBITDA/A, which is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by the total assets. SIZE is 
measured as the natural log of the net sales. R&D/A is the research and development expense over the total assets. The dummy variable R&Dd takes the value of ―1‖ when 
research and development expense information is missing in the database. Asset tangibility, PPE/A, is defined as the net plant, property, and equipment divided by the total 
assets. The financial information was obtained from the Thomson Financial database. In this chapter, observations with missing values for commonly used variables are 
excluded from the empirical tests. Robust asymptotic standard errors are in brackets (clustered at industry level). *, **, and *** denote that the parameter is statistically 
significantly different from ―0‖ at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 3-9 Alternative Market Timing Proxies 
 
  
dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx
(se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se)
PosOutlt-1 -0.014 ** -0.013 ** -0.014 ** -0.011 -0.019 ** -0.015 * -0.017 **
(0.128) (0.130) (0.129) (0.223) (0.159) (0.173) (0.171)
NegOutlt-1 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.011 ** 0.005
(0.117) (0.115) (0.120) (0.167) (0.109) (0.115) (0.115)
M/Bt-1 0.006 ** - - - - - -
(0.051) - - - - - -
BW-M/Bt-1 - -0.003 - - - - -
- (0.066) - - - - -
Indu-M/Bt-1 - - 0.010 ** - - - -
- - (0.092) - - - -
PriorAbnReturn - - - 0.003 ** - - -
- - - (0.029) - - -
FutureAbnReturn - - - -0.007 ** - - -
- - - (0.044) - - -
PriceRunupt=0 - - - - 0.018 *** - -
- - - - (0.081) - -
PEt=0 - - - - - 0.009 *** -
- - - - - (0.057) -
Disc.Accrualst-1 - - - - - -0.013
- - - - - (0.229)
N 13,076 12,306 13,011 7,914 11,843 9,978 10,882
Pseudo-R 2 0.0396 0.0343 0.0400 0.0455 0.0524 0.0594 0.0476
Chi 2 135.49 125.33 127.38 114.42 152.47 168.48 182.09
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pooled Logit
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This table shows a logit analysis of the seasoned equity offering (SEO) decision in a given year as a function of credit rating concerns and alternative 
market timing proxies. The sample consists of SEOs by S&P-rated companies between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2008. Table 3-5‘s control 
variables are included in the analysis but the results are not tabulated. PosOutl and NegOutl are dummy variables for the credit rating outlook equal to 
―1‖ if the rating outlook is ―positive‖ or ―negative‖ at the fiscal year-end before the offering and ―0‖ otherwise. Market-to-book ratio, M/B, is defined 
as the book debt plus the market value of the equity divided by the total assets. BW-M/B is the historic finance weighted market-to-book ratio. Indu-
M/B, which is the industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio, is defined as the firm‘s M/B divided by the median industry‘s M/B, where the industry is 
determined using the three-digit SIC codes. PiorAbnReturn is the average 36-month market-adjusted prior abnormal stock return (winsorized on the 1 
percent and 99 percent quantile). FutureAbnReturn is the average 36-month market-adjusted future abnormal stock return (winsorized on the 1 
percent and 99 percent quantile). PriceRunup, which is the change in market capitalization, is defined as the market capitalization in a given year 
divided by the average market capitalization of the prior two fiscal years. PE is the price earnings multiple. Disc-Accruals, which is discretionary 
accruals, is defined as the difference between the realized accruals and normalized accruals (Chan et al. 2006; Polk and Sapienza 2008). In this 
chapter, observations with missing values for commonly used variables are excluded from the empirical tests. Coefficients are reported as marginal 
effects. Robust asymptotic standard errors are in brackets (clustered at the industry level). *, **, and *** denote that the parameter is statistically 
significantly different from ―0‖ at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. Prob denotes the significance level of the asymptotic 
Chi
2
 statistic, which tests the hypothesis that all parameters in the model are simultaneously equal to zero. 
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Table 3-10 Robustness Tests 
 
  
Investment Grade Speculative Grade
Commercial 
Paper Access1
US Companies EMEA Companies 1990-1999 2000-2008
dF/dx dF/dx
(se) (se)
PosOutlt-1 -0.021 ** -0.023 - -0.021 ** 0.005 -0.009 -0.020 **
(0.289) (0.175) - (0.161) (0.378) (0.290) (0.180)
NegOutlt-1 0.010 * 0.002 0.014 * 0.001 0.026 ** -0.012 0.010 *
(0.152) (0.128) (0.214) (0.111) (0.209) (0.284) (0.104)
Stand-M/Bt-1 0.011 *** 0.021 *** 0.017 *** 0.008 ** 0.012 * 0.011 *** 0.009 **
(0.081) (0.061) (0.133) (0.054) (0.115) (0.069) (0.064)
D/At-1 0.022 ** -0.011 ** 0.064 *** -0.001 0.037 ** 0.015 0.001
(0.250) (0.093) (0.496) (0.088) (0.344) (0.292) (0.097)
EBITDA/At-1 -0.238 *** -0.167 *** -0.334 *** -0.211 *** -0.116 ** -0.201 *** -0.194 ***
(1.211) (0.598) (2.258) (0.637) (1.041) (1.072) (0.619)
SIZEt-1 -0.005 ** 0.000 ** -0.002 -0.008 *** -0.002 -0.017 *** -0.005 **
(0.048) (0.039) (0.076) (0.036) (0.076) (0.060) (0.033)
R&D/At-1 -0.054 -0.240 0.075 -0.165 ** -0.197 0.000 -0.196 **
(3.375) (1.760) (4.887) (1.642) (4.678) (3.192) (1.807)
R&Ddt-1 0.009 * 0.001 * 0.012 0.009 0.000 0.008 0.006
(0.162) (0.124) (0.227) (0.113) (0.250) (0.199) (0.114)
PPE/At-1 0.060 *** 0.092 *** 0.086 *** 0.088 *** -0.009 0.029 0.080 ***
(0.367) (0.255) (0.570) (0.249) (0.408) (0.411) (0.237)
N 6,908 5,898 2,560 10,103 2,477 2,637 10,169
Pseudo-R 2 0.0770 0.0231 0.0818 0.0597 0.0169 0.0721 0.0399
Chi 2 112.98 57.09 49.72 195.48 22.73 101.97 123.23
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0068 0.0000 0.0000
1 Firm-years rated AA-, A, BBB
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This table shows a logit analysis of the seasoned equity offering (SEO) decision in a given year as a function of a set of explanatory variables for differently defined sub-samples. 
The sample consists of SEOs by S&P-rated companies between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2008. The subsample Investment Grade is made up of firm years rated BBB- 
or better. Speculative Grade consists of firm years rated BB+ or lower. The subsample Commercial Paper Access restricts the analysis to firm years rated AA-, A or BBB. US and 
EMEA Companies is made up of firms incorporated in the US or Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA). The sub-samples 1990-1999 and 2000-2008 split the overall 
sampling period into two time periods. PosOutl and NegOutl are dummy variables for the credit rating outlook equal to ―1‖ if the rating outlook is ―positive‖ or ―negative‖ at the 
fiscal year-end before the offering, and ―0‖ otherwise. Stand-M/B, which is the standardized market-to-book ratio, is defined as the firm‘s raw M/B (defined as the book debt plus 
the market value of the equity divided by the total assets) divided by the median market-to-book ratio of all the firms. Book leverage, D/A, is the ratio of the book debt to the total 
assets. Profitability is measured by EBITDA/A, which is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by the total assets. SIZE is measured as the natural log of the net 
sales. R&D/A is the research and development expense over the total assets. The dummy variable R&Dd takes the value of ―1‖ when research and development expense 
information is missing in the database. Asset tangibility, PPE/A, is defined as the net plant, property, and equipment divided by the total assets. The financial information was 
obtained from the Thomson Financial database. In this chapter, observations with missing values for commonly used variables are excluded from the empirical tests. Coefficients 
are reported as marginal effects. Robust asymptotic standard errors are in brackets (clustered at the industry level). *, **, and *** denote that the parameter is statistically 
significant different from ―0‖ at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. Prob denotes the significance level of the asymptotic Chi2 statistic, which tests the 
hypothesis that all parameters in the model are simultaneously equal to zero. 
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4 “Privacy please!” - The Public to Private 
Decision in Germany
85
 
4.1 Introduction 
Through its division of ownership and control, and widely dispersed 
shareholdings, the publicly held corporation‘s benefits significantly exceed those 
of a privately held company. Consequently, going public is often regarded as an 
endpoint in the corporate life cycle (Burghof and Schilling 2003), and has been 
the focus of a wide strand of literature. The observation that the majority of 
companies remain private and that an increasing number of firms are opting for a 
delisting contradicts a linear interpretation of the corporate life cycle in which the 
endpoint is an initial public offering (IPO). Since going private is associated with 
high transaction costs as well as considerable execution risks, the dominant 
arguments have to favor a complete delisting.  
While the going private phenomenon is still relatively young in Germany, it 
has become a permanent element of highly flexible stock markets such as those in 
the US. The introduction of the German Transformation Act (Umwandlungs-
gesetz) in 1995 facilitated taking PTP decisions in practice. This explains the 
numerous empirical studies on the going private market in the US and limited 
work on the German equity market.86 Our study is based on a sample period 
between 1996 and 2004, which helps broaden the data base and scope of previous 
German empirical works.87  
Most going private research is based on US samples covering the 1980s. 
However, it is doubtful whether the implications of other seminal going private 
studies on international capital markets can simply be applied to Germany. Since 
going private is commonly understood as a transaction to alter a firm‘s corporate 
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 Co-author: Christian Klein, Universität Hohenheim, Germany, forthcoming in Review of 
Managerial Science, copyright Springer. 
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 Prior studies on the German PTP market include those by Zillmer (2002; 2003) and Eisele et al. 
(2003). 
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 Our study contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, the introduction of the 
squeeze-out regulation was a cornerstone in the development of the German PTP market. The 
studies by Zillmer (2002; 2003) and Eisele et al. (2003) do not cover this major change in 
legislation. Furthermore, the latter‘s work primarily focuses on forms of going private and 
descriptive statistics, while our study provides a comprehensive analysis of PTP motives. Second, 
our study allows secondary market liquidity, which is a driver of a PTP, to be tested. 
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control structure (Easterbrook and Fischel 1981), the German peculiarities 
regarding corporate governance make applying foreign findings very difficult. 
The German corporate governance system is specifically characterized by an 
influential and controlling corporate institution supervisory board and public 
corporations‘ concentrated ownership. The difference becomes clear when 
comparing the number of hostile takeovers in the US and Germany, or in 
Continental Europe in general. Second, German companies, or their majority 
shareholders, must offer to buy out pre-transaction investors before delisting their 
shares. This course of action is unlike in the UK where, for example, investors can 
find their money trapped in companies after 75 percent of the shareholders have 
approved the move. Finally, international corporate tax regimes differ 
substantially, complicating the universal interpretation of going private 
transactions as a measure to save taxes. 
Further research into the going private decision is extremely useful, as the 
financial crisis and its repercussions in the global equity markets have put 
delisting on the agenda again. While the last few years were marked by strong 
stock markets, the mood has totally changed since the events of September 2008. 
Across the board, global stocks have lost a significant share of their pre-crisis 
value. The shares of small and medium-sized companies are among the hardest 
hit, as the MSCI Europe Small Cap Index has more or less trailed bigger stocks. 
Moreover, a notable number of European small cap funds was liquidated or 
discontinued in 2008 and 2009. Some funds stop investing in companies, 
especially smaller companies, with a market value below EUR 400 million, as 
they expect them to suffer financial problems due to the crisis. These 
circumstances are likely to intensify the trend of going private in the coming 
months and years. London's Alternative Investment Market has already seen PTPs 
just a year after the initial going public due to these companies‘ shares falling 
heavily.  
Since the German private equity market has developed rather slowly in 
terms of size, investors in German companies going private are mainly strategic 
buyers and only a small number of private equity sponsors. Therefore, our study is 
well suited for investors who want to identify potential going private candidates in 
order to speculate in takeover premiums or positive share price reactions after the 
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announcement. On the other hand, our findings can also be of help to investors 
who want to avoid being squeezed out of a company, as can happen when, for 
example, funds are restricted to invest in quoted vehicles only. 
Our sample comprises 52 Germans PTPs which took place from 1996 until 
the end of 2004 and for which sufficient data are available. Unlike in other major 
stock markets, there are no official statistics available that track going private 
transactions; consequently, we hand-collected the sample from various public data 
sources. The sample comprises firms taken private by strategic investors, private 
equity buyers, as well as their owners. Our analysis empirically tests the relevance 
of the following important hypotheses derived from international going private 
research in respect of the German market: a strong free cash flow in firms, a 
potential to further leverage their capital structure, high ownership concentration, 
their stock market quotation‘s decreasing benefits, a limited capital market 
efficiency and dividend payments which have to be collected privately.  
The results obtained show that, in Germany, going private transactions are 
predominately undertaken by smaller companies with average total assets of EUR 
242 million and an average market capitalization of just EUR 109 million. After 
2001, larger companies also delisted, partly driven by financial sponsors‘ 
increasing activity as they tend to buy larger firms. The sample‘s breakdown per 
sector is dominated by mature industries, with the companies showing weak sales 
and employee growth rates. The profitability of the going private firms was also 
lower compared to that of a control group. This favors the hypothesis regarding a 
stock market listing‘s decreasing benefits in the current stage of the firm‘s 
corporate life cycle. Moreover, we find evidence of the hypothesis that a PTP 
transaction further leverages the capital structure, as the sample companies‘ gross 
debt to assets ratios are lower. However, the equity market is not fully efficient for 
PTPs, as the respective shares‘ trading volumes were very low. We find no 
evidence to support the free cash flow hypothesis, as the companies were not 
taken private to pay out high free cash flows.  
The chapter is organized as follows: in section 4.2, we review the existing 
literature and derive hypotheses which will form the foundation of our empirical 
study. In section 4.3, we describe the sampling procedure of our going private 
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transactions as well as that of the control group, and outline the variables used in 
the analysis. We moreover provide some descriptive statistics regarding the going 
private sample. Section 4.4 forms the main body of our study, which is divided 
into the univariate and multivariate test statistics, and presents the results of our 
research as well as robustness checks. Section 4.5 provides a description of our 
main findings and concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Theoretical Foundations and Hypotheses 
The theory on the conflict between the ownership and control of a publicly 
held company (Berle and Means 1932; Fama and Jensen 1983) has been a 
cornerstone of PTP research for a long time. In particular, the free cash flow 
discussion, originally postulated by Jensen (1986; 1989), has triggered a 
considerable number of studies in respect of the US and other capital markets. 
Nevertheless, as Halpern et al. (1999) rightly point out, firms going private do not 
form a homogenous population. For example, depending on the management‘s 
degree of share ownership, the motives for a PTP might differ substantially. We 
therefore formulate various hypotheses which might explain the reason for taking 
a firm private and will also cover this heterogeneity in motives.88 These 
hypotheses, which are derived from the existing literature on going private 
transactions, form the basis of our empirical analysis in section 4.4. 
4.2.1 Free Cash Flow 
Although only the studies by Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Opler and Titman 
(1993), and Rao et al. (1995) could find evidence that support a positive 
correlation between the amount of free cash flow in a target firm and the 
probability of a PTP in the US, Jensen‘s (1986) theory is still the foundation of 
going private research. The management of a publicly held company has strong 
incentives to keep any free cash flow within the corporation in order to remain 
flexible and avoid the monitoring of outside debt and equity investors. This 
suboptimal allocation of capital is the free cash flow‘s agency costs, as any excess 
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 We consequently concentrate on hypotheses that can be tested in respect of the German market. 
There are, for example, no official statistics of hostile takeover bids, which makes testing for this 
impractical. Secondly, the number of hostile takeovers in Germany is still negligible. 
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cash should be disbursed to the shareholders. This phenomenon is most likely to 
occur in industries characterized by stable, but low, long-term growth rates, as 
well as by limited opportunities to invest in projects with a positive net present 
value (Jensen et al. 1988). This holds true, among others, for the tobacco, forestry, 
pulp and paper, and food industries. Especially highly diversified conglomerates 
are likely to have considerable agency costs in respect of ownership and control 
conflict. A PTP transaction may reduce these costs through the management‘s 
equity participation in the private company, which, in turn, should help realign the 
incentives between the firm‘s post-transaction shareholders and the management. 
Second, buyouts are commonly financed by means of considerable debt in order 
to discipline the management through increasing debt servicing costs, which 
reduces their discretionary scope. Consequently the amount of free cash flow in a 
company should positively influence the probability of a PTP. This forms the free 
cash hypothesis H1. Zillmer (2003) could not, however, find evidence to support 
this relationship in respect of the German stock market. The same holds true for 
Renneboog et al. (2007) in respect of the UK capital market. 
4.2.2 Leverage Potential 
The debt financing argument also applies to the second hypotheses (H2), 
which sees an additional value creation potential in the target companies by means 
of their capital structure. Before the PTP, these companies‘ financing structure 
appears to be suboptimal. The companies‘ stable operating cash flow and their 
assets‘ tangible character, which facilitates their use as security, reduce the agency 
costs of debt compared to those in the corporate life cycle‘s previous stages (Kim 
and Lyn 1991). Thus, a higher debt burden in the capital structure and, therefore, a 
releveraging of companies appears to be preferred in terms of agency costs.89 The 
additional debt puts pressure on the management to perform, limits their scope for 
discretionary spending, and increases the risk of imminent job losses if 
performance is poor. The findings regarding this relationship in respect of the US 
market are inconsistent. While Kim and Lyn (1991) have found evidence that 
support a negative relationship between leverage and the probability of PTP, Rao 
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 Though it remains unclear why the company or the management refrains from adjusting the debt 
level (e.g., through share buybacks) before the PTP takes place. This can only be explained by 
significant agency problems between the management and shareholders.  
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et al. (1995) do not find any evidence of this. Zillmer (2003) finds a lower 
leverage ratio in respect of German PTPs.  
4.2.3 Ownership Concentration 
Our third hypothesis (H3) reflects the direct and indirect costs associated 
with a PTP transaction. In Germany, the legal precondition for taking a firm 
private is a 75 percent share of the capital with voting rights. In his study, 
Lawrence (1986) finds evidence that support PTP‘s higher ownership 
concentration in the form of majority owners. Zillmer (2002) finds evidence that 
in German takeover bids aimed at delisting, 79 percent of the bidders between 
1996 and 2001 already possessed 75 percent of the voting stock. A majority 
owner or several shareholders with a combined majority ownership clearly 
facilitate the successful closure of the PTP transaction, as the number of outside 
investors entitled to compensation is smaller. This helps reduce the delisting‘s 
coordination costs. These costs are expected to increase proportionally to the 
number of outstanding shares (Zillmer 2003). This implies that especially 
companies with a low free float are likely to file for a delisting. A majority voting 
interest of 95 percent increases this probability significantly, as German 
legislation has allowed minority owners to be squeezed out since 2002.90 
Alternatively, a high free float might lead to shareholders controlling the 
management suboptimally due to free rider problems. This would add to the 
agency costs of a publicly held company.91 
4.2.4 Decreasing Benefits of a Stock Market Quotation 
Our next two hypotheses (H4 and H5) are closely related to organized 
capital markets‘ functions: valuation, funding, liquidity, and control.  
If, on stock markets, the need to raise additional equity capital with the help 
of secondary public offerings decreases, a PTP might become an option for a 
                                                 
90
 Currently, the German government plans to reduce this percentage to 90 percent as part of its 
efforts to help struggling companies overcome the financial crisis. This could trigger a new wave 
of German PTPs in the coming years. 
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 In order to investigate this relationship more closely, we would have to identify the free float 
figure long before the PTP, as majority owners often increase their shareholding on the free market 
long before the actual PTP.  
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listed company. In this case, a private entity‘s expected benefits overshadow any 
associated limitations and costs. Companies in a corporate life cycle stage marked 
by slow growth in the mid to long term might benefit from such an option. Such 
companies can be easily financed by means of internal capital generation, or low 
cost debt sourced outside. Moreover, compared to their previous life cycle stages, 
such companies have a larger amount of easy to assess assets, which can serve as 
security for debt financing. This additional security may help reduce their risk 
profile and, consequently, the debt funding costs. A decreased need for external 
funding can be triggered by both slow growth rates and higher and more stable 
operating cash flows. This holds true for companies in stagnating or shrinking 
industries, which is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis (H1) mentioned 
above.  
Capital markets produce random, although diverse, information on strongly 
growing companies, which not only helps investors, but also the management 
itself, to assess investment projects (Subrahmanyam and Titman 1999). Moreover, 
the stock market quotation allows the original owners and management to protect 
specific investments if the net cash flow is insufficient to pursue the envisaged 
growth targets. If this occurs, the original owners and management constantly face 
the risk that well informed investors with strong bargaining power could oust 
them from the company, leading to the loss of their investments (Burghof and 
Rudolph 1999). Another argument for delisting might be the decreasing amount of 
company-specific risks associated with more stable cash flows that are easier to 
evaluate and forecast. A stock market listing allows the former owners to spread 
the idiosyncratic risks, as investors are able to diversify their portfolios more 
widely (Shah and Thakor 1988). However, as the company-specific risks 
decrease, the quotation might become obsolete. Generally speaking, the motives 
for the initial going public are no longer as evident as in the corporation‘s current 
life cycle status (Nathusius 2003). 
A similar argument can be applied to the relative costs of a stock market 
listing. The costs of investor relations as well as the opportunity costs of the 
required management attention, which is hard to quantify, should be regarded in 
relation to the company size and prospective growth. In this regard, the going 
private transaction might not be the outcome of the management‘s wrong 
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decisions, or the capital markets malfunctioning, but rather a logic step in the 
corporate life cycle since funding decisions have to be regarded and taken in a 
dynamic context (Burghof and Schilling 2003).  
The company size is also expected to induce a degree of information 
asymmetry in the capital markets (Kim and Lyn 1991; Rao et al. 1995). Small and 
medium-sized companies are more likely to experience undervaluation than big 
corporations, as they produce less valuable information randomly. Thus, the costs 
of signaling and bonding measures to convey internal valuation factors increase. 
This is linked to the listing‘s decreasing attractiveness, as other projects can only 
be funded under unattractive terms and conditions. On the other hand, the relative 
costs of the obligatory capital market communication decrease with an increase in 
company size (DeAngelo et al. 1984).  
4.2.5 Limited Capital Market Efficiency  
Also our following hypothesis (H5) is connected to the capital markets‘ 
above-mentioned main functions. Ideally, corporate shares‘ secondary market 
pricing should reflect the inner value of the firm itself. Nevertheless, the 
information asymmetries between firm insiders and outsiders may lead to 
valuation discrepancies due to the differing information and assumptions 
regarding the firm‘s future productivity and profitability (among others, Myers 
and Majluf 1984). If insiders are aware of the firm‘s undervaluation, it is 
beneficial to, for example, set up share buyback programs and signal the 
undervaluation to the capital markets. In this context, the going private and final 
delisting can be regarded as an ultimate share buyback (Lehn and Poulsen 1989). 
Therefore, the PTP helps correct the undervaluation and should be initiated by 
insiders, i.e. the management or the majority shareholders (Kim and Lyn 1991). 
The demand side in the capital markets might also be a potential cause of a 
PTP transaction. An example of this occurring is specifically in small and 
medium-sized companies that are majority owned by founder families (Kemper 
and Schiereck 2002). This implies a limited market capitalization, which has 
adverse effects on the secondary market liquidity. On the Warsaw Stock 
exchange, Jackowicz and Kowalewski (2006) observe subdued liquidity in respect 
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of PTP shares. Not only do institutional investors have a restricted capability to 
influence these companies‘ strategic decisions, but this subdued liquidity also 
makes any investment appear unattractive. The low market depth prevents 
investors from exiting the company at short notice, thus limiting the flexibility 
required (Raffel 2003). This effect is amplified by equity analysts‘ inadequate 
coverage of the shares due to the subdued free float, which may add to the 
information asymmetries between firm insiders and outsiders. Moreover, most 
stock markets show a certain degree of sector rotation in terms of investor 
interests and market sentiment. Therefore, investors might even pay very little 
attention to companies with strong growth stories due to their currently 
unattractive industry background. The insufficient liquidity reinforces the 
undervaluation of such companies, increasing either the owners and 
management‘s incentives to take them private, or those of outside investors‘ who 
have identified a potential for value generation by taking them over.  
The subdued liquidity also constrains another function of organized capital 
markets: the market for corporate control, i.e. the management‘s supervision and 
sanctioning through the shareholders. No investor interest and random price 
setting due to lacking liquidity hamper, or even inhibit, an efficient form of 
corporate control through the market. In such an environment, the secondary 
market price no longer serves as an adequate criterion for the management‘s 
capital allocation. In such a constellation, a concentrated shareholdership without 
public listing might outweigh the traditional advantages of capital markets. 
4.2.6 Dividend Payments 
Our last hypothesis (H6) is also closely associated with the perception of 
PTPs as rather stable companies that tend to operate in mature industries 
characterized by low R&D costs and investment needs. Owing to these 
characteristics, companies eligible for PTP transactions are expected to pay 
relatively higher dividends (Carroll et al. 1988). The same argument applies to the 
possibility to service higher interest expenses, as the dividends can be partly 
retained going forward and may be applied as debt service payments. On the 
whole, we expect PTPs to yield high dividend payments, which makes taking the 
firm private attractive for investors as they can thereafter collect the payout fully. 
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Moreover, any corporation‘s dividend policy is marked by conflicting 
interests between shareholders and management. While the shareholders have a 
strong interest in high dividend payments, the management wants to keep 
financial resources within the company (Rao et al. 1995). Going private in the 
form of an owner or management buyout may help to restore – at least partly – the 
division between ownership and control. Thereafter, the management can act 
without the pressure of having to account for high short-term profits and 
dividends, but can follow long-term strategies and goals.  
We have now formed six fields of possible motives for a PTP transaction, 
which are operationalized by means of financial variables in section 3.2. This 
allows us to test the hypotheses in an empirical context.  
4.3 Data Set and Variables 
4.3.1 Sample Selection 
Our subsequent analysis of German publicly owned firms taken private 
covers the period 1996 to 2004. The period before 1996 has no empirical 
relevance since PTPs in the German capital markets were only practically 
facilitated by the introduction of the German Transformation Act (Umwandlungs-
gesetz) in 1995.92  
Unlike other important stock markets, there is no central data base available 
that tracks PTP transactions in Germany; accordingly, we had to turn to different 
data sources to construct our sample. The study by Hohn (2000) provided data for 
the period 1995 to 1999.93 Second, as another source of information, we used the 
voluntary public notice of takeover bids, which was in use before the introduction 
of the German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (Wertpapiererwerbs- und 
Übernahmegesetz – WpÜG) in 2002. We specifically concentrated on takeover 
bids that explicitly mentioned a private corporation‘s aim of delisting the target 
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 Furthermore, including transactions which took place before 1996 would have led to a possible 
structural interruption in the study with unknown consequences for the analysis due to the 
introduction of the German Transformation Act. Eisele et al. (2003), Zillmer (2002), and Hohn 
(2000) followed a similar approach. 
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 While cross-checking the compilation of the PTPs, there were seven corporations in the sample 
for which we could not find any information. These companies were consequently excluded. 
Furthermore, four PTP candidates abandoned their plans and were also eliminated. 
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company. As this procedure does not cover ―cold delisting,‖ we supplemented our 
sample with the help of the Hoppenstedt and Saling Financial Information Stock 
Guides for the entire sampling period.94 We cross-checked the annual stock 
market exit data included in the Guides against newspaper information to identify 
suitable PTPs. The data bases LexisNexis and Genios, which cover all relevant 
German financial newspapers, and Factiva!, which lists Reuters news reports and 
all publicly listed companies‘ ad hoc notices, served as a fourth source of 
information for the construction of our sample. In addition, the German 
Association for the Protection of Small Shareholders provides a data base that 
allows a search for all German publicly held corporations‘ shareholder meetings.95 
When we found hints of a potential PTP in one source of information, we double-
checked this with other sources. Finally, we compared our preliminary sample 
with Zillmer‘s (2003) list of German PTPs during the period 1990 to 2001.  
The differences between the two samples are due to missing company 
information, a different interpretation of the available news flow, and delisting 
plans that were subsequently abandoned.96 With the help of this sampling 
procedure, we identified 57 successfully completed PTPs between 1996 and 2004. 
A further 12 PTPs had been announced but not completed by December 31, 2004. 
After excluding three observations from the financial services industry due to 
differing accounting standards and eliminating five PTPs due to insufficient data 
coverage, the sample consisted of 52 corporations. Accordingly, the number of 
observations in the sample is not very large, but this is an inherent problem in the 
going private research. The sample size in other notable studies ranges from 54 
(Maupin 1987) to 263 (Lehn and Poulsen 1989). The complete list of company 
names and those of their investors can be found in the Appendix. 
In order to analyze the characteristics of the going private sample with the 
help of univariate and multivariate test statistics, we needed a control group, 
which is made up of publicly held corporations listed on a German stock 
exchange. We therefore used the complete list of all publicly listed German 
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 Cold delisting makes use of company law provisions that allow the requirements for a stock 
market listing to be omitted (Oetker and Heise 2002). 
95
 The data base is available at www.hv-info.de. 
96
 The data bases used especially lacked sufficient information on transactions before 1996. 
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corporations in the Datastream database on December 31 2004 as the universe.97 
The control group‘s selection was choice based, i.e. according to the paired 
sample design. This approach has been used in numerous studies, for example, by 
Cosslet (1981), Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), and 
Weir et al. (2005a; 2005b). Other studies have relied on random sampling of the 
control group (Kim and Lyn 1991; Rao et al. 1995; Zillmer 2003). A matched 
pairs approach has two advantages in our context. First, random sampling would 
not allow controlling for industry and size effects in the univariate analysis. 
Second, as German PTPs are of relatively smaller size, random samples or 
industry adjusted control samples would always lead to control portfolios of much 
larger average size (Wagner 2005). Furthermore, our approach is widely regarded 
as appropriate if the sub-group is minimal in relation to the total population 
(Amemiya 1985). The studies by Song and Walking (1993) and Jackowicz and 
Kowalewski (2006) used both approaches, but the authors were unable to find any 
significant differences in their analysis. Consequently, we use the paired sample 
design for our analysis.98  
The two criteria for the selection of the control group are industry 
background and size (Lawrence 1986; North 2001). This approach helps us 
minimize any sector or size effects in our analysis.99 We relied on the FTSE 
Global Classification System as of January 2005 for the sector classification. In a 
first step, we looked for control companies by means of the three-digit FTSE code 
and the latest available sales figure (Wagner 2005). We tried to select one firm 
with a higher sales figure than the going private company and one with a lower 
one as the control group for each PTP.100 If the approach delivered no, or only one, 
fitting control company, the approach was continued on the level of the two-digit 
                                                 
97
 Consequently, firms that vanished as a result of takeovers or bankruptcies were ex-ante excluded 
from our sample. This approach might, however, exclude relevant parameters from the regression 
– for a detailed discussion, see Kieschnick (1998). Since the extent of this effect is unclear, this 
approach was nevertheless used for our analysis. 
98
 Furthermore, any systematic biases due to the sampling approach should not occur in the 
explanatory variables or the standard error, but in the constant term (Maddala 1983). 
99
 Our study design is therefore based on differences in the explanatory variables within an 
industry group. Some balance sheet ratios and figures might correlate with the respective 
company‘s sector background. If this were the case, our study design would not be sufficient to 
identify company-specific differences in the variables (Lawrence 1986).  
100
 This sampling approach should enhance the matching of the control group (Spiess and Affleck-
Graves 1995). In addition, the problem of the ―public company‖ group‘s underrepresentation 
relative to the overall population might be reduced to some degree.  
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FTSE classification code. Ultimately, we identified 90 listed corporations for our 
control sample as we were unable to find two fitting control companies for each 
PTP.101 
To obtain reliable statements on going private companies‘ characteristics, 
we have to assess whether our sample is representative. Possible biases can occur 
because our data bases specifically lack balance sheet, profit and loss statement, 
and cash flow information on small companies. However, this problem holds 
good for most studies on this topic. Moreover, the beginning of our sampling 
period tends to be underrepresented due to missing data, especially regarding 
early PTPs.102  
4.3.2 Definition of Key Variables 
In order to test the above-derived hypotheses, we need a sound definition of 
the key variables.103 For the calculation of the explanatory variables, we mostly 
relied on the last complete financial year prior to the PTP transaction. This 
financial year is regarded as the control group‘s reference year. A complete list of 
the variables that we used can be found in the Appendix.  
We first use the firm‘s free cash flow with regard to the free cash flow 
hypothesis’s explanatory variables. We follow the definition by Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989) to calculate this factor.104 Since we expect the free cash flow figure to 
increase with increasing company size, we standardize the variable with the help 
of the book value of the firm‘s equity value.105 We also include a standardized 
                                                 
101
 On the one hand, some German sectors have only a very limited number of listed companies. 
On the other hand, if the market leader of one sector opted for a PTP, the control group‘s sales 
figures differed significantly.  
102
 However, this situation limits any adverse economic cycle side-effects on our financial data 
over the study period. 
103
 It is noteworthy that in our data bases, information on profit and loss statements is partly 
aggregated, which prevents the calculation of some variables. Furthermore, a number of our 
hypotheses are based on or connected to the extent of the information asymmetry in the capital 
markets, which cannot be measured directly. We therefore try to assess this value by indirect 
means and variables.  
104
 As we were unable to obtain company information on interest payments, our free cash flow 
figures tend to be higher than in comparable US studies. Our figures are, however, comparable to 
that in Zillmer‘s (2003) study.  
105
 Halpern et al. (1999) recommend a standardization approach by means of the sales figures as a 
measure of the company‘s cash flow. This should lead to fewer distortions in the analysis, as no 
capital structure components enter the variable. Our control sample‘s sampling procedure by the 
means of the sales figure makes the equity figure appear more feasible. 
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operating cash flow and an available cash holdings figure in the analysis, as our 
approximation‘s feasibility remains unclear. Since the described three variables 
only provide the firm‘s amount of liquidity in the financial year prior to the PTP, 
but not the prospective growth potential, we also include a Tobin‘s Q figure which 
measures future investment projects‘ value (Tobin 1969). For our analysis, we use 
the approximation of the Tobin‘s Q by Denis (1992) and Opler and Titman 
(1993), which relies on the book values of assets and debt instead of market 
values.106 107 
In order to measure the potential for further debt in the sample firms‘ capital 
structure, we used a leverage variable, defined as the total debt to assets. In 
addition, the decision on a further leveraging depends on the total cost of the debt, 
which is driven by the specific risk premium in the credit agreements. We have 
tried to approximate the sample‘s risk profile with the help of the operating 
earnings‘ fluctuation range, i.e. the variant coefficient of the EBIT in the three 
financial years prior to the PTP, or the control sample‘s reference period. 
Moreover, we expect the going private companies to have higher tax payments, 
which management or investors try to reduce with a higher debt. The study by 
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) found evidence to support this link to a certain extent.108 
Accordingly, we include the standardized total tax burden in our analysis.109  
The ownership hypothesis will be measured by the percentage of free float 
shares as well as the number of shareholders who, together, hold more than 50 
percent of the share capital (Beck and Stinn 2002).110 
                                                 
106
 Denis (1992) mentions that this approximate figure depends on the current level of prices in 
stock markets and it may therefore fluctuate over time. As we have used an effective date 
comparison regarding the control sample, this constraint does not apply. 
107
 In order to measure the postulated relationship between free cash flow and the amount of 
valuable future growth projects, we have developed two interaction variables (not reported): First, 
the multiple of the respective free cash flow and Tobin‘s Q figure (Lang et al. 1991). Second, we 
constructed a dummy variable which splits the going private and control sample along the median 
in respect of the observed free cash flow and Tobin‘s Q values. Companies above the first 
variable‘s median and below the second one are coded ―1,‖ i.e. firms with above average unused 
liquidity but below average investment opportunities with a positive net present value. As the 
separating force of the two interaction measures is limited, we have excluded the variables from 
our presented analysis.  
108
 Since German tax legislation differs from that of the US, the relevance of this relationship is 
unclear. 
109
 Alternatively, the tax rate was applied instead, but the results did not show any difference.  
110
 We have excluded the number of holders from our further analysis, because the separating force 
of the variables is limited. 
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Since the hypothesis regarding the decreasing benefits of a stock market 
listing covers several arguments, it will also be measured by a wider range of 
variables. In order to cover the relative costs of the quotation in relation to the 
company size, we use different size proxies like the sales, total assets, the book 
and market value of the company‘s equity position, and the number of employees. 
Whether the going private sample is marked by slow growth in the years before 
the PTP will be analyzed on the basis of the sales figure‘s growth rates and that of 
the firm‘s work force for the years t-1 to t-3. In addition, the growth values‘ 
respective geometric means will be applied. 
A potential systemic undervaluation of the going private sample, as 
expressed in our fifth hypothesis, will be measured by the market capitalization to 
book value ratio, as well as the price-earnings and the price-sales multiple. The 
assumption that PTPs tend to take place in industries with low prospective growth 
rates and value creation potential is closely associated with the undervaluation. 
This can be illustrated by a rather low price-earnings multiple, which could 
indicate little future earnings potential. We apply the EBITDA margin and the 
return on capital ratio (ROCE) as other variables for the sample companies‘ 
productivity. A comparatively low efficiency and productivity could explain the 
undervaluation and the need for restructuring.111 112 
The weekly trading volume mean in the calendar year prior to the PTP and 
the control sample‘s reference date allow us to analyze the relationship between 
secondary market liquidity and the PTP probability. We expect a negative link 
between the two variables.  
                                                 
111
 The studies by Kim and Lyn (1991), Denis (1992), Rawashdeh (1994), Rao et al. (1995), and 
Halpern et al. (1999) find evidence that supports this negative relationship between profitability 
and the PTP probability. 
112
 Financial sponsors‘ target firms specifically show a profitable operating business but low 
valuations. In order to examine this relationship more closely, we constructed a dummy variable 
and an interaction variable (not reported). The dummy variable takes the value ―1‖ for companies 
with a ROCE above the respective sample median and, simultaneously, a market-to-book ratio 
below the median. The interaction variable is defined as the multiple of the EBITDA margin and 
the market-to-book ratio. However, the two variables did not have any significant influence on the 
decision to conduct a PTP. 
“Privacy please!” - The Public to Private Decision in Germany 103 
 
In order to test the dividend hypothesis, we use the dividend yield. The 
studies by Rao et al. (1995) and Carroll et al. (1988) have found higher dividend 
yields or payout ratios with regard to US PTPs.113 
4.3.3 Sample Characteristics 
In order to characterize the firms of our two samples, table 4-1 provides 
descriptive statistics of the most important key variables used.114  
We can see that the going private sample is made up of small firms with 
average total assets of EUR 242 million and average sales of EUR 325 million. 
The average market capitalization of just EUR 109 million presents a similar 
picture when compared to values of EUR 219 million, EUR 245 million, and EUR 
85 million in respect of the ―public company‖ sample.115 The figures are also 
higher compared to the earlier study by Zillmer (2003), which indicates that 
especially larger firms opted for PTP transactions in later years. This could be a 
sign of financial sponsors‘ increasing activity in the German market. From an 
international point of view, the German going private sample appears to comprise 
relatively smaller firms.116  
The PTP sample is marked by slow, or even negative, growth rates of, 
respectively, 2 percent and -2 percent with regard to total sales and number of 
employees. This compares to 9 percent and 2 percent for the control sample. 
Accordingly, the values of the PTP sample can be regarded as low both in 
absolute and relative terms. This could confirm our hypothesis regarding PTP 
transactions mainly involving slowly growing, stagnating, or even shrinking 
companies. The average weekly trading volume of just 2,439 PTP shares, 
compared to that of 17,313 control sample shares, is consistent with our 
assumptions of low trading in PTP shares before going private. Nevertheless, the 
valuation, measured by the market-to-book ratio and the price-earnings multiple, 
                                                 
113
 We also included the payout ratio in our analysis (not reported), but could not find any 
significant influence on the PTP probability.  
114
 In our descriptive analysis, we concentrate on the median instead of the mean, as the 
distribution of most variables shows a considerable skewness. 
115
 Initially, it is surprising that the going private companies tend to be larger than the control firms 
in terms of assets, sales, and market capitalization. However, this is probably due to our sampling 
technique regarding the control sample and its inherent size restrictions as mentioned above. 
116
 In respect of the US market, compare the studies by Denis (1992) and Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989). However, the different observation periods are a limiting factor in any comparison. 
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is inconclusive regarding the going private sample‘s potential systematic 
undervaluation.  
The free cash flow figures are lower compared to those of the control 
sample, which clearly contradicts Jensen‘s (1986) theory. Our observed values 
are, however, comparable to the figures in the study by Zillmer (2003).  
From a relatively low leverage of 17 percent in terms of total assets, it is 
possible to conclude that the PTPs could be financed by means of additional debt, 
which should bring the going private companies‘ capital structure more in line 
with the public company control sample.  
In the PTP companies, both the ROCE and the EBIT variation coefficient 
value are lower. This could confirm our assumption that PTP transactions are 
undertaken by firms with low profitability but rather stable operative earnings, 
which reduces the risk of any additional debt financing, thereby decreasing its risk 
premium.  
The free float figure does not differ significantly in the two samples, but is 
relatively low at the PTPs‘ 24 percent and the control group‘s 27 percent. Despite 
the stock market listing, large blockholders seem to still control both samples. 
This could explain why the free cash flow hypothesis does not seem to apply to 
the German market regarding corporate control: these blockholders have strong 
incentives to monitor the management closely and the power to execute strategic 
changes (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). This is especially true in illiquid stock 
markets, as the investors cannot exit a company within a short timeframe if the 
corporate performance is weak (Maug 1998). 
In order to obtain a better understanding of the going private sample‘s 
industry background, we have classified the PTP companies according to the 
FTSE Global Classification System and their core business.  
The table 4-2 shows a broad spectrum of industries and sectors with an 
emphasis on manufacturing businesses. The producers of capital goods are the 
largest single group. However, this focus reflects the overall distribution of small 
and medium-sized companies in Germany. In comparison to Germany‘s stock 
market indices, S-DAX and M-DAX, the focus on manufacturing sectors and 
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machinery is in line. However, the going private distribution shows relatively 
more companies in the food producing sectors than the indices do. Generally 
speaking, the industry allocation mainly shows sectors that can be considered 
mature and slow growing (Eisele et al. 2003). This is compliant with our observed 
growth rates regarding the total sales and number of employees in table 4-1. As 
discussed above, these industries show relatively low capital needs, which can be 
fulfilled by cheaper funding alternatives. Additionally, such industries tend to 
show strong and relatively stable cash flows, which strengthen their ability to 
refinance internally and decrease their need to turn to external capital markets. 
An analysis of the investor types who took the sample companies private 
could provide further information about their motives and characteristics. We 
therefore clustered the sample according to the investor categories: strategic 
investors, financial investors, and traditional owner buyout.117 By means of this 
approach, we were able to identify 40 transactions led by strategic investors, nine 
by financial sponsors, and three owner buyouts.118 As the number of typical owner 
buyouts is very low in Germany, the three sub-samples‘ descriptive statistics are 
presented in the Appendix. 
Although the number of transactions in which financial sponsors are 
involved as investors is still limited in our sample, we examine the differences 
between the two groups with the help of univariate test statistics. The results are 
shown in table 4-3. The companies which were taken private by strategic 
investors tend to be smaller in size. Their asset value is EUR 199 million 
compared to the financial sponsor group‘s of EUR 488 million. A similar picture 
emerges for the equity book value of just EUR 39 million (EUR 119 million) and 
the sales figure of EUR 290 million (EUR 668 million). However, only the 
number of employees –1,100 – is significantly lower than that of the financial 
buyouts (5,400).  
                                                 
117
 We follow the definition that strategic investors have an operating business and their principal 
goal is to generate synergies by combining the target and the existing operations. They do not have 
a clear exit strategy. Financial investors, in contrast, have no operating business but funds that they 
invest in firms, which may have a different industrial background. They follow a clear, short to 
mid-term exit strategy.  
118
 The classification of transactions according to financial investors and owner buyouts is 
sometimes difficult, as external investors also tend to hold controlling interest in a company more 
than a year before the actual PTP. 
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Moreover, the strategic investor sub-sample shows significantly lower 
growth rates in the year preceding the PTP. This might explain why strategic 
buyers do not envisage short-term value generation. This argument is supported 
by the observation that beside the slow growth in sales, the companies also 
demonstrate a lower return on capital than the reference group does. Financial 
investors might want to make these companies more profitable, while strategic 
buyers might have their eye on operating synergies with their companies. 
However, we do not find any reliable evidence that would characterize the PTP 
companies as typical restructuring candidates. This observation is similar to the 
discussion by Sinnenberg (2005). 
We find some evidence that the free cash flow hypothesis might only apply 
to financial buyouts. These companies show higher cash flow figures, measured 
by free cash flow and EBITDA, and have a lower Tobin‘s Q proxy. However, 
only the former two variables differ significantly from those in the strategic buyer 
sample. 
4.4 Empirical Results of Univariate and Multivariate Analysis 
4.4.1 Univariate Test Statistics 
The observed sample‘s characteristics and differences will now be analyzed 
by means of univariate test statistics. The table 4-4 shows the results of the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test.119 This test statistic allows a better control of potential 
outliers because it relies on the sample median instead of the mean.120 As the sales 
growth measures are marked by a very high standard deviation, we winsorized 
them on the 95 percent quantile.121  
As already mentioned above, the univariate analysis also clearly shows that 
the going private sample is marked by slow growth in sales and number of 
employees. The sales growth rates range between 6 percent and 10 percent with 
regard to the median control company, which is considerable above the observed 
                                                 
119
 The results are qualitatively identical if a t-test is applied. 
120
 Furthermore, a non-parametric test statistic is better suited for our study, as the assumption of 
the variables‘ normal distribution has to be rejected.  
121
 The findings are not affected if the variable is winsorized on the 99 percent quantile.  
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rates of the PTP sample. Accordingly, statistically, the sales growth rates‘ 
geometric means in the second and third year before the PTP are significantly 
higher at the 5 percent and 10 percent level. The sample shows a high 
heterogeneity in the work force growth rates, but the median PTP firm has a 
constant number of employees in the second year directly before the going 
private, even reducing this number it in the third year. The employee growth 
variable two years before the transaction is thus significantly lower than the 
control group‘s rate at the 10 percent level. Although the standard deviation in the 
sample is high, we maintain that going private companies are not growth 
companies, but merely keep their sales figures constant. The development of the 
work force clearly shows that these companies are no longer growing. This speaks 
in favor of our hypothesis regarding a stock market quotation‘s decreasing 
benefits.  
Moreover, the profitability and productivity in the year before the PTP are 
slightly lower compared to those of the control sample. The variables of the 
EBITDA margin and the return on capital employed are significantly lower at the 
10 percent level. The PTP sample‘s median EBITDA margin stands at 8 percent, 
while the ―public company‖ group has a margin of 9 percent. The median return 
of just 4.2 percent compares unfavorably with the 6.5 percent of the reference 
group. However, future profitability in the form of the Tobin‘s Q variable is 
identical at a median level of 0.73. This might indicate that there is a prospective 
value generation potential in the companies but that this potential should be raised 
outside the public markets. Therefore, our hypothesis regarding the stock market 
listing‘s decreasing benefits cannot be rejected at this point. 
The difference between the two groups‘ weekly trading volume before the 
PTP is highly significant at the 1 percent level. A closer investigation of the going 
private sample‘s data shows that a significant number of companies tend to have 
no trading for several weeks and therefore have no price setting. The limited 
liquidity restricts capital markets‘ other main functions as mentioned above, 
thereby making a further stock listing unattractive. Our hypothesis regarding the 
limited capital market efficiency can therefore be confirmed from a univariate 
point of view. A limiting factor in our observation and assessment is the 
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considerable variability in the weekly trading volume, which makes the sample 
very heterogeneous.  
Also our hypothesis regarding the further leverage potential can be 
confirmed on a univariate basis, as the median going private leverage of 17 
percent is significantly lower than the control figure of 26 percent. Accordingly, 
we maintain that the initiators of the transaction regard PTPs‘ leverage ratio and, 
consequently, their capital structure as inadequate; therefore, the taking private 
aligns these with the respective risk profile. This adjustment is expected to create 
value for the post-transaction shareholders.  
We were unable to find any evidence in favor of the postulated free cash 
flow hypothesis. The free cash flow figure is lower for the going private sample 
and there is no significant difference in the Tobin‘s Q figure.  
Also our dividend hypothesis has to be rejected from a univariate point of 
view, as the control group shows a significantly higher dividend yield. This 
observation is partly due to numerous PTP companies not paying any dividends at 
all, which might be explained by their slow growth and low profitability.  
4.4.2 Univariate Test Statistics of Subdivided Going Private Samples 
The considerable heterogeneity in our sample might be a result of changing 
PTP motives over time. We therefore divide our overall observation period into 
two sub-samples. The figure 4-1 shows the chronological distribution of the going 
private sample and the announcement dates of still pending taking private 
transactions. 
Subsequent to the introduction of the squeeze-out legalization in Germany 
in 2002, companies literally rushed away from the public markets. Of our overall 
52 observations, 12 were completed in 2002. Moreover, the number of PTP 
appears to be dependent on the overall stock market development. The weak 
market conditions in 1999 and 2000 specifically led to a large number of going 
privates. 
In order to mirror the evolution of the legislation as a result of the squeeze-
out rule, we have divided the overall observation phase into the periods 1996–
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2001 and 2002–2004. The table 4-5 shows descriptive and univariate test statistics 
for the two groups. The first stage consists of 30 transactions and the second of 22 
going privates.122 
The analysis of the size variables clearly shows that from 2002–2004, larger 
companies opted for a delisting. While in the first period, the median going 
private firm had total assets of EUR 214 million, a market capitalization of just 
EUR 50 million, and total sales of EUR 290 million, the later median company 
shows figures of EUR 320 million, EUR 251 million, and EUR 420 million. The 
equity‘s book value paints a similar picture. The first period‘s total of 1,510 
employees compares poorly with the 2,980 of the second group. The trading 
volume seems to be a function of the low market capitalization as, in the first half, 
only 2,250 shares were traded weekly in respect of the median company. The 
second group shows a weekly trading of at least 5,210 shares. This significant 
difference may be explained by the simplified squeeze out of minorities after 
2002, or by financial investors initiating important going private transactions. 
Both explanations argue in favor of a professionalization of the German PTP 
market, which Eisele et al. (2003) also support. The strong deviation in the 
median and mean reveals the strong heterogeneity in size – even within the sub-
groups. This supports the conclusion that both small and larger companies are 
taken private by their owners. We expect this to hold true for the future German 
market as well.123  
We find some evidence of the assumed increased information asymmetry in 
the form of a higher undervaluation of smaller sized companies in the first group. 
The median market-to-book ratio and price-sales multiple are lower for the first 
sub-group. The latter variable is significantly different at the 5 percent level. 
However, the price-earnings multiple shows a contrary relationship.124  
Moreover, we observe that the first group has significantly lower sales 
growth rates in the third year before the PTP transaction. However, in the 
financial year immediately before the going private, the relationship is the reverse 
                                                 
122
 The split between the two time periods is 17 and 22 PTP transactions for the trading volume 
variable.  
123
 Eisele et al. (2003) come to the same conclusion. 
124
 Some outliers in terms of the price-earnings multiple distort the analysis. 
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and the workforce growth does not differ significantly, which precludes any direct 
conclusion.  
The free cash flow figure of the first group is slightly higher than for the 
second sample, and the Tobin‘s Q somewhat lower. However, as the variance in 
the second group is very high and the difference is not significant; any conclusion 
would be controversial. 
Since all other variables do not show any systematic differences, the overall 
going private sample is representative of our subsequent multivariate analysis, 
which forms the main body of our study.  
4.4.3 Multivariate Analysis 
We decided to estimate a logit model by maximum-likelihood, comparable 
to the one employed in the studies by Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Weir et al. 
(2005a; 2005b), for our multivariate analysis. Previous studies had partly used 
probit models (Rao et al. 1995; Verbeek 2000).125  
The dependent variable in our model equals zero if the company stays 
public over the sampling period and one if the company goes private. In order to 
guarantee the correct use of the logit model, we examined the independent 
variables for multi-collinearity. Linear dependencies between the explanatory 
variables with a correlation coefficient of r > 0.5 were only observed in respect of 
the different size proxies. Accordingly, they were not simultaneously included in 
the logit model. Second, an analysis of the variance inflation factors did not show 
any signs of multicollinearity (not reported).126 Thus, multi-collinearity should not 
constrain our model‘s separating force and the variables should be free of any 
significant biases.127 As only observations that have valid data for all the included 
variables are used in the model, the number of observations in the different 
specifications of the logit model varies. However, we could not find structural 
                                                 
125
 Using a probit model instead of a logit regression produces qualitatively similar results.  
126
 Only the tax variable showed minor collinearity indications and was accordingly not 
simultaneously included in the multivariate analysis. In a simplified model specification with no 
collinearity problems, the variable had no significant influence on the PTP probability (not 
reported).  
127
 One observation had to be excluded from the multivariate analysis as it showed outlier 
characteristics in numerous explanatory variables (using Cook‘s D). 
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differences between the overall data set and the reduced sample. Consequently, all 
model specifications should be feasible and comparable.  
We have estimated four different model specifications, which form our core 
results. The results are tabulated in table 4-6. The first model allows us to test all 
our postulated hypotheses. The scope of the selected variables is therefore rather 
broad and partly influenced by the univariate analysis results. However, chapter 
4.4.4 illustrates the robustness of our results in respect of alternative model and 
variable definitions. 
The first two models vary only in respect of the inclusion of the weekly 
trading volume variable in the first specification. Without the VOLUME variable, 
the data set increases from 101 to 125, as a number of companies‘ trading volume 
data are unavailable. Since the first logit model‘s overall goodness of fit remains 
relatively poor in the first step, we searched for outliers with the help of Cook‘s 
D, which measures the influence of a given data point in the regression analysis 
(Cook and Weisberg 1982; Long and Freese 2006). Through this approach, we 
identified seven outlier observations and, accordingly, included an outlier dummy 
variable in the first model specification. This confirms the rather high 
heterogeneity in the sample, which we already observed in our univariate analysis 
above. Moreover, we winsorized the variables VOLUME, SALE1-3, and 
MARGIN on the 5 percent- and 95 percent quantile in respect of both model 
specifications.128 This allowed us to keep the outlier observations in the model and 
maintain the broad data set.  
All four estimated specifications of the logit model show satisfactory 
economic properties. In terms of the McFadden pseudo-R
2 
ratio, the 
specifications‘ model fit ranges from 0.050 to 0.104. The Wald test for the null 
hypothesis of the independent variables‘ lack of joint influence can always be 
rejected at the 1 percent level. At first, a very broad variety of variables was 
included in the model specifications, which should help reflect the wide range of 
potential company specifications and minimize the risk of an omitted variable 
bias. Nevertheless, the risk of not identifying a valuable influencing factor, or the 
                                                 
128
 Alternatively, we winsorized the variables on the 1 percent and 99 percent quantile, which did 
not change the results. 
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failure to operationalize such a factor, cannot be fully excluded. For example, one 
can assume that the degree of information asymmetry regarding large diversified 
conglomerates is especially high. In this context, a PTP might help reorganize the 
corporation in private through the spin-off of non-core activities and the 
refocusing of the remaining operations. The Herfindahl index is a good proxy to 
measure the extent of information asymmetry (Opler and Titman 1993). However, 
due to a lack of data on the ―dead‖ companies, we were not able to calculate the 
index value of the whole sample and therefore did not include this Herfindahl 
index in our analysis. Nevertheless, as discussed above, the linear correlation 
between our variable data set is minimal, which should also hold true for any 
unobserved variables. This should help keep any adverse effects at a minimum. 
In a multivariate context, the statistical significance of the variables in our 
univariate analysis changes partly. The geometric mean of the growth in total 
sales in the three years before the PTP transaction is no longer significant. The 
first model shows significant statistical influence on the probability of a PTP in 5 
of 11 variables included in the model, i.e. the leverage ratio (statistical 
significance at 5 percent), the current valuation of the target company in the form 
of the market-to-book ratio (statistical significance at 1 percent), and the 
profitability measured by the return on capital employed (statistical significance at 
10 percent). Also the ratio of net working capital to total assets, which should help 
measure the company‘s liquidity position, gains statistical significance at the 5 
percent level. In addition, the variable of the weekly trading volume is significant 
at 5 percent in the first model and increases the respective model specification‘s 
goodness of fit, while the marginal effect on the PTP probability is negligible.  
By excluding the trading volume variable in the second model specification, 
we have a broader data set of 125 observations compared to 101 in the first logit 
model. This allows us to drop the outlier variable as well. The statistical 
significance in this specification is reduced to three out of nine included 
explanatory variables. The leverage ratio is now even significant at the 1 percent 
level. The market-to-book ratio is now only significant at 5 percent, but the return 
on the capital employed improves its significance at the 5 percent level.  
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Increasing the leverage by one unit, decreases the probability of a PTP by 
1.070, with a standard error of 0.364 in the first model specification. With a 
parameter of 1.112 and a standard error of 0.305, the relationship is even stronger 
in the second model. That is, the higher the leverage ratio of the company, the 
lower the probability that it will become a target for PTP. Since the effect on the 
going private decision is very strong, this relationship confirms our leverage 
hypothesis (H2). However, the other proxies that helped us operationalize the 
leverage potential hypothesis – variance in earnings and the company‘s tax burden 
– gain no significance in the analysis (not reported). A low leverage is therefore a 
significant factor in the decision to go private, which adjusts to a more optimal 
level. In this sense, the right leverage level will be strongly influenced by the 
company‘s current risk profile and, consequently, by the cost of debt.  
All three measures of the hypothesis regarding a stock market quotation‘s 
decreasing benefits (H4) show the right signs of the coefficients. With a marginal 
effect of -0.613, the EBITDA margin has the strongest influence on the 
probability of a PTP in a simplified model 3, which removes insignificant 
explanatory variables. However, the effect is not statistically significant in the 
first and second model specification. The return on the capital employed seems to 
have a minor, but statistically significant, effect at -0.007 (-0.008/-0.005). As the 
parameter of the sales growth rates‘ geometric mean at least has the right sign in 
all three model specifications, hypothesis H4 is confirmed in the multivariate 
environment. The going private companies‘ economic situation has probably 
changed since the initial IPO, and the stock market listing no longer justifies their 
inherent direct and indirect costs. In respect of a sample of reverse LBOs, which 
returned to the capital markets, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) demonstrated 
that three-fourths of the companies had in the meantime undergone a restructuring 
to strengthen their profitability. A strategic reorganization is specifically simpler 
outside the public capital market and without minority shareholders‘ involvement. 
Since the risk of delay is minimal in a private context and with a dominant 
shareholder, we expect the initiators of the PTP transaction to operationally or 
strategically reorganize the company. However, as discussed above, the going 
private companies do not qualify as classic restructuring candidates since the debt 
ratio shows potential for further leverage.  
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On examining the PTP companies‘ market valuation, it is clear that 
undervaluation, measured by the market-to-book ratio, has a marginal effect of -
0.028 (-0.020/-0.022) on the probability of a going private. This influence is 
significant in all three model specifications. Although the effect is only marginal, 
the weekly trading volume has the right sign and the univariate analysis also 
supports the assumption of low trading in PTPs‘ shares the year prior to the taking 
private. Therefore, also our hypothesis regarding the limited capital market 
efficiency of PTPs (H5) is confirmed in the multivariate environment. The lower 
valuation increases the costs of refinancing with the help of the stock market. 
Capital increases may, however, no longer be placed in the market due to a lack of 
investor interest. This assumption is supported by the rather mature industry 
breakdown and the weak trading in PTP shares. Alternatively, company insiders 
may use the low valuation and their informational advantage regarding the firm‘s 
real inner value to buy outsiders out at very attractive terms. This is equivalent to 
an overreaching of the pre-transaction shareholders by paying too low premiums 
over the current share price. Eisele and Walter (2003) find evidence that the 
positive share price effects after the announcement of German PTPs are 
compensated by induced gains in the company value as well as by the 
redistribution of wealth between the shareholder groups. 
The free cash flow variable‘s parameter shows the right sign in all three 
model specifications, but the figures remain insignificant regarding the probability 
of a taking a company private. The liquidity ratio, measured by the working 
capital to total assets, is statistically significant in the first and third logit model, 
but has the opposite sign, as postulated by our free cash flow hypothesis (H1). It 
seems that a better liquidity situation decreases the likelihood of going private. In 
the fourth model, we replaced the free cash flow variable with the Tobin‘s Q 
measure, but also this alternative explanatory variable shows no significant 
influence on the going private decision. Therefore, we have to dismiss the free 
cash flow hypothesis (H1), also in the multivariate context.129 The agency conflict 
described by Jensen does not appear to be severe enough in the German corporate 
governance system to justify a PTP. On the other hand, the relationship of the 
liquidity figure could support the cost saving hypothesis (H4). Companies could 
                                                 
129
 The study by Zillmer (2003) comes to the same conclusion. 
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try to save their listing and other associated costs in order to bolster their 
decreasing liquidity. 
Hypothesis H3 regarding PTPs‘ greater ownership concentration has to be 
rejected, also in the multivariate context. The free float explanatory variable gains 
no significance in the analysis (models 1, 2 and 4) and has a positive marginal 
effect, which is contrary to our hypothesis. The study by Zillmer (2003) comes to 
a different conclusion, which might be due to the differing sampling approach in 
respect of the control group. Accordingly, the coordination costs of a delisting 
seem to play no overruling role regarding taking private considerations. The 
successful introduction of the squeeze-out regulation in Germany might have 
added to this observation.  
Similarly, the assumption by H6 regarding PTPs paying higher payouts in 
the form of dividends, which external shareholders want to collect in the private 
sphere, cannot be confirmed. The dividend yield variable gains no statistical 
significance in the analysis and shows the opposite sign of the coefficient than 
expected. However, it may be the other way round and financial investors may 
want to increase the payout ratio in their favor after the taking private. However, 
the dividend variables‘ lack of significance and the liquidity proxy‘s opposite sign 
do not indicate any surplus in liquid assets that might be distributed after the 
going private.  
4.4.4 Robustness Checks 
We have conducted further analyses to gauge the extent to which the results 
are robust to alternative model and variable definitions.  
First, we reestimated our four main models using robust standard errors. All 
core results are robust to this alternative model specification. Only the statistical 
significance is somewhat reduced. Second, a number of alternative growth and 
size measures were also tested. All were found to be insignificant, which supports 
our findings in section 4.3. Third, given free cash flow‘s contended impact on 
PTP decisions in other studies, we estimated models 1 to 3, using the cash flow 
measures instead of the free cash flow variable. Also this variable was 
insignificant, suggesting, that the free cash flow hypothesis plays no role in 
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German PTPs. Fourth, we estimated the logit models by replacing the market-to-
book ratio with alternative valuation measures, i.e. the price-earnings and price-
sales ratio. Neither measure was found to be significant, which partly challenges 
our hypothesis regarding the limited capital market efficiency. However, both 
explanatory variables show the correct signs of the coefficients, which definitely 
supports our hypothesis of a systematic undervaluation of PTP companies. 
Accordingly, our core results appear to be robust. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The table 4-7 provides an overview of the main findings of our study. The 
aim of this study was to examine the characteristics of going private companies in 
Germany and the possible motives behind such a transaction. With this in mind, 
we analyzed a hand-collected sample of 52 PTP companies for the period 1996 to 
2004 with the help of univariate and multivariate test statistics. 
Our findings show that with total assets of EUR 241 million, German going 
private companies are relatively small in size. However, after 2001, an increasing 
number of larger companies delisted. This might be due to the increasing activity 
of financial sponsors in the German capital markets, as their target companies 
have an average equity book value of EUR 120 million compared to the mere 
EUR 39 million of those of strategic investors. Financial investors‘ subdued 
activity at the beginning of our sampling period may be one explanation why we 
did not find evidence to support the free cash flow hypothesis. Taking firms 
private with the aim of paying out unused liquidity and cash flow to ex-post 
shareholders would specifically apply to buyout deals led by financial investors.  
We showed that mature sectors, which are marked by slow growth and low 
capital needs, dominate the going private sample. The PTP companies have very 
low sales growth figures in the three financial years preceding the taking private.  
A very important factor in the going private rationale should be the low 
trading in the PTP companies‘ shares. In most cases, we observed consecutive 
weeks without any price setting. There can be no doubt that the shares‘ low 
liquidity has adverse effects on the companies‘ valuation besides hindering the 
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capital markets‘ correct functioning. The advantage of refinancing through the 
public capital market is therefore no longer valid for PTPs. 
Another central characteristic of the going private companies is their low 
leverage, measured as the gross debt to total assets. Accordingly, we conclude that 
the initiators of the transaction regard the ex-ante capital structure as suboptimal 
and that the taking private will be used to align the debt to assets ratio to the 
respective corporate risk profile.  
Statistically, PTP firms‘ low profitability, measured by the return on capital 
employed, increases the probability of a PTP significantly. The explanatory 
variable should be partly correlated with the mature industry breakdown. On the 
other hand, the low profitability supports the idea of the PTP companies‘ strategic 
reorganization and operative restructuring after the taking private. The low 
EBITDA margin paints a similar picture regarding the value generation potential 
through streamlining.  
On the whole, we find no evidence of the free cash flow problem in the 
German corporate governance system. In respect of the respective PTP 
companies, the PTP phenomenon can be accounted for by a changing corporate 
life cycle status and a malfunctioning of the public capital markets. 
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Tables 4 
Table 4-1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table contains a selection of key variables for the two samples and shows that the going private sample 
contains mainly small and medium-sized companies with low growth rates in sales and number of employees. 
The free cash flow figure is lower for the going private sample, which contradicts the free cash flow hypothesis. 
ASSETS is the total assets on the balance sheet; MKTCAP the market capitalization; SALE-1 is the total sales in 
t=-1; SALE1-3 the last three sales growth values‘ geometric mean; EMPLGR-3 the growth in the number of 
employees between t=-3 and t=-2; VOLUME measures the average weekly trading volume in the calendar year 
or reference year before PTP; FCF is the free cash flow; LEVERAGE is the ratio of the gross debt / total assets; 
MKTBOOK is the ratio of the market capitalization to the equity‘s book value; PE is the price-earnings multiple; 
RETURN is return on capital employed, VARIA measures the EBIT‘s variation coefficient for the years t=-1 to 
t=-3, FREEFLOAT is defined as the percentage of shares in free float. 
  
Median Mean StandDev N Median Mean StandDev N
ASSETSa 241,560 579,121 880,835 52 218,633 451,723 724,502 90
MKTCAPa 108,500 327,011 570,311 52 84,680 274,753 732,893 90
SALE-1 324,811 917,224 1,826,795 52 245,178 570,157 819,751 90
SALE1-3 0.02 0.11 0.41 52 0.09 0.46 1.80 75
EMPLGR-3 -0.02 0.14 0.76 52 0.02 0.11 0.53 87
VOLUMEb 2,439 92,990 315,342 39 17,313 138,321 549,370 73
FCFc 0.22 0.18 0.72 51 0.28 0.12 3.96 90
LEVERAGE 0.17 0.18 0.17 52 0.26 0.27 0.20 90
MKTBOOK 1.90 2.11 5.29 52 1.35 8.53 36.50 89
PEc 8.94 21.28 61.77 51 11.35 -9.50 206.09 90
RETURN 4.23 -4.17 47.86 52 6.49 8.54 19.94 89
VARIA 0.37 2.51 14.97 52 0.42 0.46 3.71 86
FREEFLOAT 0.24 0.29 0.25 52 0.27 0.31 0.24 90
a
 in '000 EUR
b
 in shares
c
 One outlier observation eliminated in the going private sample
Going private sample Control sample
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Table 4-2 Industry Distribution of Going Private Sample 
 
This table contains an aggregated overview of the industry 
distribution of the going private sample. The companies were 
classified with the help of the FTSE global classification system and 
according to their core business and activities. The industry 
breakdown shows some similarities with the overall population 
breakdown of small and medium-sized companies in Germany, but 
focuses on mature and slow-growing industries like food production 
and household goods /textiles. 
  
Industry N Share
Chemicals 3 5.8%
Construction and materials 4 7.7%
Electronic and electric 2 3.8%
Engineering and machinery 17 32.7%
Food producers 7 13.5%
Forestry and paper 3 5.8%
Healthcare 2 3.8%
Investments and real estate 2 3.8%
IT hardware and information technology 4 7.7%
Household goods and textiles 6 11.5%
Transport and logistics 2 3.8%
Sum 52 100%
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Table 4-3 Univariate Test Statistics of Sample Breakdown between Strategic and Financial Investors 
 
The table shows the going private sample‘s univariate test statistics (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) broken 
down according to the strategic and financial investors in the PTP transaction. Financial investors‘ 
target companies seem to be larger, although the difference is not significant. The strategic sub-
sample shows slower growth rates in the year directly before the PTP. The same is true for the return 
on capital, which, statistically, is significantly lower in the strategic buyer sample. The free cash 
flow hypothesis might therefore only apply to financial buyouts, as their standardized cash flow 
figures are significantly higher. ASSETS is the total assets on the balance sheet; EQUITY the book 
value of the company‘s equity position; MKTCAP the market capitalization; SALE-1 is the total 
sales in t=-1; EMPL-1 is the number of employees in t=-1; SALGR-1 measures the growth in sales 
in t=-1; SALGR-2 is the growth in sales t=-2; SALGR-3 the growth in sales in t=-3; SALE1-2 is the 
last two sales growth values‘ geometric mean: SALE1-3 the last three sales growth values‘ 
geometric mean; EMPLGR-1 the growth in the number of employees in t=-1; EMPLGR-2 the 
growth in the number of employees in t=-2; EMPLGR-3 the growth in the number of employees in 
t=-3; VOLUME measures the average weekly trading volume in the calendar year or reference year 
before PTP; FCF is the free cash flow; CF is a cash flow proxy defined as EBITDA / Equity (book 
value); LIQUI is defined as the net working capital / total assets; TAX is the ratio of the taxes paid 
and total equity (book value); DIVY is the dividend yield; LEVERAGE is the ratio of the total debt / 
total assets; MKTBOOK is the ratio of market capitalization to the equity‘s book value; PRISALE is 
the sales multiple of the market capitalization; PE is the price-earnings multiple; MARGIN is the 
EBITDA margin; PROXYQ the Tobin‘s Q approximation; RETURN is return on capital employed, 
LIQUI is defined as the net working capital / total assets; VARIA measures the EBIT‘s variation 
coefficient for the years t=-1 to t=-3, FREEFLOAT is defined as the percentage of shares in free 
float. 
  
Difference
Median Mean StandDev Median Mean StandDev Wilcoxon
ASSETS 199,875 595,443 945,031 487,931 638,529 726,552 -1.084
EQUITY 38,702 152,253 282,792 119,295 135,935 147,129 -0.852
MKTCAP 111,200 366,584 637,891 112,000 230,134 216,314 -0.103
SALE-1 290,175 985,461 2,045,134 667,753 835,232 829,139 -1.239
EMPL-1 1,107 4,457 8,075 5,439 4,964 2,708 -1.911 *
SALGR-1 0.01 0.00 0.30 0.08 0.96 2.65 -1.679 *
SALGR-2 0.05 0.07 0.31 0.06 -0.03 0.31 0.387
SALGR-3 0.01 0.15 0.60 0.02 0.06 0.15 -0.439
SALE1-2 0.03 0.04 0.25 0.06 0.46 1.18 -1.317
SALE1-3 0.00 0.07 0.30 0.09 0.33 0.76 -1.936 *
EMPLGR-1 0.00 -0.05 0.35 0.04 0.88 2.44 -1.988
EMPLGR-2 0.00 0.18 0.73 0.02 -0.08 0.28 0.026
EMPLGR-3 0.00 0.19 0.87 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 1.368
VOL 2,348 119,112 356,697 5,501 7,243 5,905 -0.853
FCF 0.18 -3.77 24.38 0.50 0.61 0.41 -2.685 ***
CF 0.22 0.17 0.82 0.63 0.72 0.43 -2.659 ***
LIQUI 0.22 0.51 1.65 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.000
TAX 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.232
DIVY 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.164
LEVERAGE 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.15 -0.723
MKTBOOK 1.85 2.07 6.01 2.15 2.38 1.31 -1.007
PRISALE 0.39 2.02 5.12 0.20 0.29 0.23 1.782 *
PE 4.91 -310.26 2050.99 21.01 57.35 85.42 -2.195 **
MARGIN 0.06 0.05 0.45 0.10 0.09 0.04 -0.981
PROXYQ 0.77 1.13 1.27 0.60 0.64 0.37 1.420
RETURN 1.38 -8.34 53.95 8.07 8.91 4.55 -1.885 **
VARIA 0.39 3.08 17.07 0.38 0.73 0.65 -0.542
FREEFLOAT 0.29 0.33 0.26 0.17 0.19 0.19 1.511
* Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%
a
 in '000 EUR
b
 in shares
Strategic investors Financial investors
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Table 4-4 Univariate Test Statistics of entire Sample 
 
The table shows univariate test statistics (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) on the differences between the going private 
sample and the control sample. The test statistics show that the going private sample is marked by slow growth 
in total sales and number of employees. Second, the profitability and productivity, measured by the return on 
capital and EBITDA margin, are slightly lower. Statistically, there is significantly less trading in the going 
private sample‘s shares. Also the leverage, measured as gross debt to total assets, is significantly lower in respect 
of the PTP companies. We do not find evidence in favor of the free cash flow hypothesis. ASSETS is the total 
assets on the balance sheet; EQUITY the book value of the company‘s equity position; MKTCAP the market 
capitalization; SALE-1 is the total sales in t=-1; EMPL-1 is the number of employees in t=-1; SALGR-1 
measures the growth in sales in t=-1; SALGR-2 is the growth in sales t=-2; SALGR-3 the growth in sales in t=-3; 
SALE1-2 is the last two sales growth values‘ geometric mean; SALE1-3 the last three sales growth values‘ 
geometric mean; EMPLGR-1 the growth in the number of employees in t=-1; EMPLGR-2 the growth in the 
number of employees in t=-2; EMPLGR-3 the growth in the number of employees in t=-3; VOLUME measures 
the average weekly trading volume in the calendar year before PTP or reference year; FCF is the free cash flow; 
CF is a cash flow proxy defined as EBITDA / Equity (book value); LIQUI is defined as the net working capital / 
total assets; TAX is the ratio of taxes paid and the total equity (book value); DIVY is the dividend yield; 
LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt / total assets; MKTBOOK is the ratio of market capitalization to the 
equity‘s book value; PRISALE is the sales multiple of the market capitalization; PE is the price-earnings 
multiple; MARGIN is the EBITDA margin; PROXYQ the Tobin‘s Q approximation; RETURN is return on 
capital employed, LIQUI is defined as the net working capital / total assets; VARIA measures the EBIT‘s 
variation coefficient for the years t=-1 to t=-3, FREEFLOAT is defined as the percentage of shares in free float. 
  
Difference
Median Mean StandDev Median Mean StandDev Wilcoxon
SALGR-1 a 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.06 0.09 0.19 1.479
SALGR-2 a 0.03 0.04 0.24 0.10 0.08 0.28 1.503
SALGR-3 a 0.02 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.15 0.34 1.584
SALE1-2 a 0.03 0.07 0.20 0.07 0.13 0.23 1.748 *
SALE1-3 a 0.02 0.11 0.29 0.09 0.18 0.33 2.501 **
EMPLGR-1 0.00 0.12 1.07 0.00 0.06 0.38 0.959
EMPLGR-2 0.00 0.13 0.66 0.02 0.14 0.41 1.757 *
EMPLGR-3 -0.02 0.14 0.76 0.02 0.11 0.53 1.593
VOLUME b 2,439 92,990 315,342 17,313 138,321 549,370 2.849 ***
FCF 0.22 0.17 21.40 0.28 0.12 3.96 0.275
CF 0.34 0.28 0.77 0.43 1.10 4.63 1.469
LIQUI 0.25 0.45 1.46 0.09 0.60 2.65 -1.682 *
TAX 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.14 0.82 0.347
DIVY 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.32 -0.232
LEVERAGE 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.26 0.27 0.20 2.465 **
MKTBOOK 1.90 2.11 5.29 1.35 8.53 36.50 -0.838
PRISALE 0.36 1.62 4.54 0.30 1.63 3.51 -0.356
PE 8.38 -228.23 1,800.25 11.35 -9.50 206.09 0.254
MARGIN 0.08 0.06 0.40 0.09 0.13 0.17 1.630 *
PROXYQ 0.73 1.02 1.14 0.73 1.35 2.06 0.068
RETURN 4.23 -4.17 47.86 6.49 8.54 19.94 1.681 *
VARIA 0.37 2.51 14.97 0.42 0.46 3.71 0.457
FREEFLOAT 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.24 0.730
* Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%
a
 Data was winsorized on the 95% quantile
b
 in shares
Going private sample Control sample
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Table 4-5 Univariate Test Statistics of different Time Periods 
 
The table shows univariate test statistics (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) for the differences between the going 
private sample and the control sample for the periods 1996–2001 and 2002-2004. The test statistics show that, 
in the latter period, bigger companies – in terms of all size variables – opted for PTP transactions. The first 
period‘s trading volume is also significantly lower. ASSETS is the total assets on the balance sheet; EQUITY 
the book value of the company‘s equity position; MKTCAP the market capitalization; SALE-1 is total sales in 
t=-1; EMPL-1 is the number of employees in t=-1; SALGR-1 measures the growth in sales in t=-1; SALGR-2 
is the growth in sales t=-2; SALGR-3 the growth in sales in t=-3; SALE1-2 is the last two sales growth values‘ 
geometric mean: SALE1-3 the last three sales growth values‘ geometric mean; EMPLGR-1 the growth in the 
number of employees in t=-1; EMPLGR-2 the growth in the number of employees in t=-2; EMPLGR-3 the 
growth in the number of employees in t=-3; VOLUME measures the average weekly trading volume in the 
calendar year before PTP or reference year; FCF is the free cash flow; CF is a cash flow proxy defined as 
EBITDA / Equity (book value); LIQUI is defined as the net working capital / total assets; TAX is the ratio of 
taxes paid and the total equity (book value); DIVY is the dividend yield; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt / 
total assets; MKTBOOK is the ratio of market capitalization to the equity‘s book value; PRISALE is the sales 
multiple of the market capitalization; PE is the price-earnings multiple; MARGIN is the EBITDA margin; 
PROXYQ the Tobin‘s Q approximation; RETURN is return on capital employed, LIQUI is defined as the net 
working capital / total assets; VARIA measures the variation coefficient of the EBIT for the years t=-1 to t=-3, 
FREEFLOAT is defined as the percentage of shares in the free float. 
Difference
Median Mean StandDev Median Mean StandDev Wilcoxon
ASSETS 
a
213,551 379,696 473,496 320,419 851,065 1,200,150 -1.648 *
EQUITY 
a
32,703 109,417 215,937 89,787 191,861 298,944 -2.074 **
MKTCAP 
a
50,270 221,120 445,954 250,570 471,408 690,945 -2.352 **
SALE-1 
a
290,175 627,227 1,014,908 419,704 1,312,674 2,529,462 -0.815
EMPL-1 1,512 2,563 2,778 2,979 6,864 10,166 -1.473
SALGR-1 0.04 0.31 1.48 0.00 -0.03 0.24 1.093
SALGR-2 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.09 0.12 0.27 -1.278
SALGR-3 -0.03 0.06 0.27 0.07 0.22 0.76 -1.723 *
SALE1-2 0.03 0.15 0.70 0.06 0.05 0.15 -0.407
SALE1-3 0.01 0.12 0.49 0.04 0.10 0.28 -0.704
EMPLGR-1 0.00 0.19 1.41 0.00 0.01 0.17 -0.278
EMPLGR-2 0.00 0.07 0.52 0.02 0.21 0.81 -0.537
EMPLGR-3 -0.02 0.01 0.16 0.00 0.32 1.15 -0.861
VOLUME 
b
2,257 7,565 12,247 5,208 159,000 411,525 -0.991
FCF 0.26 0.30 0.76 0.09 -7.00 32.85 2.334 **
CF 0.35 0.39 0.79 0.24 0.14 0.74 1.241
LIQUI 0.19 0.58 1.89 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.037
TAX 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.593
DIVY 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 -1.570
LEVERAGE 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.19 -0.037
MKTBOOK 1.64 2.49 3.97 2.16 1.60 6.76 -0.871
PRISALE 0.25 1.06 3.35 0.41 2.39 5.78 -2.000 **
PE 9.85 -402.45 2371.73 3.60 9.35 17.74 0.963
MARGIN 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.59 -0.463
PROXYQ 0.64 0.87 0.65 0.81 1.22 1.59 -1.111
RETURN 4.23 -6.78 60.84 2.47 -0.61 20.73 0.871
VARIA 0.44 0.17 2.53 0.35 5.70 22.73 -0.426
FREEFLOAT 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.27 0.33 0.28 -0.871
* Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%
a
 in '000 EUR
b
 in shares
1996 - 2001 2002 - 2004
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Table 4-6 Results and Diagnostics for Alternative Specifications of the Logit Model 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hypothesis dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx
(se) (se) (se) (se)
LIQUI H1 -0.194 ** -0.052 -0.241 ** -0.206 **
(0.091) (0.035) -(0.703) (0.089)
FCF H1 0.035 0.048 0.015
(0.026) (0.040) (0.166)
PROXYQ H1 0.017
(0.061)
LEVERAGE H2 -1.070 ** -1.112 *** -0.969 *** -1.126 ***
(0.364) (0.305) (0.325) (0.342)
FREEFLOAT H3 0.148 -0.027 0.186
(0.169) (0.192) (0.177)
SALE1-3 H4 -0.055 -0.175 -0.121 -0.039
(0.165) (0.161) (0.156) (0.174)
RETURN H4 -0.007 * -0.008 ** -0.005 * -0.007 *
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
MARGIN H4 -0.609 -0.520 -0.613 * -0.672
(0.406) (0.426) (0.400) (0.438)
MKTBOOK H5 -0.028 *** -0.020 ** -0.022 ** -0.023 ***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
VOLUME H5 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 *
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OUTLIER -0.156 0.342 * -0.167 **
(0.080) (0.078) (0.085)
DIVY H6 -0.065 -1.228 -0.007
(0.736) (0.938) (0.769)
CONSTANT 2.665 * 1.765 ** 2.835 ** 2.382 **
(0.910) (0.605) (0.898) (0.876)
N 101 125 101 101
Pseudo-R 2 0.064 0.058 0.104 0.050
Chi 2 32.55 29.76 33.92 30.72
Prob 0.0006 0.0005 0.0001 0.0012
* Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%
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The table shows Logit maximum-likelihood estimation of the determinants of a going private decision. The 
dependent variable equals ―1‖ for PTP companies and ―0‖ for the matched control sample. In the first model, a 
lower leverage, poorer valuation in terms of market-to-book ratio, an inferior return on capital, and a lower 
liquidity position have a positive effect on the PTP probability. Also the weekly trading volume is significant 
with the right sign, although the marginal effect is minimal. Excluding the trading volume in the second model 
specification increases the number of observations and shows the robustness of the results. The third model is 
estimated without explanatory variables, which proved insignificant in the univariate analysis. This helps to 
improve the overall goodness-of-fit of the logit model, but does not lead to different results. The fourth model 
specification includes the Tobin‘s Q measure instead of the Free Cash Flow variable. This does not change our 
conclusions either. LIQUI is defined as the net working capital / total assets; FCF is the free cash flow; 
PROXYQ the Tobin‘s Q approximation; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt / total assets; FREEFLOAT is 
defined as the percentage of shares in the free float; SALE1-3 is the last three sales growth values‘ geometric 
mean; RETURN is the return on capital employed, MARGIN is the EBITDA margin; MKTBOOK is the ratio of 
market capitalization to the equity‘s book value; VOLUME measures the average weekly trading volume in the 
calendar year before PTP or reference year; OUTLIER is a dummy variable for outliers by means of Cook‘s 
distance statistic; DIVY is the dividend yield. Coefficients are reported as marginal effects for all continuous 
variables, as a discrete change of the OUTLIER dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The Pseudo-R
2
 reported is the McFadden (1973) measure. The asymptotic Chi
2
-Wald statistic tests 
the hypothesis that all parameters in the model are simultaneously equal to zero. Prob denotes the significance 
level of the Chi
2
 statistic. 
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Table 4-7 Overview of Findings 
 
The table shows the observed relationship between the individual hypotheses derived from the literature and the 
probability of a PTP, the observed relationship in the univariate and multivariate tests, and the final decision 
regarding the validity of the hypothesis. 
 
  
Hypothesis Assumed relationship
Observed relationship - 
univariant
Observed relationship - 
multivariate
Decision on 
hypothesis
H1: Free cash flow positive insignificant insignificant reject
H2: Leverage potential negative negative negative accept
H3: Ownership concentration negative insignificant insignificant reject
H4: Decreasing benefits of a stock market quotation negative negative negative accept
H5: Limited capital market efficiency negative negative negative accept
H6: Dividend payments: positive insignificant insignificant reject
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Figures 4 
Figure 4-1 The PTP Transactions of over time (closing year or announcement year) 
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Appendix 4 
Appendix 4-1  Description of Variables 
 
 
  
Name of Variable Definition
Cash flow (CF) EBITDA / Equity (Book Value)
Dividend yield (DIVY) Dividend per share*100 / Share price at fiscal year end
EBITDA margin (MARGIN) EBITDA / Sales
Employee growth (EMPLGR-1, EMPLGR-2, EMPLGR-3)Employee growth figures in FY t-1, t-2 and t-3
Employees (EMPL-1) Average number of employees
Equity (EQUITY) Book value of equity
Free cash flow (FCF) (EBITDA - Net tax expense - Dividends paid) / Equity (Book Value)
Free float (FREEFLOAT) Free float of shares outstanding in %
Leverage (LEVERAGE) Total debt / Total assets
Liquidity (LIQUI) Net working capital / Total Assets
Market capitalization (MKTCAP) Number of outstanding shares * share price at fiscal year end
Market to Book ratio (MKTBOOK) Market capitalization / Equity (Book Value)
Mean of sales growth (SALE1-2, SALE1-3) Geometric mean of last two or three sales growth figures
Payout ratio (DIVQ) Dividends paid / Net income
Return on capital employed (RETURN) Net income / ( Equity incl. Minorities + total net debt + provisions)
Sales (SALE-1) Total sales 
Sales growth (SALEGR-1, SALEGR-2, SALEGR-3) Sales growth figures in FY t-1, t-2 and t-3
Sales multiple (PRISALE) Market capitalization / Sales
Taxes paid (TAX) Taxed paid / Equity (book value) 
Tobin's Q (PROXYQ) (Market Capitalization + Debt) / Total Assets
Total assets (ASSETS) Book value of total assets
Trading volume (VOLUME) Average weekly trading volume in the calendar year before PTP or reference year
Variance in EBIT (VARIA) Standard deviation of EBIT (t-1 to t-3) / Mean of EBIT (t-1 to t-3)
Note: If not otherwise stated, figures are as of the financial year before the PTP (FY t=-1) or the the control sample's reference year
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Appendix 4-2  Overview of Hypotheses and Operationalization 
 
The table shows the different hypotheses derived from the literature, the 
operationalization of the individual hypotheses through a set of variables and the 
assumed relationship between the value of the variables and the PTP probability.  
  
Hypothesis Variables
Assumed relationship 
to PTP probability
FCF
CF
LIQUI
TOBIN'S Q
LEVERAGE
VARIA
TAX
FREEFLOAT
HOLDER
SALE-1
ASSETS
EQUITY
MKTCAP
EMPL-1
MARGIN
RETURN
SALEGR-1 to -3
SALE1-2, SALE1-3
EMPLGR -1 to -3
VOLUME
MKTBOOK
PRISALE
PE
DIVY positive
H4: Decreasing benefits of 
a stock market quotation
H6: Dividend payments
H1: Free cash flow
H2: Leverage potential
H3: Ownership concentration
H5: Limited capital market efficiency
negative
positive
negative
positive
negative
negative
“Privacy please!” - The Public to Private Decision in Germany 129 
 
Appendix 4-3  Investor Breakdown of Going Private Sample 
 
The table shows the going private sample‘s descriptive statistics according to the type of investor in the 
PTP transaction. While the size of owner buyouts and strategic buys differs only marginally, financial 
investors‘ median target company is considerably larger in terms of all size variables. ASSETS is the total 
assets on the balance sheet; EQUITY the book value of the company‘s equity position; MKTCAP the 
market capitalization; SALE-1 is total sales in t=-1; EMPL-1 is the number of employees in t=-1; 
SALGR-1 measures the growth in sales in t=-1; SALGR-2 is the growth in sales t=-2; SALGR-3 the 
growth in sales in t=-3; SALE1-2 is the geometric mean of the last two sales growth values: SALE1-3 the 
last three sales growth values‘ geometric mean; EMPLGR-1 the growth in the number of employees in t=-
1; EMPLGR-2 the growth in the number of employees in t=-2; EMPLGR-3 the growth in the number of 
employees in t=-3; VOLUME measures the average weekly trading volume in the calendar year before 
PTP or reference year; FCF is the free cash flow; CF is a cash flow proxy defined as EBITDA / Equity 
(book value); TAX is the ratio of the taxes paid and total equity (book value); DIVY is the dividend yield; 
LEVERAGE is the ratio of the total debt / total assets; MKTBOOK is the ratio of the market 
capitalization to the equity‘s book value; PRISALE is the sales multiple of the market capitalization; PE 
is the price/earnings multiple; MARGIN is the EBITDA margin; PROXYQ the Tobin‘s Q approximation; 
RETURN is return on capital employed, LIQUI is defined as the net working capital / total assets; VARIA 
measures the EBIT‘s variation coefficient for the years t=-1 to t=-3, FREEFLOAT is defined as the 
percentage of shares in free float. 
Median Mean StandDev N Median Mean StandDev N Median Mean StandDev N
ASSETS 
a
199,875 595,443 945,031 40 487,931 638,529 726,552 9 203,939 183,267 42,487 3
EQUITY 
a
38,702 152,253 282,792 40 119,295 135,935 147,129 9 68,279 63,301 12,799 3
MKTCAP 
a
111,200 366,584 637,891 40 112,000 230,134 216,314 9 36,460 90,003 119,812 3
SALE-1 
a
290,175 985,461 2,045,134 40 667,753 835,232 829,139 9 261,436 253,361 59,798 3
EMPL-1 1,107 4,457 8,075 40 5,439 4,964 2,708 9 2,057 1,647 807 3
SALGR-1 0.01 0.00 0.30 40 0.08 0.96 2.65 9 0.00 0.03 0.06 3
SALGR-2 0.05 0.07 0.31 40 0.06 -0.03 0.31 9 -0.02 0.02 0.09 3
SALGR-3 0.01 0.15 0.60 40 0.02 0.06 0.15 9 0.03 0.05 0.12 3
SALE1-2 0.03 0.04 0.25 40 0.06 0.46 1.18 9 0.04 0.03 0.04 3
SALE1-3 0.00 0.07 0.30 40 0.09 0.33 0.76 9 0.05 0.03 0.06 3
EMPLGR-1 0.00 -0.05 0.35 40 0.04 0.88 2.44 9 0.00 0.01 0.06 3
EMPLGR-2 0.00 0.18 0.73 40 0.02 -0.08 0.28 9 -0.06 -0.04 0.05 3
EMPLGR-3 0.00 0.19 0.87 40 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 9 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 3
VOLUME 
b
2,348 119,112 356,697 30 5,501 7,243 5,905 7 1,271 1,271 244 2
FCF 0.18 -3.77 24.38 40 0.50 0.61 0.41 9 0.25 0.16 0.52 3
CF 0.22 0.17 0.82 40 0.63 0.72 0.43 9 0.45 0.49 0.14 3
LIQUI 0.22 0.51 1.65 40 0.27 0.23 0.23 9 0.19 0.23 0.11 3
TAX 0.03 0.04 0.13 40 0.02 0.04 0.08 9 0.07 0.06 0.06 3
DIVY 0.01 0.02 0.02 40 0.00 0.02 0.03 9 0.06 0.09 0.07 3
LEVERAGE 0.12 0.17 0.18 40 0.22 0.20 0.15 9 0.23 0.26 0.06 3
MKTBOOK 1.85 2.07 6.01 40 2.15 2.38 1.31 9 1.24 1.85 1.10 3
PRISALE 0.39 2.02 5.12 40 0.20 0.29 0.23 9 0.14 0.30 0.38 3
PE 4.91 -310.26 2050.99 40 21.01 57.35 85.42 9 9.31 8.76 8.01 3
MARGIN 0.06 0.05 0.45 40 0.10 0.09 0.04 9 0.11 0.12 0.04 3
PROXYQ 0.77 1.13 1.27 40 0.60 0.64 0.37 9 0.50 0.70 0.57 3
RETURN 1.38 -8.34 53.95 40 8.07 8.91 4.55 9 11.73 12.14 7.99 3
LIQUI 0.22 0.51 1.65 40 0.27 0.23 0.23 9 0.19 0.23 0.11 3
VARIA 0.39 3.08 17.07 40 0.38 0.73 0.65 9 0.22 0.26 0.14 3
FREEFLOAT 0.29 0.33 0.26 40 0.17 0.19 0.19 9 0.03 0.07 0.07 3
* Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%
a
 in '000 EUR
b
 in shares
Strategic investors Financial investors Owner Buyout
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Appendix 4-4  Details of the Going Private Sample 
 
No. Target company Investor Type Announcement Delisting
1 A. Friedr. Flender Citicorp. Venture Capital Finan. investor 20-Oct-00 12-Mar-01
2 Aesculap B. Braun Melsungen Strateg. investor 01-Mar-96 17-Mar-97
3 Allw eiler Constellation Verw altungs GmbH & Co. Strateg. investor 2002 14-Oct-03
Gesellschaft des Bundes für
Industriepolitische Maßnahmen
5 Barmag W. Schlafhorst AG & Co. Strateg. investor 2002 15-Aug-03
BBG-Beteiligungs AG
(ehemals Frankfurter Bankgesellschaft)
7 Brauerei Cluss Dinkelacker AG Strateg. investor 12-Nov-98 19-Mar-00
8 CAA AG Harman Becker Automotive Systems Strateg. investor 05-Sep-02 10-Oct-02
9 Campina (Suedmilch AG) Campina Malkunie BV Strateg. investor 1999 14-Apr-00
10 Computer 2000 Tech Data Germany AG Strateg. investor 26-Feb-99 16-Jul-99
11 Concept! OgilvyOne w orldw ide GmbH & Co. KG (WPP Group) Strateg. investor 28-May-02 16-Oct-02
12 Duew ag Siemens Strateg. investor 1999 01-Aug-03
13 Edscha Carlyle Group Finan. investor 2003 29-Jan-04
14 Ezw o Computervertriebs AG - Strateg. investor 1998 10-Jan-01
15 FAG Kugelf ischer Ina Holding Schaeffler KG Strateg. investor 30-Oct-02 18-Dec-03
FPB Holding
(Feldmuehle Nobel AG) 2000
17 Friedrich Grohe BC Partners Finan. investor 21-Jun-99 30-Mar-01
18 GAH Anlagentechnik GAH Beteiligungs AG (Tochter Dt. Beteiligungs AG) Finan. investor 01-Nov-98 13-Nov-98
19 Gardena Industri Kapital Finan. investor 12-Sep-02 16-Jan-03
20 Gerresheimer Glas Investcorp / JPMorgan Finan. investor 13-May-03 06-Jun-03
21 Gestra Foxboro Eckardt GmbH Strateg. investor 08-Mar-97 28-Jul-97
HGV (Hamburger Gesellschaft für
Vermögens- u. Beteiligungsverw altung)
23 Honsel Carlyle Finan. investor 1999 27-Oct-99
24 Kamps Barilla Strateg. investor 25-Jun-05 09-Apr-04
25 Kiekert Permira Finan. investor 25-Apr-02 15-Jul-02
26 KM Europa Metall Finmetall Investitions GmbH & Co. KG Strateg. investor 1999 01-Mar-01
27 Koepp Dt. Vita Polymere GmbH Strateg. investor 15-Jul-00 30-Jun-00
28 Lambda Physik Coherent Holding GmbH Strateg. investor 06-May-04 25-Jan-05
29 Macrotron Ingram Micro. Inc. Strateg. investor 30-May-99 28-Jan-03
30 Michael Weinig AG Weinig International AG Ow ner buyout 16-Jul-02 21-Oct-02
MONACHIA Grundstücks- Bayerische Städte- und Wohnungsbau GmbH
Aktiengesellschaft (Doblinger Group)
32 MTD Products (Gutbrod AG) MTD Products Inc. Strateg. investor 1997 13-Jun-97
33 Muehle Rueningen Werhan Muehlen KG Strateg. investor 2000 03-Jan-01
34 MVS Miete Vertrieb Service AG Cottbuser Maschinen- und Stahlbau GmbH Strateg. investor 15-Oct-04 27-Dec-04
35 Otavi Minen Silver & Baryte Ores Mining Co. S. A. Strateg. investor 2000 04-Sep-02
36 Pfersee-Kolbermoor Wissner Dienstl. GmbH Plauen & Co. KG Strateg. investor 05-Sep-96 17-Feb-97
37 Radeberger Dr. August Oetker KG Strateg. investor 18-Aug-03 13-Aug-04
38 Revell Revell-Monogram Inc. Strateg. investor 1996 12-Jul-96
39 Rolf Benz LoCom GmbH Strateg. investor 25-May-00 13-Oct-00
40 Rütgers RAG AG Strateg. investor 2003 16-Jul-03
41 SAI Automotive AG Faurecia S.A Strateg. investor 04-Oct-02 12-Jul-04
42 Schaerf Samas Management buy. 01-Oct-99 03-Apr-01
43 Schleicher & Co. International AG Martin Yale Industries Inc.(Escalade Group) Strateg. investor 05-May-03 22-Oct-03
44 Schmalbach-Lubeca Allianz Capital Partners Finan. investor 2002 19-Nov-02
45 SG Holding AG Emil-Frey-Gruppe Strateg. investor 2001 29-Nov-01
46 Steinbeis Temming Steinbeis Temming GmbH & Co.KG Ow ner buyout 2001 31-Dec-03
47 Stinnes Deutsche Bahn AG Strateg. investor 2003 12-May-03
48 Stixi Vogeley Lebensmittelw erk GmbH Strateg. investor 18-Dec-98 01-Jul-99
49 Systematics electronic Data Systems Corp Strateg. investor 2001 17-Oct-02
50 Wayss & Freytag Beton Groep Strateg. investor 1999 03-Jan-00
51 Wickrather Bauelemente Bow ater Window s Limited Strateg. investor 2000 30-Mar-01
52 Zanders Feinpapiere Metsä-Serla Strateg. investor 2001 09-Aug-02
ATB Antriebstechnick Strateg. investor 1999
16 Stora Enso Strateg. investor
16-Oct-02
6 Rudolf August Oetker Strateg. investor 24-Apr-02 29-Aug-02
4
31 Strateg. investor 08-Feb-02 08-Aug-02
22-Oct-01
22 Hamburger Hochbahn Ow ner buyout 04-Jul-03 28-Oct-03
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5 Summary 
(1) Even though it is now more than 50 years since Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
formulated their irrelevance theorem, capital structure research is still a key 
cornerstone of corporate financial theory. It encompasses, among other topics, 
the search for the optimal balance between debt and equity, the adjustment 
behavior of firms after experiencing shocks to their capital structure, the timing 
of equity issues by managers, and the choice between public and private equity 
financing. However, the empirical evidence that is provided in the literature 
seems partly contradictory, and alternative theories do not explain observed 
leverage ratios satisfactorily. 
 
(2) The list of possible variables that are likely to affect capital structure choices 
was reduced to the following ―core‖ determinants: growth, size, tangibility, 
profitability, industry median debt ratios, and expected inflation. Against the 
background of the rising importance of debt capital markets for corporate 
financing and its interconnection with issuer ratings by external rating 
agencies, capital structure decisions are likely to also be influenced by credit 
ratings. 
 
(3) Different rating levels are associated with discrete costs (benefits) for the firm: 
Rating changes may cause alterations to the coupon rate, put rights for 
investors, loss of access to the commercial paper market, or loss of a contract. 
Regulatory costs of bond investments by banks, insurance companies, and 
funds are mainly based on and driven by the respective rating of the security. 
As credit ratings serve as the main source of information on firm quality, a 
rating change will inevitably result in discrete changes in a firm‘s cost of 
capital. Managers take the credit ratings into account when they consider 
capital structure because of these direct and indirect costs for the firm. 
 
(4) The credit rating-capital structure hypothesis is consistent with both the trade-
off and the pecking order theory. In terms of the former, the rating-dependent 
costs and benefits are balanced against the traditional costs and benefits 
proposed by the trade-off theory. If the costs (benefits) of different rating levels 
are material, capital structure choices may deviate from behavior implied by 
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the trade-off theory. Regarding the pecking order theory, the relative advantage 
of debt over equity financing, in terms of asymmetric information costs, may 
shift if the firm is near an upgrade or downgrade of the corporate rating. In 
other words, the costs (benefits) associated with credit ratings and therefore 
with a manager‘s rating concerns are most material if a firm is near a rating 
change. Accordingly, the primary testable hypothesis that I considered in this 
study is that firms that are close to an upgrade or downgrade of the issuer 
rating prefer equity to debt financing, or issue less net debt relative to net 
equity, than firms that are not close to a rating change.  
 
(5) The rating outlook and the watchlisting present appealing proxies for 
measuring the imminence and likelihood of a rating change. Both measures 
provide more accurate information regarding the future development of a credit 
rating than previous proxies described in the literature. 
 
(6) The study shows that firms near a rating change, measured by a positive or 
negative rating outlook, issue 1.8 percent less net debt relative to equity (as a 
percentage of total assets) than firms that are not near a rating change. The 
credit rating effect is even economically larger if the credit rating is about to be 
lowered (-2.1 percent). The measured impact of credit ratings on capital 
structure decisions is stronger and robust to the inclusion of large debt and 
equity offerings that those described in previous studies. 
 
(7) We find that the credit rating effect is more pronounced for US firms. Positive 
outlook firms in the US reduce net debt issuance (relative to net equity) by -1.7 
percent; negative outlook firms measure a reduction of -3.6 percent. The 
negative and statistically significant coefficient of positive outlook firms 
underlines that the measured credit rating effect bears no relation on any 
distress arguments. Descriptive statistics show that positive outlook firms have, 
on average, better credit quality and should, in terms of a distress rationale, 
issue more net debt. These results show the contrary. Moreover, we find that 
EMEA firms are not subject to a direct credit rating effect. Credit ratings 
matter only if large debt and equity offerings are excluded from the analysis. 
However, the impact of credit ratings on net debt issuance is then comparable 
to the results of the US sample. 
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(8) Although S&P‘s watchlisting is a stronger and more short-term indication of 
credit rating changes, the credit watch dummy variables have no statistically 
significant influence on capital structure decisions. The watchlists‘ very short 
timeframe makes the measurement on a 12-month basis rather noisy.  
 
(9) Potential changes in broad rating categories (e.g., AA or A) have a comparable 
economic effect on net debt (relative to net equity) issuance in the year that 
follows. However, the relationship is only statistically significant if the firm is 
near a downgrade of a broad rating category (-1.8 percent less net debt relative 
to net equity).  
 
(10) We find that the borderline between investment and non-investment-grade 
becomes incrementally more important in managers‘ capital structure choices. 
The possibility of losing or obtaining an investment-grade rating has a 
statistically significant influence on the proportion of net debt to net equity 
issuance. 
 
(11) Multivariate analysis by rating categories indicates that rating levels that are 
crucial for gaining access to the US commercial paper market are also 
invaluable for subsequent net debt (relative to net equity) issuance.  
 
(12) Rating considerations play a central role in a firm‘s decision to conduct a 
seasoned equity offering. We find that the probability of an equity issue is 
positively (negatively) related to a negative (positive) prior rating outlook. 
However, only the positive outlook‘s influence (-1.7 percent) is statistically 
significant in a multivariate analysis. This credit rating effect is economically 
even stronger than an alternative market timing explanation of seasoned equity 
offerings, measured by the market-to-book ratio (0.09 percent).  
 
(13) Descriptive statistics indicate that debt and equity offerings of rated firms are 
often paired, which makes it difficult to draw clear distinctions between the 
underlying motives. Accordingly, the negative outlook‘s estimated marginal 
effect of 1.1 percent is only statistically significant if dual issues (cases of 
seasoned equity and debt offerings in the same fiscal year) are excluded from 
the sample. 
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(14) The importance of credit ratings in managers‘ capital structure choice is more 
pronounced when the decision to issue equity is contrasted by the alternative of 
debt issuance. We find that the likelihood of equity issuance (rather than debt) 
increases (decreases) by 3.3 (6.1) percent if the issuer credit rating has a 
negative (positive) outlook prior to the offering. This further supports that the 
direct rating effect has a significant impact on capital structure decision 
making.  
 
(15) Deviations from credit rating induced target leverage may be offset by debt and 
equity issuance as well as reductions (repurchases). The results of a 
multinomial logistic model suggest that a negative outlook decreases the 
likelihood of a debt issuance (against a no-transaction alternative), while it 
increases the probability of a debt reduction. A positive outlook, however, has 
a statistically significant negative marginal effect on the likelihood of an equity 
issue. All in all, firms adjust their leverage ratio to the respective rating 
situation mainly by increasing or reducing their debt position. 
 
(16) We find evidence of both market timing and credit rating concerns in our 
investigation of the composition of seasoned equity offerings. A prior negative 
rating outlook increases total offering proceeds (scaled by total assets) by 2.1 
percent. There is no credit rating effect in primary proceeds (equity sale of 
insiders), as fresh equity is needed to bolster credit ratios. The market timing 
effect on total offering proceeds, measured by the market-to-book ratio, is 
comparatively stronger with 4.8 percent. A more thorough analysis shows that 
managers‘ market timing efforts are based on a lower number of shares 
offered, but at higher prices. We find that a negative outlook is associated with 
more shares offered, at lower prices. However, only the former relationship is 
statistically significant.  
 
(17) The trade-off theory helps to explain German public-to-private transactions 
very well. The results show that German PTP firms emerge from relatively 
mature industries and are marked by low growth rates and less profitability. 
Moreover, we find that the going private companies have statistically 
significant lower leverage ratios before the transaction than the control group. 
This is completely in line with the trade-off theory, which posits higher debt 
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ratios for mature, cash-cow businesses with few profitable investment 
opportunities. 
 
(18) We do not find a notable discrepancy between managers and shareholders‘ 
interest in the form of a large amount of financial slack in the going private 
firms (free cash flow theory). This suggests that German companies are not 
taken private to disgorge excess cash to the new shareholders. This 
phenomenon is likely to be restricted to the US equity market in the 1980s. 
 
(19) The low trading volume of going private companies‘ shares is another central 
characteristic of German PTPs. We observed that there was no price setting 
before a transaction for several consecutive weeks. The reduced liquidity and 
therefore public capital markets‘ malfunctioning has adverse effects on the 
companies‘ valuation and increases the likelihood of a firm to go private. 
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